Democratic Palestine : 39 (ص 14)
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- Democratic Palestine : 39 (ص 14)
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form and the organization of immig-
rant absorption than about many of
the intricacies of the political bargain-
ing going on between various parties.
In particular, the public was disgusted
by practices engaged in by Peres and
Shamir, literally buying defectors from
each other’s camps, and the readiness
of various factions to be bought.
On April 6th, the Israeli daily
Maariv wrote: «The mountains of dirt
amassed over the past few weeks have
made the public sick... People are in a
state of despair.» The credibility gap
was not healed by the formation of the
government, as was apparent from the
‘happening’ organized by the Move-
ment for Political Change as MKs
entered the Knesset to endorse the
new cabinet. The building was _ sur-
rounded by dogs, running in every
direction and each adorned with a sign
bearing the name of one of the new
ministers.
However, as in the case of the
electoral reform movement, public dis-
gust with the politicians did not lead to
any significant soulsearching about the
deeper reasons for the political corrup-
tion. In the space provided by the cre-
dibility gap, Shamir’s caretaker gov-
ernment pushed forward quite success-
fully, laying the foundations for a new
right-wing offensive and rampant set-
tlement drive. Fascist tendencies were
apparent, not only directed against
Palestinians but aimed at impacting on
internal Israen policy. The most obvi-
Ous case was when Sicarii, the secret
Israeli terror group that specializes in
attacking «dovish» Jews, threatened
President Hertzog and his family after
he had prolonged Peres’ mandate to
form a cabinet (reported in Jerusalem
Post, April 15th).
Internal power struggles
Internal conflict appeared to
wrack both the Labor and Likud blocs
prior to the formation of the new gov-
ernment. This conflict reflected shades
of difference in political positions, as
well as the quest of certain individuals
for more power.
Ultimately Peres could not form a
government because he failed on two
counts. He could neither unite Labor’s
own ranks under his leadership, nor
attract factions from both the left and
14
the right of Labor, relatively speaking,
at the same time. Throughout the bar-
gaining, there were well-founded
rumors that Rabin would either break
ranks to join a Likud-led government
or try to replace Peres as Labor’s
leader in order to form a new national
unity government. Not by chance, an
internal Labor document was leaked in
May, blaming Peres for the party’s fai-
lure in the November 1988 elections,
and indicating that he had ignored
polls showing that Rabin had been
more popular among floating voters.
Some polls this spring also showed
Rabin to be more popular than either
Peres or Shamir.
On the other hand, a wing of
Labor led by MK Uzi Baram formed a
lobby against any new partnership in
government with the Likud. In addi-
tion to the Knesset deputies of the
Democratic Front for Peace and
Equality, Citizens’ Rights Movement,
Mapam, Shinui and the Arab Democ-
ratic Party, there are an estimated 15
Labor Party MKs for talking to the
PLO under certain conditions (that the
PLO has actually met). But the Labor
leadership is not ready for any such
departure from its traditional Zionist
principles. Instead, Peres pandered to
the religious right - and got slapped in
the face. He failed to muster a major-
ity in late April because two Agudat
Israel deputies defected: Mizrachi went
to the Likud because he opposed any
compromise on the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, reportedly on the advice of
a US rabbi; while Verdiger pulled out
rather than vote for a government that
would have had the support of Arab
MKs. Shinui, on the other hand, had
already declined to join any coalition
based on what it termed defectors (a
reference to the Liberal faction that
broke with Likud and was negotiating
with Peres) and religious coercion (the
religious legislation favored by the
orthodox parties).
Even after failing to form a gov-
ernment, and Rabin’s call for Peres to
resign on May 11th, the latter stuck to
his rightist positions. He suffered an
extreme embarrassment when he at-
tended the Socialist International
meeting held in Cairo, at the same
time the May 20th Rishon Letzion
massacre occurred. The meeting
wll
adopted a resolution for Palestinian
self-determination and statehood. In
Jerusalem, the Labor Party quickly
issued a statement, saying that: «Peres
refused to support the decision draft in
its adopted version regarding the right
to self-determination and_ territorial
issues linked to the PLO» (Associated
Press, May 24th). About a week later,
the Labor Party student organization’s
convention came out against a national
unity government with the Likud and
for talks with the PLO (Israeli Radio,
June 2nd).
Likud also suffered internal prob-
lems, as Sharon and other ultraright-
ists challenged Shamir’s leadership and
pressured him to form a so-called
Jewish national government, rather
than reforge the coalition with Labor.
It is, however, indicative that the
Likud succeeded at last in crystallizing
a coherent rightist government. The
most reactionary Zionist tendencies
are clearly on the ascent, and it is not
logical to expect that Labor, from its
new position in the opposition, can or
will mount a real counteroffensive.
It should be obvious that the
internal Zionist contradictions that
have been described above are far
from being of the sort that could be
exploited to Palestinian advantage, and
certainly not in the immediate political
conjuncture. There are moreover
two more basic elements that have
been shaping Israeli strategic thinking
during this spring of ‘political stale-
mate. They are even more unequivoc-
ally mitigating against Israeli moves to
meet the Palestinians even a fourth of
the way, and they will be major ele-
ments in shaping the Israeli political
scene in the future. These two issues
are the waves of Soviet Jewish immig-
rants arriving in Israel and the boost
this gives to Zionist colonization; and
the parallel attempt to shift attention
away from the Palestinian intifada in
favoring of addressing the Arab
regimes.
Does Saddam Hussein
scare Israel?
Shifting the focus
The partial realignment in the
Arab world, induced to a great extent
by the intifada and Israel’s aggressive,
intransigent policy, has begun influenc- - هو جزء من
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