Democratic Palestine : 45 (ص 8)
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- Democratic Palestine : 45 (ص 8)
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Reassessing the Intifada
by Farida Al Asmar
For well over a year now, the
Palestinian intifada has been facing
serious problems, which were
‘subsequently aggravated by the Gulf war
and its aftermath. Many of the
difficulties stem from weak points in
Palestinian policy, but objective
obstacles related to the Israeli
occupation also play a major role. It is
not the people’s will to fight for their
freedom and independence that is in
question; in fact, acts of militancy are on
the rise. Yet, a more consistent political
line and practice, as well as more support
to the intifada, are needed from the PLO
and its component organizations, to
empower the people in the occupied
territories. The broad mass participation
and organization of 1988—89 must be
restored, perhaps in a new way, if the
intifada is to meet the current challenges.
Israeli — created obstacles
The Israeli government’s categorical
dismissal of the Palestinian peace
initiative of November 1988 delineates
the overall condition in which the
activities of the intifada began to decline
in 1990. Already at this point the
problem intersects with Palestinian
policy. The false expectations promoted
by sectors of the PLO leadership — that
a Palestinian state could be established
soon — left the intifada ill — prepared to
face the ensuing stalemate. While the
PLO relied on the intifada to score gains
for the Palestinian cause, excessive
attention and resources were devoted to
the diplomatic struggle, at the expense of
substantive support to the intifada itself.
Programs adopted to escalate the
intifada were not thoroughly
implemented. The PLO as a whole did
not use its military capacity to support
the intifada by confronting the Israeli
occupation forces with firepower. Nor
were Palestinian communities in exile
systematically mobilized in support of
the struggle in the occupied territories.
As a result, the population of the
occupied territories was not provided
with sufficient material support to
counter successive waves of Zionist
attacks. There was seeming disregard for
«the integral relation between the
requirements of militant action and the
economic needs of the masses» — a
relation highlighted by the UNL in call
no. 70, May Ist. Funds were channeled
in a short—sighted and sometimes
wrong way, instead of being invested in
developing social and_ productive
institutions to sustain the people’s
steadfastness and build the infrastructure
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of the declared State of Palestine.
Moreover, by spreading unrealistic
expectations and offering concessions,
without the prospects of attaining
anything in return, PLO policy confused
people and encouraged a return to the
traditional attitude of waiting for the
leadership outside to take the initiative.
The inconsistent PLO policy also
affected the Arab masses_ whose
mobilization in support of the intifada
began to dwindle after the first year (the
situation in Jordan being one of few
exceptions).
Meanwhile, the Israeli government’s
rejection of peace was predictably
coupled with escalating repression. In
addition to the murder of activists, the
occupation authorities’ arrest campaigns
carved into the intifada’s leadership and
structure on the local level. In some
places, less experienced cadres were left
to guide the struggle. The gaps created
by Zionist repression are part of the
explanation for the emergence of
incorrect practices and _ factional
behavior in the ranks of the intifada
itself.
Settlements mushroom
All the while an even more
far — reaching attack on the intifada has
been underway in the form of massive
Soviet Jewish immigration to occupied
Palestine, supplemented by the airlift of
14,000 Ethiopian Jews as the Mengistu
regime crumbled. This influx has
allowed the Shamir government to
reinvigorate its settlement — building
program, despite a patent lack of
finances, in a new thrust to preempt an
independent Palestinian state through
more land — grabbing and demographic
transformation.
Among other things, the Gulf war
curfew on Palestinians served as a
subterfuge for Israeli land surveyors
with an eye for confiscation. The NGO
Coordinating Committee in Jerusalem
reported that at least 3,030 hectares of
West Bank land were taken over by
Israel in March and April alone, while
another 4,000 hectares were closed off by
the IDF for possible confiscation.
The Israeli Housing Ministry has
operational plans aimed at fulfilling
Sharon’s seemingly wild pledges to
double the number of settlements in the
Golan Heights, settle one million Jews in
Democratic Palestine, August 1991 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 45
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- أغسطس ١٩٩١
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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