Democratic Palestine : 39 (ص 20)

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Democratic Palestine : 39 (ص 20)

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THII
met, and Mubarak seems willing to
oblige even if that means colliding with
the PLO and pressuring it.The Egyp-
tian regime seems intent on conti-
nuing down this one-way street,head-
ing towards a solution, any solution, if
only this would ensure its prominent
role and justify the policy it adopted
almost two decades ago.
To serve these ends, it was
required that the military option be
dropped from the final communique of
the summit. It was also required to
drop the PLO’s call for boycott and
economic sanctions, letting the US off
the hook for its unconditional support
to Israel’s aggressive policies. In short,
it was required to advance the same
old line of decline in the official Arab
position.
On the other hand, it must be
recorded in favor of the Baghdad Sum-
mit that there was another political
line represented. Its positions can be
characterized by two major aspects:
One: Calling for reserving the
right to use force when the logic of
reason proves futile, and working to
attain the capacity to do so. This
attitude was expressed by the Iraqi
president in his opening speech and in
his comments to the speeches of
Others. It was also expressed by the
president of the State of Palestine,
PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, in his
decisive words against the US
administration and Israel, in his call
for economic sanctions against states
which facilitate Jewish immigration to
occupied Palestine, and those which
support continued Israeli aggression
against the Arab nation. In a similar
vein, Arafat called for convening the
joint Arab defense council; he stressed
the military option and signalled that
the patience of the Palestinian leader-
ship is running out because neither the
US nor Israel have made any approp-
riate response to the PLO’s peace
initiative.
Two: The political discourse of
those espousing this line was logical
and reasonable and in compliance with
the concepts of the present stage. For
perhaps the first time, the expression
of this political line has made the link
between the logic of force and the
force of logic, and herein lies its
strength.
20
The outcome
After prolonged debate in the
assembly hall and behind the scenes,
the Baghdad Summit arrived at joint
results which to a great extent were in
favor of the «hardliners,» but without
irritating or embarrassing the «moder-
ates» whose weight at the summit was
greater. A glance at the balance of
gains and losses allows us to assess the
summit’s results.
Iraq gained from this summit first
of all simply because it was held in
Baghdad, and a considerable number
of the Arab leaders attended. More-
over, this summit took decisions which
support Iraq’s course on the eastern
front in its war and peace with Iran,
and in its confrontation of the cam-
paign launched against it by the US,
Israel and other parties.
The PLO came out victorious,
first of all because the summit was
convened in response to its_ call.
Moreover, the summit took decisions
that were supportive of the Palestinian
peace initiative; it pledged financial aid
and promoted Arab solidarity which
has not excluded the military option
and which stands by the Palestinian
people and intifada.
King Hussein got more out of this
summit than he expected. It was gen-
erally agreed that he succeeded in
illuminating the situation in Jordan and
why it needs support in the face of
external threats.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia came out
neither winners nor losers. They lost
«the war of words» since the final com-
munique condemned the US administ-
ration. But each state got something in
return. Egypt repossessed the Arab
League, and Cairo was again made the
site of its permanent headquarters.
Saudi Arabia obtained broad support,
including from the PLO and Iraq, for
its policy vis-a-vis Lebanon and the
activities of the tripartite Arab com-
mittee in which Riyadh plays a main
role.
The biggest winner at the summit
was the concept of Arab solidarity
based on upholding Arab nghts and
confronting challenges to the Arab
nation. The Arab summit as an institu-
tion was a winner, for it regained its
importance with this summit. To make
a long story short, the Baghdad Sum-
mit put a halt to the line of decline
that had characterized the preceding
summits. This was expressed by Co-
lonel Qaddafi in the final session when
he said that the previous Arab summits
came to nothing, while the Baghdad
Summit amounted to something.
It is true that the summit was not
completely equal to the challenge cur-
rently posed to the Palestinian people
and the Arab nation as a whole. It fail-
ed to adopt many needed decisions,
but at least it was an important step in
the right direction. A number of fac-
tors contributed to the summit’s suc-
cess, especially the following three:
1.All the Arab leaders seemed to
be aware that the conditions generated
by the new intermational situation will
not be to their interest unless they
adapt to the changes and impose their
positions as a major independent
power bloc.
2.There was also broad awareness
of the intensification of the aggressive,
expansionist Zionist policy, its oppres-
sion of the Palestinian people, and the
potential dangers it poses to Jordan,
Iraq, Libya and other countries. The
shadow of the Rishon Letzion mas-
sacre hung over the summit, as did the
dangers posed by the unprecedented
tide of new immigrants to Israel.
Meanwhile, the Bush Administration
seems just as close to Israel as were
previous administrations, refraining
from exerting any real pressure on it as
some Arab regimes had expected.
These factors weakened the line of sur-
render, and supported the logic of
those who called for defending Palesti-
nian and Arab rights by all means.
3.With the convening of the sum-
mit in Baghdad, the Iraqi leadership
spared no effort to make it produce
outstanding results that would conform
to the regional role Iraq seeks to play.
In this regard, the prevailing good
relations between the PLO and Iraq
were quite useful.
Real evaluation of the summit can
only come in connection with the
implementation of its decisions. This
final judgement must wait for a time.
In the interim, we are encouraged by
the fact that the promised financial aid
was extended to the PLO and Jordan
only few days after the summit con-
cluded. @

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