Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 19)
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- Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 19)
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AP, August 17th, «Israeli employers have been under pressure
from the government toreplace their Arab workers with Israelis
for security reasons and to lower the nation’s rising unemploy-
ment rate.» This effort seems dubious, since Palestinians from
the territories do the jobs Israelis avoid. The initial response to
the Palestinian strikes was to import workers. (Davar, August
4th, reported that there are 10-15,000 workers in Israel from
Portugal, Poland, Thailand, England, Turkey and the Philip-
pines.).»
Unemployment intersects with the issue of demoralization in
the army as well. Aside from immigrants from North Africa, the
Israelis hardest hit are those who have just completed military
service. Ran Cohen of the Citizens Rights Movement said:
«This is what the State of Israel asks of its soldiers, to go and
serve their country and then go and stand in line for unemploy-
ment payments» (AP, September 5, 1989).
Our review of the Isracli cconomy during the uprising reveals
only one success story: On June 11th, the Defense Ministry
released figures for 1988 weapons sales that exceeded $1.47 bill-
ion, with export contracts signed that were greater than the pre-
vious peak year. The Jsrael Economist magazine reported that
Israel got $2 billion in military contracts - twice the 1987 amount.
With Palestinian workers excluded from the vital military
industry, it can remain unaffected by the uprising, and Israelcan
base its economy more and more on this sector. This will, of
course, strengthen Israel’s nature as a garrison state. Another
suggestion has been to make a high-tech revolution which would
render Palestinian labor superfluous. The feasibility of doing
this very quickly is dubious; in any case, it would require massive
new infusions of US aid, such as accompanied the restructuring
of Israel’s economy in the early eighties - a phenomenon which
raised many question about Israel’s independence and ability to
provide the degree of welfare to which its Jewish citizens are
accustomed.
Water as aresource is obviously vital for any state’s existence,
and the need for water was one of the motives of the 1967 occu-
pation in the first place. Reuvan Pedatzur wrote in Haaretz,
April 23, 1989, «Any future settlement will rise or fall around
one essential issue - the water problem...The government of
Israel has ignored this problem...It constitutes the major prob-
lem in Isracl’s relations with its eastern neighbors, and once
again reveals the shortcomings of Israel’s strategic planning.
The reason for this blunt statement is quite simple. Those who
control West Bank water sources will - quite simply - have the
ability to dry up the Israeli coast...Close to one-third of Israel’s
water is from the West Bank.» The opponents of withdrawal can
bolster their position with a material arguement even if the occu-
pation becomes unprofitable. Until the uprising, the occupation
paid for itself with the taxes, cheap labor and other resources
stolen from the Palestinians. This is no longer the case, but the
cost has not yet become high enough to force Israeli consensus
on withdrawal, much less a just solution that might pave the way
for neighborly, civilized solutions between Palestinians and
Israelis on issues such as water. Here it is useful to recall that
politically-related security considerations have generally taken
Democratic Palestine, February 1990
precedence over economic considerations in the occupation
authorities’ decision-making. We also recall that Israel has pre-
viously solved economic crises by going to war, 1967 being the
most obvious example. But can Israel afford to do so today with
the war raging in its «backyard»?
Is Israeli security compatible with peace?
We have seen that the Palestinian intifada has had a devas-
tating, though certainly not fatal, impact on the Israeli military,
the cornerstone of Israeli security doctrine. It has also impacted
significantly on all fields considered to have importance for
israel’s secuirty in a comprehensive sense. The uprising has
posed as a reality that the only possible alternative to the occu-
pation is an independent Palestinian state, but while many
Israelis realize the status quo is untenable, they are far from
countenancing this state which is being built right under their
noses.
Even the thinkers of the Tel Aviv University Strategic Studies
Institute have not come farther than the Israeli man on the street
in this respect, as evidenced by a report issued midway through
1989. These experts are aware of all the dangers involved:
«While compromise options appear to be either unfeasible or
too risky for Israel; while its legitimate fears of the alternatives
appear tu be. paralyzing Israel’s capacity for bold initiative;
while Israel may indeed «muddle through» for some time to
come - it is equally possible that the foundations of Israel’s soci-
ety and its deterrence will begin to crumble, thus raising the
specter of war..» The study group examined a series of options:
the status quo, autonomy, annexation, a Palestinian state, Gaza
withdrawal, Jordanian-Palestinian federation. None of them
were found to be feasible and desirable. at the same time. For
example: «Palestinian statehood is potentially extremely risky
from a security standpoint, and is as dangerous for the fabric of.
Isracli socicty.as is annexation» (/srael, the West ° ..k and Gaza
- Toward a Solution).
Thus, Israel remains armed with the intransigence of its sec-
urity concept which rules out real consideration of Palestinian
rights; discussions on how to resolve the dilemma posed by the
intifada remain trapped in the withdrawal-annexation-transfer
paradigm. To break this vicious circle, the intifada must con-
tinue and become more radical, and the Palestinian resistance
and Arab liberation movement must move more decisively to
create a new dynamic in the regional situation. Theoretically,
this could prod Israel to resolve its own internal contradictions
and develop a consensus for security via a just peace. We say
theoretically because Israel's colonial and militarist nature have
always been steering it in the opposite direction. The intifada has
shown the traditional Zionist security concept to be non-func-
tional, when faced by united Palestinian determination to
achieve independence. Whether the Zionist state will draw the
obvious conclusions is however uncertain. In this sense, Israel’s
security is in its own hands.
- For quotes from Israeli sources, we are indebted to the translations provided in
the following sources: Journal of Palestine Studies, Al Fajr English weekly edition,
the monthly Uprising Updates published by Database Project on Palestinian
Human Rights, Associated Press news bulletins and EURABIA (French). @
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