Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 14)
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- Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 14)
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The Uprising’ S Impact
on Israeli Security
This is the third and concluding part of the study on Israeli security and the intifada which we began in pre-
ceding issues of Democratic Palestine. We call attention to the fact that this study was made on the basis of
information available to us as of last autumn. However, we stand by our conclusions with one exception: In
this study we tended to downplay the possibility of massive Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel, whereas this
has since become a major danger facing the Palestinian cause.
From failure to end the uprising militarily, and the resulting
demoralization and loss of stature of the army, stem all the other
questions about Isracli security, pertaining to settlements,
international relations, demography, relations to the Palesti-
nians in the Zionist state itself, economic considerations, etc..,
which we will address below.
Settlements - A provocation
Our examination of settlements in the first part of this study
showed that their role in security is ambiguous; they are more
related to the drive for control of the land than to defense needs.
The uprising, and the international push for a political solution
that accompanied it, led part of the Zionist leadership to clarify
their position, as when Rabin said on Israeli radio, May 2nd,
that settlements don’t necessarily contribute to security with the
exception of those in the North, Golan Heights, Jordan Valley
and Arava, but that they do symbolize the «return to Zion.»
However, the overriding phenomenon is polarization on the
role of settlements, which parallels the controversy concerning
territorial compromise.
Those who continue to oppose any withdrawal also maintain
that settlements have a security role. Shamir and Sharon are the
most outspoken proponents of this line. In an interview printed
in the Washington Report, September 1989, Sharon said that the
following in answer to a question about self-rule for the Palesti-
nians:«...people must understand, the settlements are not an
obstacle to peace. On the contrary, the settlements are a very
important factor in our security. Once we manage to accomplish
our plan, the possibility of granting that autonomy becomes
wider». Here it is obvious that security is doublespeak for
demographic and military control that would preempt any con-
cessions to the Palestinians. On May 7th, Arens stated that the
settlers are the main obstacle to a Palestinian state.
If such statements are often rhetorical, let us look at what the
Israeli government has actually done concerning settlements, as
an indication of the importance attached to them. In the first
year of the uprising, two new settlements were established in the
West Bank, and the year ended with the Labor-Likud coalition
agreement - a compromise - to create cight more settlements
within a year. In 1989, at least two new settlements have been
12
established, while the settler compound in Al Khalil (Hebron)
was expanded. Throughout the period, the Housing Ministry
has pushed for building new houses in existing settlements.
While this is clearly a drop compared to previous years, we can-
not attribute it solely to the impact of the uprising, for settle-
ment-building had already slowed in the mid-eighties due to
economic constraints. This summer there was extensive land
confiscation in areas of the West Bank for expanding scttle-
ments, and roads to settlements and military outposts, while the
government was reported to have a new plan for expanding set-
tlementsin Jerusalem.
Ironically, the intifada has actually spurred an attempt to
revive the settlement boom begun by Begin’s government in
1977. An article in Haaretz, September 1,1989, was entitled: «De-
spite the intifada. Also because of it.» It reported that the
number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip grew
by 10.3% in 1988; aslightly higher increase is expected this year;
and more families have applied for places in settlements than
could be accomodated. This increase is much less than in earlier
years; still it is noteworthy because of its political connotations.
As explained by one of the newsettlers:«I’m very fearful, but we
came to settle here despite the intifada. The intifada has
strengthened our feelings that we have to show the Arabs we
aren’t afraid of them.» Another family quoted in the article had
moved from Hadera (Israel), because Palestinian Arabs had
begun moving into their neighborhood. In the West Bank. they
Correction
In the first installment of this study, there was a mistake in the
last half of the middle paragraph on page 20. second column.
Here we print the sentence as it should read:
A report from Tel Aviv University Strategic Studies Center
referred to a poll which showed that Israch public opinion was
becoming more hard-line on short-term issues (increased sup-
port to repression vs. the intifada), even while becoming more
realistic concerming a long-term solution (those who accept a
Palestinian state rose to 25% . compared to 20% al the onset of
the intifada).
Democratic Palestine, February 1990 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 37
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