Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 18)
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- Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 18)
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allowing the police to search for and confiscate said materials or
funds on suspicion alone. Justice Minister Meridor said on
Israeli radio, May 24th, that the government intro<tuced the bill
because the PLO is channeling money to Palestinians in Isracl,
as well as to the 1967 occupied territories, in «an attempt to
create an economic framework...to destroy the foundations of
the building we call the State of Israel.»
Mansour Kardoush, director of the Nazareth-based mnuman
Rights Society, believes that the law aims to shut dc..u the
nearly 80 Palestinian socicties providing socia’ and cultural ser-
vices (Al Fajr, May 8, 1989). These are ident on support
from abroad in the light of the gross underfunc 4 of Palestinian
communities by the Zionist state. The obvious conclusion is that
the Israeli authorities don’t distinguish between «fighting ter-
rorism» anc <ceping the Palestinians weak. This is related to
what the Ziomsts consider the «demographic danger,» and fear
of this has been; :creased by the intifada, for its challenge of the
1967 occupation _ nrinciple reopens the files of the 1948 occu-
pation on which the state is based. Thus, the debate about what
to do with the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which we will term the
withdrawal-annexation-transfer paradigm, also pertains to
Israel itself, as every good Zionist knows very well.
Parallel to the Israeli army’s failure to suppress the uprising,
the Israeli police have created their own dilemma, lesser in
proportion, but serious, since it involves the state itself. Since
national expression is considered a security threat, the police
raided children’s summer camps in the Galilee and arrested
some of the supervisors, because the tents had been dubbed
intifada, Nablus, etc. «We are now spending more time inves-
tigating weddings and summer camps and nationalistically-
motivated offenses than we are in dealing with crime gencrally
and the war against drugs,» said a police spokesman in the
northern district (Jerusalem Post, July 24, 1989). Police Inspec-
tor-Gencral Kraus told the Knesset Interior Committee:
«There must be a police station in every Arab village if growing
Arab nationalism is to be effectively countered.» The commit-
tee chairman, Yehoshua Matza, warned of a repctition of the
1948 tragedy if «Israeli Arabs» didn’t stop their militant
behaviour (Jerusalem Post, August 2, 1989). This is one of many
threats of mass expulsion uttered by Israeli officials during the
uprising.
The danger that Israel might resort to mass expulsions, to
resolve the dilemma presented by the Palestinian uprising,
stems from the state’s incapacity to attract enough new immig-
rants to counter the «demographic danger.» The conditions of
the intifada hardly make Israel a more attractive immigration
goal today, and the only «bright spot» which the Zionists can
point tois a plan for forcing Soviet Jews to Israel. In 1987, before
the start of the uprising, Shamir asked the Reagan Administra-
tion to deny refugee status to Soviet Jews wanting to immigrate
to the US. (Less than 10% have chosen to settle in Israel.) It has
since been reported that from Scptember 1988, the US has
denied 19% of the applications of Soviet Jews for refugee status.
This summer there were predictions by Israeli officials that
50-100,000 Soviet Jews and also Argentinians would immigrate
16
nll
to Israel over the next three years, and that part of them would
be settled in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. When Peres visited
the US in late September, he asked for $400 million in loans to
finance housing for the new immigrants. The whole absorption
process is estimated at $3 billion. Irregardless of whether the
emigrants can be forcibly channeled to Isracl, which appears
doubtful in itself, this project seems precarious in view of its
costs and the objections already voiced by some US Zionist
leaders. The Absorption Ministry itself has expressed skepti-
cism in view of past difficulties with integrating new immigrants.
This leaves Israel in the withdrawal-annexation-transfer
paradigm concerning the «demographic danger. »
Economic bind
We earlicr indicated that those who view Isracli security in
comprehensive terms had begun to question, even before the
intifada, whether Israel could perpetually bear the costs of occu-
pation and war. The uprising made this question acute as is most
apparent in rising defense expenditures. In mid-June, a Defense
Ministry report estimated that the uprising costs the military
$250 million annually, and requested an immediate transfusion
of $200 million - one of several emergency requests made during
the uprising.
With Palestinians constituting 60% of the agricultural labor
force in Israel and 26% of construction workers, the impact of
strikes has been enormous. According to an army report, Pales-
tinian strikes cost the Isracli economy $40-50 million in the first
six weeks of the intifada alone. In August, Yitzhak Ben Dov,
chairman of the Israeli national building construction agency,
estimated Palestinian worker attendance at 50% during the
uprising, and this dropped with the prolonged strike against the
imposition of the new magnetic IDs. The Palestinian strikes,
coupled with a housing shortage, contributed to the 32.7% rise
in apartment prices, which in turn added to the resurging infla-
tion (Jerusalem Post, June 24, 1989). The tax boycott has cut tax
revenucs in half, according to official Israclisources.
Bank of Israel Governor Michael Bruno called on the govern-
ment to declare an emergency situation, attributing the
economic problems to the intifada - $650 million in export losses
(trade with the occupied territories has dropped by 63%); $280
million losses in tourism (the biggest foreign currency earner
next to the arms trade); and further incalculable losses, includ-
ing investments deterred by uncertainty (Jerusalem Post, June
10, 1989). In July 1988, Peres said the economy would be «en-
dangered» if the uprising continues. This was after uncmploy-
ment hit 9.7% in May, the highest since 1967.
With 100,000 Israelis deployed in the 1967 occupied ter-
ritories, this figure seems doubly astounding. On July 2nd, 30
mayors from the so-called development towns demonstrated
outside Shamir’s office, demanding steps against unemploy-
ment which always hits these towns hardest. «Our settlements
are about to collapse,» said one of them. On July 23rd, there was
a two-hour strike by one million Israeli workers and employees,
the most serious labor action in two years; one of the organizers
said, «We are fearful for the fate of our country.» According to
Democratic Palestine, February 1990 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 37
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