Democratic Palestine : 45 (ص 4)
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- Democratic Palestine : 45 (ص 4)
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Despite the progress made by the US in its diplomatic efforts, great
doubt remains about a just and comprehensive peace being established
in the Middle East. This is due to the bias of the Bush administration’s
proposals, as well as to Israel’s rejectionism and arrogance.
by Ahmed Halaweh
On July 3l1st, at the end of the
two—day summit with Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev, US _ President
George Bush declared that the US and
Soviet Union would co-sponsor the
proposed Middle East peace conference
to be held in October He said that
invitations would be sent to all parties
concerned 10 days before the conference
convened, adding that there is a «historic
opportunity» for «a just and compre —
hensive peace» in the area, based on UN
resolutions 242 and 338. Bush also
announced that Secretary of State James
Baker was returning to the region with
the aim of bringing all parties to the
conference. This is a strong indication
that the Bush administration is
determined to push forward in _ its
efforts, especially after its success in
obtaining the consent of the Arab states,
in One way or another, to the US
proposals.
Baker’s previous five trips in fact
succeeded in resolving two main issues
that had blocked the «peace» process,
namely the duration of the so—called
regional conference and the role of the
UN in such a conference. According to
Bush’s proposals, the UN would be
represented by a silent observer who
would «take notes, and can
communicate with the participants and
the sponsors...» (Associated Press, July
19th). The observer can also report to
UN Secretary General Javier Perez de
Cuellar. Concerning the other point, the
US proposed that the conference could
be reconvened only with the consent of
all partes. Thus, Baker’s August Ist
return to the Middle East, his sixth
shuttle since the end of the Gulf war,
aimed to address the remaining
problem, i.e. Palestinian representation
at the conference, and to guarantee the
Israeli government’s attendance.
The day before the US-—Soviet
summit ended, Israel announced that it
would not attend a Middle East
conference unless it receives US
guarantees about Palestinian
participation. Previously the Israeli
government had asked the Bush
administration for clarifications about a
Jordanian — Palestinian delegation: who
4
would lead it, how it would make
decisions, who would speak for it at the
Opening session of the conference, and
under which flag it would sit. But after
meeting Baker upon his arrival in
occupied Palestine on August Ist, Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir announced that
Israel would attend the conference on
condition that Palestinians of East
Jerusalem and in exile are not included in
a Jordanian — Palestinian delegation.
Although Shamir only repeated the
Israeli position of saying «no» by giving
a conditional «yes,» Baker
enthusiastically welcomed his position,
describing it as a _ «significant
development» that moves the peace
process forward. In a strong indication
of his support for the Israeli condition,
Baker urged Faysel Husseini and Hanan
Ashrawi, the Palestinians whom he met
in Jerusalem, to reconsider the situation
and accept the conference proposal
without putting conditions. Baker issued
an even more obvious warning as he was
leaving for Jordan. After naming the
parties that had agreed to attend the
conference, he warned the Palestinians
not to refuse and lose the opportunity of
attending the conference; otherwise,
they would be the sole losers.
It has become increasingly clear that
Baker is saying that the «peace» process
is advancing, with or without the
Palestinians, heading toward its final
end which both Bush and Baker
repeatedly identify as a «just and
comprehensive peace.» While the US
administration tries to project that peace
is at hand, one would ask: What sort of
peace are the various parties aiming for,
or ready to accept? However, if peace is
not at hand, one would ask: Why not?
To evaluate these two questions, it is
necessary to analyze the motives of the
respective parties and the conditions that
determine their political maneuvers.
The US proposals and motives
Among the most destructive
consequences of the Gulf war was the
rapid shift in the balance of forces in
favor of the impcrialist, Zionist and
reactionary camp; increased US ability
to influence international and regional
affairs; and an openly declared, official
Arab tendency to follow the US plans in
Judging the Peace Process
the region. The other side of this
dramatic change is the frustration and
despair which swept the area as a result
of the destruction of Iraq; the ongoing
attacks and conspiracies against the
Palestinian people in the occupied
territories, Kuwait, Lebanon and some
other Arab countries; and the increased
fragmentation of the Arab world. These
realities convinced Arab states that the
wind favors the US and Israeli sails.
Under these conditions, opportunities
for a US — orchestrated settlement of the
Arab — Israeli conflict and the Palesti-
nian problem increased enormously.
For the US, it is a golden opportunity
to move swiftly towards resolving the
conflict and establishing reactionary
stability in the area, motivated by a
number of considerations. A prime
consideration is that the US, as the
leader of the imperialist camp, views the
persistence of the Arab — Israeli conflict
as a potential danger to the long — term
interests of imperialism; the
continuation of the conflict could lead to
revolutionary upheaval in the whole
area, not only threatening imperialist
interests, but also undermining its
natural alliance with Arab reaction. A
related consideration is insuring that the
reactionary Arab regimes remain in
power, since they should — secure
imperialist domination of the region.
More important, the strength of Zionism
and Israel, the creator of the conflict,
might be challenged, so that imperialism
Democratic Palestine, August 1991 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 45
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