Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 16)
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- Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 16)
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Forswear annexation. Stop settlement activity. Allow the
schools to reopen.»
However, the Zionist leadership will not begin to translate
criticism into rethinking of how to guarantee Israeli security in
new ways, unless its allies pressure it into doing so. With the
reception given the Shamir plan - outright US support and a
relative slowdown of European diplomacy - It seems that
Isracl’s allies are not yet prepared to pressure it to do what they
think would be logical in the given situation.
A good gage of the US position is found in «Building for
Peace: An American Strategy in the Middle East,» prepared by
the Washington Institute’s Presidential Study Group on US pol-
icy, chaired by Lawrence Eagleburger and Walter Mondale.
This report was completed before the PLO launched its peace
initiative in November 1988, but there is little indication that the
Bush Administration has departed from its basic premises,
despite changing events. A quote from this study explains the
US failure to pressure Israel on any basic issue so far: «The inter-
communal conflict between Palestinians and Israelis manifest in
the uprising, has now become a chronic problem, rendering
peacemaking more urgent and more difficult. Israel feels now it
can take fewer risks for peace; the Palestinians seem to believe
they can achieve more than is possible or, from the US view-
point, desirable; and Jordan appears to have retreated to the
sidelines. The interstate conflict between the Arab states and
Isracl now threatens to become increasingly dangerous and vol-
atile... Another ambitious American plan for solving the Pales-
tinian problem is not only likely to fail but will also be counter-
productive...The first task of diplomacy is to lay the foundation
upon which negotiations can be built.»
One concrete proposal of the report has_ been
implemented:«strengthening Isracl’s deterrent by advancing
strategic cooperation.» In April 1988, the US and Israel signed
yet another memorandum of agreement for political, security
and economic cooperation, including development of the
Arrow missile, and the Marines training on the ground in Israel
(Israel radio, July 21, 1988). Strategic cooperation is being
further advanced with the current US proposal to preposition
$100 million worth of military equipment in Israel, suitable for
both armies, which Israel could draw on according to a pay-as-
you-use agreement. (In return, Israel is requested not to oppose
US tank sales to Saudi Arabia. )
Unprecedented US criticism of Israeli practices in the
occupied territories, and the fact that influential legislators put
questions to US aid to Israel in the future, initially led to
optimism in some circles that the US might pressure Israel on
meaningful issues. However, ensuing developments show that
while the uprising has raised questions as never before, it will
have to be even more prolonged and radical before the pro-
jected separation could be created between Isracl and its main
financier, to the extent of enforcing Palestinian rights. In a
paper entitled «Political Implications of the Uprising,» Rashid
Khalidi noted:«In spite of the opening of contacts with the PLO,
the isolation of the United States has increased as a result of the
uprising. I would strongly argue, however, that there is still no
14
SRAMIRS CAMMANDMENT
THE BuRNING BUSH
crisis for American policy makers. Until there is one - whether
it’s a crisis on the ground or some crisis in the domestic situation
here or in Israel - I think the United States and Israel can hold
out in splendid isolation indefinitely «(A merican-Arab Affairs,
Winter 1988-89). This is, of course to a great extent the case due
to the absence of a satisfactory response to the uprising in the
Arab world, whether from the regimes or the national liberation
movement.
If this situation continues, US policy can shelter Israel, giving
it time to resolve its internal contradictions about the questions
of withdrawal and a political settlement. Abba Eban expressed
this in a commentary which appeared in the Washington Post,
July 24, 1989): «The only thread that now separates the Isracli-
Palestinian area from early explosion is the fact that the United
States is in a simultaneous discourse with all the parties. Ending
the Amcrican-Palestinian dialogue now would lead to despair of
peace, escalation of violence and the growth of extremism on
both sides of the conflict. It would be injurious to Israeli
interests for the United States to withdraw its restraining pre-
sence from this area.»
One can conclude that the guarantees of security which Israel
receives from its main allics have not as yet been decisively
affected, though this might happen in the future as the intifada
continues. In evaluating how Israel may react to potential US
pressure in the future, it is useful to refer to a book published in
New York, 1987, in cooperation with the Hebrew University:
Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East. The
author, Yaacov Bar Siman Tov, lists cight counterstrategics
used by Israel in the past to offset US pressure: self-retraint;
swift military offensive before a ceasefire is imposed; escalation
to provoke confrontation with the Soviet Union and force a US
response; bargaining; penetration of the domestic system of its
US patron; blackmail by weakness; threatening regional insta-
bility; and military confrontation with the Soviet Union.
Reviewing this book in the Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter
1989, Michael Collins Dunn remarked that these coun-
terstrategies «would appear to be singularly ineffective in deal-
ing with the US on the issue of the intifada.»
The enemy within/demography/transfer
If Israel does not appear to be threatened in terms of its
rcliance on international aid for security and well-being, the
Democratic Palestine, February 1990
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