Democratic Palestine : 39 (ص 18)
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- Democratic Palestine : 39 (ص 18)
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from those of Baghdad. It is not sur-
prising that they expressed reserva-
tions, and refrained from expressing
unconditional support to Iraq.
Moreover, due to their regional con-
siderations and interests, neither Egypt
nor Saudi Arabia was eager to provoke
the Syrian government or to cut lines
of communication with it. In relation
to the international scene, both prefer
to avoid any confrontation with the
US, which would have been inevitable
if they had joined in the wholehearted
support to Iraq.
For all these reasons, Cairo and
Riyadh tried to resolve the dilemma of
where to hold the summit, and exert-
ed direct and indirect efforts to me-
diate between Baghdad and Damascus.
Meanwhile, they postponed announc-
ing their intentions to attend the sum-
mit. However, in the end these reasons
were insufficient to keep them away.
They were forced to attend the sum-
mit, choosing to bypass the obstacle of
the place and its connotations in favor
of fighting the political battle at the
summit.
The political discourse
The summit was dominated by
two major political currents. The first,
the current of «moderation,» was led
by Egypt and supported by the Gulf
states and other traditionally moderate
Arab governments. Iraq headed the
other current, the «hardline» one, with
strong support from the PLO and
Libya.
The moderates regurgitated the
usual political positions; the speech of
Husni Mubarak encompassed all the
positions of this group. It stressed the
«strategy of peace» which, according to
him, stems from «our values, heritage
and concern about our interests. In
brief, it is the option that conforms
with our principles and truly expresses
Our masses’ aspirations... Arab tradi-
tions, especially after Islam, have been
based on applying reason before taking
up the sword... The Arabs have sur-
passed the world community in this
domain.»
Up to this point Mubarak’s speech
might have seemed okay. But as he
continued, the fine line which sepa-
rates peace from surrender was bro-
ken. So was the fine line which sepa-
18
rates upholding the legitimate, natural
rights of the Arab nation with dignity,
from stooping to accept any solution
and the humiliation of carving out a
place for oneself at the price of aban-
doning all these rights.
The moderates began to shiver
and shake from the mere possibility of
having to resort to the sword if the
resort to reason failed. They began
giving advice about how the Arab dis-
course should be «human and reason-
able» in accordance with the values of
the times. But they had no answer as
to what should be done in the case
when pursuing the course of reason
only leads to more Israeli intransigence
and expansion, more expulsion of
Palestinians, further absorption of new
immigrants and threats to attack Iraq,
and Pakistan if need be, as has been
the Israeli response to peace overtures.
What should be done if such logic only
results in the US administration’s con-
tinued massive support to the Shamir
government? What if the fears of Jor-
dan become a reality, and Israel does
occupy more Arab territory, specifi-
cally that from the Jordan River and
possibly extending to Amman? What if
Israel tries to attain what it considers
to be its natural borders? These bor-
ders are engraved on an Israeli coin
showing a Jewish state including all of
Palestine, all of Jordan and parts of
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and even Saudi
Arabia. What would happen if Israel
were to achieve these things, or at
least begin working on them? How
then would the Arabs deal with this
situation? Are we to wait until it is too
late and all is lost?
These questions and more were
asked by the «hardliners,» but there
was no answer because those who have
dropped the military option from their
calculations, and considered the 1973
war as the last one, are committed
only to «peace» and do not want the
Arab discourse to include any mention
of force. True, the «hardliners» did
not pose the military option as the pre-
ferable one. True, our experience with
Arab summits and their rhetoric is not
encouraging, and the Palestinians have
paid the price for this in the loss of
their land and nights. Yet it is also true
that, due to US-Israeli intransigence,
the advocates of «moderation» have
nothing to show for all their modera-
tion, in order to convince others of its
usefulness. This is especially true in
the current situation which is full of
tension and even signs of war.
King Hussein’s speech at the sum-
mit shed light on the reality of the situ-
ation. He tolled a bell of warning and
pointed to the possibility that Jordan
would become the target of an Israeli
attack, the battlefield of the coming
Arab-Israeli war and the destination
chosen by the Israelis for the Palesti-
nians who are to be «transferred.» This
option is becoming more and more
possible as Shamir seeks to form an
ultraright government wherein he him-
self would appear as a «dove» in con-
trast to hawks like Sharon, Eitan, etc.
Some Arab leaders viewed the
king’s speech as willful exaggeration
aimed at obtaining more financial sup-
port to Jordan which is suffering a seri-
ous economic crisis. But the majority
were convinced by the speech and con-
scious of the pending dangers.
Amidst this atmosphere which was
not at all pleasing to Cairo, Mubarak’s
speech sounded like an old,worn-out
tune.He had two choices -either to
retreat and accept a secondary role,
letting the «hardliners» set the pace; or
try to force the summit to adopt the
direction of recent summits which have
marked the decline of official Arab
policy. Mubarak yearns for Egypt to
regain the leading role it enjoyed in
the 50s and the 60s, by virtue of its
pan-Arab nationalist line, but this time
on the basis of being the leader of
«moderation,» moving in the sphere of
the Camp David accords and the
Baker plan. Realizing his intentions
required putting a brake on the line of
escalation under consideration in
Baghdad.
In this context, it is worth noting
the recent cooling-off in the PLO-
Egyptian relations, due to Mubarak’s
insistence On maintaining a super-mod-
erate line. The Egyptian regime’s
ambitions to lead the Arab world can
only be realized when moderation pre-
vails or rather when the Arabs offi-
cially adopt a policy of surrender.
Egypt wants to maintain a strong reg-
ional role for this would give it weight
in the international arena. Here it is
relevant to note that the US administ- - هو جزء من
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