Democratic Palestine : 45 (ص 12)
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- Democratic Palestine : 45 (ص 12)
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relations with the masses who, via
Organization in the bodies of the
intifada, should «participate in the
decision-making process...» This
means «rejecting bureaucratic ways of
dealing with the masses, activating their
role and responding to their demands,
because they are the great power of
determination that keeps the intifada
going on.»
Call no. 71 also banned the wearing
of masks when dealing with the masses,
as one of anumber of measures aimed to
end undisciplined behavior, including
«to stop acts of kidnapping,
interrogation and killing unless there is
agreement among the various
Palestinian organizations to do so...»
This is part of the move to restore the
intifada’s campaign against colla—
borators to its original principled basis,
which aimed to neutralize or eliminate, if
necessary, those who worked with the
occupation authorities and thus
damaged the popular struggle.
Masks were originally donned by
intifada activists who knew they were
wanted by the occupation forces, in an
attempt to avoid arrest while remaining
active in the mass struggle. However, as
the Zionist policy against the intifada
evolved, relying more and more on
undercover operations to arrest and kill
militants, the wearing of masks had to be
reconsidered. Thus, the ban on wearing
masks among the masses also aims to
guard against the attacks of the Israeli
Shin Bet. Palestinians in the occupied
territories and human rights
organizations have long been reporting
assassinations carried out by undercover
agents. A few years ago, the Israeli
authorities revoked the press credentials
of two Western journalists who reported
on Israeli death squads in the occupied
territories. However, on June 2Ist, the
truth — or rather part of it — was
broadcast on Israeli television in a short
documentary showing soldiers dressing
as Arabs, sometimes as women, in order
to approach and arrest intifada activists.
At about the same time, a masked
intifada activist was shot by another
masked man in Kafr Malik, near
Ramallah. Also in June, the PHRIC in
Jerusalem published a list of 47
Palestinians killed by Israeli undercover
agents. The author of the report, Lee
O’Brien, wrote that the great majority of
the victims were engaged in activities
such as writing slogans on the walls,
when they were killed.
The role of Palestinians outside
Though the national movement in
occupied Palestine is best qualified to
12
formulate solutions to most of the
intifada’s current problems, it cannot
alone resolve them in practice. In fact,
part of the background of the current
crisis is the mistaken assumption that the
intifada alone could achieve its goals,
even if these were restricted to ending the
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. The PLO and all Palestinian
revolutionary organizations outside the
homeland must shoulder the main
responsibility not only for substantially
upping financial and military support to
the occupied territories, but also for
ending factionalism and redressing the
imbalance between the leadership inside
and outside. The time has come for the
Palestinian leadership inside (the UNL)
to gain relative autonomy, making
day —to-—day decisions itself, based on
PNC_ decisions and_ overall PLO
directives. In the context of reforming
the PLO and forming a new PNC,
serious consideration should be given to
increasing the representation of
Palestinians in the occupied territories,
commensurate to their role in the
struggle.
In a communique issued June 14th in
Damascus, the PFLP’s Politbureau
called for making the development of the
intifada a top priority: «However, this
task cannot be carried out by wishful
thinking or focusing on minor aspects of
the intifada, as many Palestinian forces
and nationalist personalities are trying to
do right now. Rather, there must be hard
and responsible work to back the
intifada by more vital means, and a
responsible, revolutionary and daring
process of self — criticism that highlights
the primary issue, because we think that
the outside is mainly responsible for
providing the intifada with the means of
continuation and development.» It has
become quite clear that the obstacles that
hamper the intifada’s progress stem not
only from the brutal policies and
practices of the Zionist entity; but also
from the wrong policies and practices of
the dominant circles of the PLO
leadership and of the various Palestinian
Organizations as well.» Besides calling
for rectification of the PLO’s political
line and practice, and an end to the
Organizational factionalism that has
alienated the masses and reduced their
participation in the intifada, the PFLP
Politbureau advocated: «Developing a
comprehensive national economic policy
to back the economy inside [the occupied
territories], by putting all the capacities
of the PLO and the Palestinian people
worldwide at the disposal of this policy,
and by investing the little aid extended by
some Arab brothers and other friends to
the same end.»
Intifada as the center
The importance of coupling concrete
solutions to the intifada’s problems with
political rectification is dramatically
highlighted by the emergence of some
very incorrect responses to the current
crisis. Prime among these is_ the
declaration of the so — called Palestinian
National Unity Party (PNUP) in
Ramallah, by Kamal Tabanji, based on
negation of the Palestinian national
liberation movement’s past and
principles. This party proclaims that the
role of the PLO and armed struggle has
expired. Instead it calls for direct
negotiations with Israel, relying on
forging close ties with the US and asking
Jordan to reverse its decision to severe
ties with the West Bank. What appears
to distinguish this party is that it
encompasses a number of Palestinians
who have served long terms in Israeli
prisons, in addition to some West Bank
professionals. But the PNUP’s real
promoter is Salah Al Khalili, a Fatah
official who resides in London, where he
intends to ply his contacts with the
British and US governments.
The dangers of this tendency are
manifest. Not only does it violate
principles long upheld by Palestinian
freedom fighters and the masses alike; it
addresses false problems. The current
problems of the intifada and the overall
weakness of the Palestinian cause is not
due to the employment of armed struggle
as a necessary instrument for change.
Rather these problems stem from
shortcomings in terms of political
clarity, a firmly embedded mass line and
finding mew ways’ of practicing
revolutionary violence to bolster the
popular struggle. Instead of addressing
these problems, the tendency
represented by the PNUP brings new
divisiveness to the Palestinian arena. It
moreover plays into the hands of the
Israeli and US governments who have
long sought an alternative to the PLO.
Dealing with the current problems
must begin with recognition of the
centrality of the intifada in the national
liberation struggle to fulfill Palestinian
rights, and building on the experience of
this struggle, as was expressed by the
UNL in call no. 70: «... a
comprehensive, just solution of the
Palestinian question cannot be achieved
through the proposed negotiations only,
in the absence of struggle in the field,
which is the spearhead of political
activity... the political and militant
processes are organically and
dialectically linked.»
Democratic Palestine, August 1991 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 45
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