Democratic Palestine : 39 (ص 17)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 39 (ص 17)
- المحتوى
-
The Baghdad Summit
Interpreting the Significance of the Time,
the Place and the Discourse
by Imad Rahaima
Baghdad, June Ist
The emergency Arab summit in
Baghdad is over, but its effects are
not, for the summit was exceptional
not only in terms of the Arab League’s
rules, but also due to other factors
which are related to the time and place
it was held, and its packed agenda. It
was also unusual by virtue of the
debate and clamor that accompanied
and preceded it. In fact, the very con-
vening of this summit was in question
right down to when the plenary session
actually opened. It was uncertain
whether or not a quorum could be
achieved, due to Syrian objections to
the site of the summit. The question of
where a summit was to be held has
never had so many political connota-
tions as was the case with this one.
The shift in the leadership of the Arab
world, implied by holding the summit
in Baghdad, was far from satisfactory
to a number of regional and interna-
tional forces.
The significance of the place
«Why in Baghdad?» and «Why
not in Baghdad?» - this dual question
sums up all the inter-Arab contradic-
tions that accompanied and preceded
the summit. On the one hand, it sym-
bolizes the differences between the two
political currents which dominated the
summit. On the other hand, it reveals
the depth and seriousness of the sup-
posedly secondary Arab contradictions
which the intensive mediation efforts
of recent months could not dispell.
Those who supported the conven-
ing of the summit in Baghdad view this
city as a symbol of Arab steadfastness
and victory in the Gulf war. They
believe that Iraqi power enables the
Arabs to formulate a comprehensive
confrontation strategy that does not
exclude the military option. They
argued that the summit had to be con-
vened in Baghdad to show solidarity
with Iraq in the face of the US-Israeli-
British campaign, to show that Iraq
was not alone, but that the Arabs were
backing its right to possess developed
technology for peaceful and defensive
purposes.
The opponents and semi-oppo-
nents of convening this summit in
Baghdad had a different point of de-
parture. They have different views, dif-
ferent considerations and _ different
interests. First of all, there is Damas-
cus that from the beginning expressed
its rejection of the place of the sum-
mit, publicly and clearly. The Syrian
leadership added that the preparations
were not sufficient for this summit, so
the results would not meet the chal-
lenges facing the Arab world. Syria’s
absence revealed the depth of the so-
called secondary contradictions bet-
ween Damascus and Baghdad.
Almost all observers were sure in
advance that Syria would not attend;
yet hope remained that the Syrian
leadership would change its mind at
the last minute. This hope lingered
even in the first half hour of the open-
ing session, for Colonel Qaddafi of
Libya was in Damascus, and had dis-
patched a special envoy to Baghdad
the night before. Rumorss spread about
Syria joining the summit; pictures of
President Assad were put up in
Baghdad, and there was a commotion
in the suite of Al Rashid hotel where
the Syrian delegation was to stay.
Though it was known for sure that
President Assad would not attend,
there was still a small hope that Syria
would be represented, for how else
would it be possible to discuss the
issues of pan-Arab security, the Arab-
Israeli conflict and Lebanon? Even
those with the most reservations con-
sider Damascus to be a major player in
all these fields.
As the Libyan leader arrived in
Baghdad, rumors spread that he had
brought a Syrian delegation headed by
Foreign Minister Shara, but the rumors
faded and the Syrian séat remained
vacant.
Lebanon was the second opponent
of convening the summit in Baghdad.
Of course, nobody at the summit really
cared what the Lebanese officials said
to justify their absence. Still, Leba-
non’s official absence did not prevent
the Lebanese issue from being discus-
sed. Resolutions were adopted which
were welcomed by Lebanon’s Presi-
dent Hrawi, Prime Minister Hoss and
Speaker of Parliament Husseini.
Three other Arab heads of state
did not attend, but sent high-ranking
deputies in their place. The first of
these was King Hassan II, who hates
to attend any summit that he does not
host himself (7 out of 19 past Arab
summits were held in Morocco). The
second of the absentees was Sultan
Qabus of Oman, who dislikes by
nature to attend such events. The third
absentee was President Shadli Ben
Jedid of Algeria. His absence left a
significant moral void in view of his
and Algeria’s outstanding role in past
efforts to achieve Arab solidarity and
reconcile inter-Arab disputes. The
unconvincing reasons given for Ben
Jedid’s absence also had an influence
on the summit; many questions were
raised about the real motivation for
the Algerian decision.
Among those staies that had
reservations about the site of the sum-
mit, and expressed their dissatisfaction
ambiguously, the most prominent were
Egypt and Saudi Arabia that most
probably share the same reasons for
their attitude. Neither are willing to
recognize Iraq’s growing role in the
region. Both fear that Iraq’s military,
scientific, economic and human
resources will come to outweigh their
own particular political functions.
Saudi Arabia, for its part, is accus-
tomed to dominating the Arab scene
especially in the 70s and the 80s.
Egypt, newly readmitted to the Arab
League, is trying to restore the role it
lost during the years of its enforced
absence following Sadat’s visit to
occupied Jerusalem and the signing of
the Camp David accords.
These two states have their own
political line and style which differ >
17 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 39
- تاريخ
- يونيو ١٩٩٠
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
Contribute
Not viewed