Democratic Palestine : 45 (ص 20)
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- Democratic Palestine : 45 (ص 20)
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disperse the demonstrators. The police
opened fire on the fourth day and soon
afterwards, the government resigned. A
state of siege was declared, and the
military authorities were given powers
almost equivalent to martial law.
The ISF did not call off its strike until
a deal was reached with the authorities
through the newly appointed prime
minister, to postpone general elections
and to hold presidential elections by the
end of the year. An informal agreement
was also reached to change the new
electoral laws opposed by the ISF and
the other parties.
In a sermon at Friday prayers in
mid — May, Ali Belhaj, deputy chairman
of the ISF, said that if the ISF gained a
majority in the general elections, it
would immediately suspend _ the
constitution and enact sharia (Islamic
law), ban all socialist and secular parties,
and impeach Benjedid (A/ Safir, May
13th). This theme has been echoed on
many occasions by fundamentalist
leaders. It demonstrates clearly how the
fundamentalists would achieve democ-
racy.
Despite their crushing victory in the
local council elections two years ago, the
fundamentalists have failed to provide
desperately needed solutions for the
many problems from which the country
is suffering. ISF leader Madani said,
«We won the municipal elections. Now
people say we did nothing. That’s true»
(Time, June 27th). Although he blamed
the government for the ISF’s failure to
provide jobs and housing, it is clear that
even if the government had provided the
means, the ISF is incapable of solving
the complex political and socioeconomic
difficulties of the country.
It was, therefore, logical for the ISF
to avoid the scheduled June elections, by
escalating violence and anarchy. Neither
was it a surprise that the NLF
government resorted to violence to
confront the fundamentalists, declared a
state of emergency and _ suspended
elections. The authorities also face the
same complex realities. Moreover, the
deplorable events in October 1988, and
the continuously deteriorating living
conditions have stripped the ruling party
of the mass support on which it was
relying for winning the general elections.
Democracy is long overdue in
Algeria. Yet it is apparent that the
fundamentalists are not capable of
achieving or sustaining true democracy.
However, it is also true that the
government had carefully tailored the
new electoral laws to keep itself in
power. The means used by the ISF to
express opposition and pressure the
20
government are extreme and
condemnable. At the same time, the
government’s reaction was incorrect and
unjustified. Repression and _ violence
threaten the country’s unity, cause
material damage, generate more violence
and plant the seeds of civil war.
The authorities, who are responsible
for security and stability in the country,
did not initially chart a course that took
into account the fact that the ISF is the
largest opposition party in the country.
To avoid the disasterous confrontations,
the NLF should have capitalized on its
Own access to the masses on the one
hand, and on the major weakness of the
ISF on the other: its two-year flop in
the local councils. Sectors of the
Algerian people are profoundly uneasy
with the fundamentalists’ attempts to
impose a mini — Islamic state on the local
level; and the broad masses have had
none of their basic needs fulfilled.
Embarking on a broader democratiza-
tion, which involved the masses, might
have given the NLF and the government
much needed leverage in dealing with the
fundamentalists’ challenge. In this con-
text, the ISF could have been allowed to
present its programs in a_ public
to present its programs in a public
debate, to be judged by the people and
the other opposition parties. If the ISF’s
intentions had been thus exposed, the
government would have been in a strong
position to call the fundamentalists to
negotiations when the latter called their
strike. This would have deflected the
anger of the masses — the government
and NLF’s first line of defense — and
further exposed the ISF’s true aims.
An open dialogue on the political and
socioeconomic problems of the country
would have given the people at large the
chance to evaluate the ISF’s proposed
solutions. But unfortunately, open
dialogue has not been a tradition of the
Algerian government. Thus, the ISF was
not held publicly accountable for
explaining its mistakes. With the ISF’s
challenge to the _ state reaching
proportions tantamount to a coup, the
authorities’ saw no alternative but to
resort to outright repression.
Future prospects
The other opposition parties in the
country were clever enough to realize
what the ISF’s_ intentions’ were.
Although they shared the ISF’s view
concerning the electoral laws, they
refrained from participating in the
provocation of the street confrontations.
Though for different reasons, the other
opposition parties are also in agreement
with the ISF’s demand to hold
presidential elections to coincide with the
general elections, but they disagree that
this should be achieved by force. The
opposition has not given a convincing
reason for the second demand, except to
say that they want a comprehensive
renovation of the whole system. If this is
their aim, then holding the presidential
election parallel to the general election is
not enough, since real change does not,
come about only by replacing officials.
Political pluralism and _ obtaining
power by means of elections are only the
tip of the iceberg of democracy. The
essence of democracy is social justice,
1.e., equal distribution of the national
wealth among the masses. The Islamic
fundamentalists view democracy as a
means of obtaining power. But once they
achieve this, they would _ abort
democracy, as one can deduce from the
previously quoted Belhaj. The NLF and
the authorities, on the other hand,
supported democracy to the extent that it
keeps them in power. The new election
laws bear witness to this fact.
The fate of democracy in Algeria
depends primarily on the role of the
popular masses in the current struggle. It
also depends on the ability of the
democratic parties to close ranks with
the masses, and step up efforts to
safeguard national achievements and
past progress, meanwhile developing
solutions to Algeria’s current problems.
In this, the decisive question is how the
NLF will push forward in the new
situation. There are many indications
that the NLF today is not a monolithic
bloc, but encompasses a variety of forces
and opinions concerning how to
proceed.
Clearly, the role of the left, outside
of the NLF, has been marginal in the
past and present events in Algeria. The
struggle in the country has polarized
between two main blocs: the NLF and
the ISF. So _ far, this form of
confrontation appears to be leading the
country to a real disaster. Two key
questions remain: Will socialist forces,
whether inside or apart from the NLF,
be able to emerge as a bloc that can
influence the course of current events?
Will the NLF be able to rejuvenate its
historically progressive role, orienting its
internal policy towards the broad masses
whom it originally led to independence?
In both cases, the ability of these forces
to contribute to a democratic resolution
of Algeria’s current crisis will depend on
their being innovative in their thinking
and remodeling their work in tune with
new challenges on the local, regional and
international levels. @
Democratic Palestine, August 1991 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 45
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