Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 24)
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- Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 24)
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protest of April 1989 revealed the
weakness of popular support for the
regime, even in its strongholds in
southern Jordan. The decrease in the
regime’s popularity was due to the
aggravated economic and social prob-
lems which occurred in the absence of
a legislature. The dominance of the
executive authority over the country’s
resources led to the policy of theft of
public funds, corruption, favoritism
and other practices which were not
only illegal, but also immoral. The
subsequent resignation of Zaid Al
Rifai’s government and the relatively
free elections were part of the effort to
restore public confidence in_ the
authorities, mend the fences broken
with the April protest, enlarge the
regime’s social base, and absorb the
new social strata which have emerged
as a result of the economic develop-
ments which began in the mid-seven-
ties.
Fifth: The Arab countries, including
Jordan, are not immune to the influ-
ence of the new international situation
with perestroika and its repercussions.
King Hussein is one of the most
experienced Arab _ politicians, and
adept in both Arab and international
affairs. He is well aware of the poten-
tial impact of these dramatic interna-
tional developments on a country like
Jordan which lacks a self-sufficient
economic base, as well as democracy
and security. Hence, he was the first
Arab ruler to board the train of
change, taking the initiative to respond
to the changes within limits that do not
endanger his regime.
Indeed, no single one of the above-
mentioned factors alone could have
pushed the country towards the period
of relative democracy for which the
cornerstone is now being laid. Without
their interaction, the previously pré-
vailing state of oppression and political
blackmail would have continued.
The pressure of the discontent
Since the democratic margin
emerged, the task of all nationalist
forces has been to protect and develop
it, so that it covers all the political,
economic and social aspects of life.
22
without any illusions about the
genuineness of these changes, and dis-
regarding the question mark that the
previous era would put to the current
developments. The main task now Is to
develop this experiment, and not leave
it as an easy prey for those local and
regional forces that are working to
abort it. There are many such forces,
beginning with some trends within the
state itself, namely the executive
authority whose’ interests are
threatened by democracy; this includes
the intelligence and high-ranking army
officers. These two groups are the
most discontent with the introduction
of democracy into the political life.
They have nothing in common with
democracy because they were brought
up in a fully tyrannical atomosphere.
The more democracy there is, the
more limited their authority.
Ironically, we have a former security
officer, who is now a member of par-
liament, accusing Mudar Badran (him-
self a former head of the intelligence)
of «diluting the role of the intelligence
and compromising the dignity of its
officers» (Middle East International,
no. 366, January Sth). This clearly
indicates the political opposition in
some circles of the security apparatus
to Badran’s measures which reduced
the influence of the intelligence on
organized political activities.
Moreover, we have the Muslim
Brotherhood trying to break down the
foundations of the very margin of
democracy that brought them into the
parliament, by raising reactionary slo-
gans which are at odds with democracy
and progress. For example, as a solu-
tion to unemployment, the Brother-
hood proposed depriving women of the
right to work.
Regionally, there are Arab regimes
that fear that the «democratic fever»
will infect their people. More impor-
tant is the pressure applied on Jordan
by Israel with a view towards stopping
the democratization. Prime Minister
Shamir and Trade Minister Sharon
renewed their threats that Jordan is
the site of any future Palestinian state.
The Zionists have, moreover, tried to
exploit a number of shooting incidents
at the Palestinian-Jordanian borders.
In one case, they shot down a Jorda-
nian air force helicopter, killing five
high-ranking officers, after guerrillas
opened fire on an Israeli patrol from
Jordanian territory, despite the Jorda-
nian authorities denial of responsibility
for the incident. Obviously, the Israeli
provocations stem from fear of a reac-
tivation of the Jordanian national
movement and the Palestinian
nationalist forces in Jordan, and espe-
cially so in this era of the intifada.
What about the future?
The objective factors which led to
the democratization process are all
deep-rooted developments that can be
expected to continue to exert an influ-
ence for some time to come. Thus, it is
logical to assume that the mainstream
in the regime and King Hussein him-
self will remain obliged to continue the
new course, as long as it does not
endanger the regime’s stability or its
basic political and economic plans. At
present, there is no indication that the
new margin of democracy will be sud-
denly reversed, as happened with the
coup which toppled Nabulsi’s govern-
ment in 1956.
However, continuation of the demo-
cratization process is also bound to the
capacity of the pro-democracy forces
to confront the pressure exerted by
those who aim to abort this experi-
ence. This presents big tasks for the
Jordanian national movement, espe-
cially in terms of politicizing and
mobilizing the masses to protect and
expand their democratic rights. The
population at large still harbors suspi-
cions as to how genuine the new
democracy is. At the same time, they
have yet to experience any benefits on
the economic level, as the crisis con-
tinues unabated. The experienced
political forces have the duty to pro-
vide the framework for involving the
masses in shaping the democratization
process. Today, there is a real oppor-
tunity for wide-ranging national demo-
cratic activity in Jordan, to enhance
democracy and contribute to charting
the future policy of the country. @
Democratic Palestine, February 1990
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