Democratic Palestine : 40 (ص 15)
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- Democratic Palestine : 40 (ص 15)
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US-PLO Dialogue Suspended
The US decision on June 20th, to suspend the dialogue with the
PLO, was expected and inevitable in view of Washington’s arrog-
ant stance from the beginning of the talks in December 1988. Still
one should ask: Why did the US administration agree to talk to
the PLO in the first place, and then suspend the dialogue after 18
months of unproductive meetings? To answer this question objec-
tively it is not enough to listen to US officials’ statements. Rather
one must understand their practice which reveals their real inten-
tions.
by Ahmad Halaweh
It is a fact that the intifada in the
1967 occupied territories had single-
handedly restored the Palestinian
cause to the top of the Middle East
agenda. Its far-reaching achievements
had enforced positive changes in inter-
national public opinion in favor of the
Palestinian people and their legitimate
struggle for their rights. It created a
new situation on the Palestinian, Arab
and international levels. The most
important international victory for the
intifada was imposing isolation on the
position of both the Reagan Administ-
ration and Israel, in particular after
PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat’s historic
speech at the special UN General
Assembly session in 1988, which was
convened in Geneva after the US
denied him a visa to attend the session
in New York. A few days later, the US
administration backtracked: It decided
to embark on a «substantive dialogue»
with the PLO, having been forced into
this decision by the worldwide support
of the Palestinian peace initiative. The
US found itself in a situation where it
had no choice but to give up, at least
temporarily, its previous refusal to talk
‘to the PLO. The US ambassador to
Tunisia, Robert Pelletreau, was
entrusted to begin the talks.
Clearly, the decision to start the
dialogue was made as a form of dam-
age control, attempting to refurbish
the US’s image as a «peace broker» in
the Middle East. It was basically a
maneuver to avoid further isolation,
allowing the US to embark on a new
tactic for diverting international pres-
sure away from itself and towards the
PLO instead.
Thus, the talks were opened at a
particular time to serve certain aims.
Nonetheless, the US move was mista-
kenly viewed in diplomatic circles as
paving the way for a breakthrough in
the political deadlock in the Middle
East. Such faulty views were based on
Democratic Palestine, July-August 1990
the belief that the US administration is
serious about seeking a just solution to
the crisis in the area, even though the
US Secretary of State at the time,
George Schultz, made it clear that
talking to the PLO did not mean US
recognition of the Palestinian right to
an independent state which, in the US
view, remained out of the question.
The course of the talks served to con-
firm the US’s hostile policy vis-a-vis
the Palestinian people. It became obvi-
ous that the US was not serious in its
intentions. Reviewing the dialogue
from the first meeting in 1988 to the
fourth and last one in 1989, a set of
points emerges which, taken together,
spell out the US’s real intentions.
These points can be summarized as fol-
lows:
1. The US administration dealt
with the dialogue as a forum for pre-
senting its own point of view concern-
ing how the Middle East conflict
should be settled, rather than engaging
in dialogue in the real sense of the
word. Accordingly, it was not
interested in upgrading these talks
above the ambassadorial level, but
rather kept them in a framework that
could not yield positive results. Mean-
while, Washington was pressuring the
PLO via the Egyptian regime, using it
as a mediator between the US and the
PLO.
2. The US stand, as indicated by
Ambassador Pelletreau, is that the
Shamir plan is the only vehicle for
resolving the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict. To attain progress in the «peace
process,» the PLO was called upon to
be more «pragmatic,» allegedly in
order to convince the Israeli public
that it was worthy of being a negotiat-
ing partner; otherwise Israel would not
deal with the PLO at all. The US
insisted on the PLO facing up to this.
«fact,» maintaining that. it would not
pursue any other than the Shamir plan.
3. The US’s' mechanism for
achieving a settlement in the Middle
East is direct, bilateral negotiations,
but on its own terms. Namely, the US
and Israel must essentially hand-pick
the Palestinian «negotiators,» refusing
anyone named by the PLO. It views an
international peace conference, at
best, aS no more than an introduction
to direct negotiations between the
Israeli government and selected Pales-
tinians from the West Bank and Gaza
Stnp. The PLO should take this into
consideration and not be an «obstacle»
to the so-called peace process.
4. Meetings between Palestinians
in the occupied territories and Israeli
Officials were considered by the US as
being important for restoring «order
and peace» in the area. Yet, many of
these meetings took place because
Palestinians were «invited» to them by
military government officials, whose
invitation was delivered by armed sol-
diers «requesting» their attendance.
The last demand presented by the
US ambassador in the final meeting
was that the PLO should agree to the
above-mentioned points in order not to
jeopardize the dialogue.
The US objectives
From the above, it should be obvi-
cus that the Tunis meetings tailed to
touch on the heart of the matter,
namely the right of the Palestinian
people to self-determination and inde-
pendence. The fact is that the US can-
not accept the Palestinian right to self-
determination simply because this
would mean an independent Palesti-
nian state - rejected by Washington
and Tel Aviv. Since opposition to
Palestinian national rights is essential
to the US’s Middle East policy, why,
then, did the administration continue
the dialogue with the PLO for 18
months and what were its objectives?
The answer is found in Pelletreau’s
statement after the second round of
talks in Tunis, saying that the discus-
sions focused on practical steps which
could be taken to ease tension in the
occupied territories and pave the way
for direct negotiations. His statement
confirmed that foremost among the US
aims in the dialogue was pressuring the
PLO to halt the intifada.
Another major US _ objective
apparent from Pelletreau’s statement is
the attempt to create an alternative
Palestinian leadership in the occupied
territories, which the US and Israel
could recognize in place of the PLO.
This explains the US’s insistence on
the resumption of meetings between
Palestinians in the occupied territories P
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