Democratic Palestine : 40 (ص 17)
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- Democratic Palestine : 40 (ص 17)
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1é intifada.
influence in both the White House and
the US Congress. Zionist organizations
not only control a substantial number
of Jewish votes, but are also capable of
targeting anyone who opposes pro-
Israeli policy. The influence of the
Zionist lobby was apparent in the
resolutions passed this spring by both
houses of Congress, recognizing
occupied Jerusalem as Israel’s capital,
even though this contradicts with
stated US policy. Clearly, the pro-
Israel lobby also played a role in the
US decision to suspend the dialogue
with the PLO, having exerted efforts
to this end since it started in
December 1988.
The PLO’s responsibility
Reviewing the course of the
dialogue also reveals that the PLO’s
activities over the past 18 months fell
short of meeting the challenge posed
by talks with the US. It was the US
that determined the direction, pace
and content of the meetings. The
underlying reason for the PLO’s failure
to control the dialogue was the falla-
cious political approach adopted ty
sectors of the Palestinian leadership,
with the hope of achieving a Palesti-
nian state.
The intifada increased the PLO’s
stature markedly, giving it more weight
on the Arab and international arenas.
However, the PLO failed to make full
use of the new situation. Some in the
PLO imagined that by showing readi-
ness to deal with the US and Israeli
initiatives, they could make gains, dis-
regarding the contents and intentions
of these initiatives. These forces in the
PLO were in a hurry to reap political
benefits from the achievements of the
intifada, claiming that it would soon be
too late and justifying concessions with
the idea that a Palestinian state was
within reach. They hastened to give
concession after concession, without
getting anything in return, and ignor-
ing the real balance of forces and
whether or not conditions were ripe
for fulfilling Palestinian rights at this
time. The result was a weakening of
the PLO’s position in the Tunis meet-
ings, giving the an a golden pp an
ity to use the dialogue to its ends. The
PLO thus shifted from an offensive to
a defensive position in the political-
diplomatic struggle, which made it
easier for the US administration to
avoid substantive issues in the
dialogue. This also made it easier for
the US to continue to exert pressure
on the PLO via the Egyptian regime,
attempting to extract more concessions
and constantly raising secondary issues
to divert from discussion of the funda-
mental issue: the continuation of
Israeli aggression and occupation.
The PLO was unable to steer the
discussion or even raise the points it
found essential; in the end it lost the
tards it had brought into the dialogue
as a result of its policy of concessions.
Thus, when the US realized that the
PLO had nothing more to give, it stop-
ped the dialogue, preferring to con-
tinue its war on the PLO by other
means.
In spite of this, the suspension of
the dialogue inflicted no essential los-
ses on the Palestinian people, for it
was never an end in itself. The Pales-
tinians refuse such a dialogue if it is
only a vehicle for blackmailing the
PLO. The Palestinian people were sup-
portive of a dialogue that would serve
as a framework for discussing funda-
mental issues which the US insists on
ignoring.
The lesson to be drawn from the
experience of this dialogue is that the
path of concessions is endless once
embarked upon. The US and Israel
will not be defeated in the political
battle, or any other battle, unless the
PLO adheres to the principles of the
Palestinian struggle, as set out in the
PNC’s decisions. Forcing the US and
Israel to change their position remains
a major aim of Palestinian political
moves; but this can only happen by
escalating the intifada and bolstering it
with armed struggle, until the enemy
camp is forced to recognize Palestinian
rights. The Palestinian people and
their sole, legitimate representative,
the PLO, remain key players in the
Middle East, and no peace can be
achieved without addressing their
Rios @
On July 9th, the New York Times
published the results of a poll it con-
‘ducted in conjunction with CBS televi-
sion network. In answering the ques-
tion; «Should the US be more sym-
pathetie to the concerns of Palesti-
nians?> 38 percent answered yes, while
a percent answered no. The signifi-
G vce of this poll is the different :
fesults. for the same question taken a
answered no. However.
than to American public opi
year ago. in which only 26 p
p
answered yes. While 49 P
taken by the US Congress and
administration continue to be more
closely aligned to the pro Isr: rel lobhy.
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