Democratic Palestine : 39 (ص 13)
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- Democratic Palestine : 39 (ص 13)
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Palestinians from the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, and less rights for «Arab
Israelis» than those accorded to Jew-
ish citizens. This shows that the new
government is not so much a throw-
back to the past, but a model of the
Israel of the future, ever more reac-
tionary and racist.
Simmering crisis
The extended period needed to
form the new government, coupled
with the events of that period, confirm
that the stalemate was symptomatic of
a deeper crisis in the Israeli political
system that has yet to be resolved. In.
the last analysis, this crisis stems from
the Israeli society’s failure to come to
terms with the reality of the Palesti-
mian cause as expressed by _ the
intifada. The Zionist state has been
unable to crush the intifada and
equally unwilling to make any real
political overtures in relation to its
demands. In the context of this stale-
mate, a myriad of other issues became
the object of broad public protest on
the one hand, and intense political
maneuvering, backroom deals and
squabbling among politicians on the
other.
Susan Rolaf, editor of the Labor
Party’s monthly, Spectrum, wrote
about the question of electoral reform
in the Jerusalem Post, contending that
reform would not change the influence
of the small religious parties, because
Labor and Likud leaders would still
seek the rabbis’ blessings before elec-
tions. She concluded: «...only when
the tie between the two major blocs is
broken - when there will be a majority
either for Greater Israel or for talks
with the Palestinians and _ territorial
compromise - will the power of the
religious parties return to its natural
proportions, which in absolute terms is
no greater today than it was in the
early days of the state (today the
religious parties have 18 Knesset seats
- 40 years ago they had 16).» Rolaf
explained the apparent impotence of
the Israeli political system as follows:
«the mainstreams in both political
blocs are afraid of the possible con-
sequences of the solution which they
advocate to resolve the fundamental
existential problems facing the state.
That is why the Likud mainstream
never seriously considered annexing
the territories. And despite all the
talk, the Labor Party - even if it could
- would be very wary about embarking
on any process leading to the trading
of territories for peace without a very
extensive intermediate adjustment
period» (reprinted in The Middle East
Clipboard, April 5-11th).
On this background, we _ can
analyze the most salient aspects of the
internal Israeli political crisis: the mass
movement for electoral reform, the
credibility gap between the public and
the politicians, and the power struggle
between and within the Labor and the
Likud.
Electoral reform
The movement for electoral
reform blossomed in April and May,
exhibiting an unprecedented public
consensus on internal political mat-
ters. The movement spanned the Zion-
ist political spectrum from Shinui (to
the left of the Labor Party) to Tzomet
(right of Likud), grouping elements
from all political trends except for the
religious parties and their ultraor-
thodox followers. It thus expressed the
tension between religious and non-
religious Zionists, and the majority of
Israelis’ resentment that the religious
institutions consume large proportions
of the state budget, while the orthodox
can exempt themselves from army ser-
vice on religious grounds. It is typical
that the movement began with a
hunger strike of army veterans outside
the Knesset in late March.
A poll conducted by the Dahaf
Institute showed that 80% of Israelis
preferred changing the electoral law to
replace proportional representation
(which allows small parties to exert
unproportional influence) with the per-
sonal constituency system: a 78 to 11
margin supported direct election of the
prime minister, also basec on the need
to limit the influence of the small par-
ties (Yediot Ahronot, April 9th). A
petition for such reform was presented
to Israeli President Hertzog, signed by
500,000 - 22% of the electorate. By
mid-May the Knesset had begun debat-
ing bills for electoral reform, sup-
ported by both Labor and Likud. The
fate of these bills is uncertain however,
as both the major blocs have dealt
with the issue of electoral reform in
terms of their own partisan interests.
For example, Shamir presented himself
as responsive to the movement’s
demands during the period he was try-
ing to form a government, but it was
actually Likud that blocked the efforts
last summer to enact electoral reform.
Obviously, the two major blocs will
continue to relate to the public
demand for reform in an opportunistic
manner. In view of the failure of either
to gain a clear majority in the past two
elections, both need the small parties
to form a government.
There are other reservations about
electoral reforms. A number of
mainstream Israelis, mainly intellectu-
als with Labor Party sympathies, have
expressed fear that making the prime
minister less dependent on Knesset
support could lead to the rise of a
«strongman.» Seventeen university
professors issued a warning in late
March that reform would unwittingly
serve to strengthen the undemocratic
right and divert from the main con-
cerns of peace and immigrant absorp-
tion.
The more basic problem however,
is that the reform movement is after all
for making the existing political system
more efficient. It has not questioned
any of the fundamental premises of
Israeli politics, nor addressed the con-
tradiction of maintaining a democratic
system in a settler-colonial state. It is
telling that another Dahaf poll
revealed that 80% of Israelis, the same
percentage who want electoral reform,
think that the army is doing a good job
in the occupied territories. This is an
accurate gage of democratic thinking
among the Israeli public.
Credibility gap
On April 8th, when 100,000
Israelis demonstrated in Tel Aviv for
electoral reform, slogans were raised
such as: «All politicians are thieves
and whores.» Throughout the bargain-
ing for forming a new government,
there were displays of public disrespect
for the politicians. According to polls
throughout this period, most Israelis
preferred new elections or a national
unity government to one formed either
by Shamir or Peres. The public was
more concerned about electoral re- >
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