Democratic Palestine : 45 (ص 27)

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عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 45 (ص 27)
المحتوى
monarch was referring to the international conference where all
parties would meet. Aside from this, he based his assessment of
Jordan’s policy vis — a—vis the peace process on more overall
factors, including the PLO’s position: «I don’t think Jordan
will go it alone, repeating the example of Sadat, but I do think
the government is willing to make a_ joint
Palestinian — Jordanian delegation...I cannot emphasize that
the PLO will refuse because I think that many in the PLO
leadership want this.» He explained that as a Jordanian party,
the JPDP views this as a matter for the PLO to decide: «We
don’t intervene, but it is difficult to explain the PLO
leadership’s position. Here, in secret discussions with the
government, the PLO said they are willing to make a joint
delegation. In Damascus, they said they wanted an Arab
delegation. In Tunis and at the Central Council session, they
said they want a solely PLO delegation. We have heard many
different things and this makes people doubt...However, I
don’t think that Arafat and his collegues will give the final
word on this matter without the participation of other parties,
especially the PFLP and DFLP. Such a matter requires
agreement between the three essential sections of the PLO.»
Commenting on King Hussein’s statement, Abdel Rahman
Al Majali said, «We do not welcome any statement which could
weaken the demand for an international peace conference, as
this detracts from creating a united Arab position and
coordination between the PLO and Jordanian government. He
noted that at present the JCP is not so concerned with the forms
of the peace process, but insists on affirming the principles
which would guarantee solving the Palestinian cause on the
basis of the relevant UN resolutions and restoring the
Palestinian people’s rights, including the establishment of their
independent state. It is thus most concerned with maintaining
the soleness of the PLO’s representation: «We oppose any
impairment of the PLO’s independent role in solving the
Palestinian cause,» he concluded.
Lua’y Dabbagh prefaced his remarks by reminding that the
Jordanian government has always been ready to open dialogue
on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. However, there are
changes in the regional situation as well as in Jordan’s own
role. Since the 1988 decision to disengage from the West Bank,
the Jordanian role in the peace process is secondary, and it will
not negotiate on beha!f of the Palestinians, especially if the
PLO does not want this. Dabbagh suggested that the king’s
statements were intended to introduce a new element in the
context of the stalemate of the peace process: «There is a move
to resolve the problem of the Palestinians’ representation in the
proposed regional conference. We in the Unity Party are
against Jordan participating in such a conference because it is a
substitute for an international conference, and aims to focus on
bilateral settlements and avoid the Palestinian problem which is
central. No major player in the region says it opposes dialogue
with Israel, but the question is how. We strongly support the
PLO’s position for an international conference with the
participation of all parties, and the PLO representing the
Palestinians.»
Concerning the prospects for a joint Palestinian —
Jordanian delegation, Dabbagh noted that the Unity Party is
not optimistic about the peace process advancing now due to
the Israeli demands. «However, if there really is a peace
process, the new Jordanian government has the cards it needs
to play in order to ward off US pressure and seek an agreement
with the PLO; perhaps then, there would be a joint delegation,
but this is not the case now. Some are saying that this is the ideal
government to approach the peace process as the US wants, but
I don’t think it will be as the US wants. We think that there are
red lines that Prime Minister Masri cannot cross. The nature of
Democratic Palestine, August 1991
the forces that support the new government puts some kind of
conditions as to what kind of peace it must seek. If the PLO
wants a solution to the problem of Palestinian representation,
there is the possibility of a joint delegation. As a Jordanian
party, we support the Palestinians’ rights to independence,
creating their state, self—determination and return. In
principle we oppose a joint delegation, but we don’t oppose the
PLO’s choice. However, as a Jordanian nationalist party, we
seek the liberation of Palestine, notwithstanding the unity [of
Palestinians and Jordanians] created in Jordan. No Jordanian
can think differently.»
The intifada is the frontline
In Amman you can ask anybody about the connection
between Jordan and Palestine, between democratization and
the intifada, and they will tell you there is a direct, daily,
two—way relationship. The progress of the intifada is
front — page news in the press, and reactions to major events in
occupied Palestine are immediate and often emotional. This
closeness is based on social as well as political realities. Over
70% of the population in Jordan have relatives in the occupied
territories. Though Jordan is surely the country in which
Palestinians in exile are most integrated, their roots remain in
Palestine. Many Palestinians not resident in Jordan come here
to meet their families from the occupied territories.
While the intifada was one of the factors motivating the
new policy in Jordan, democratization east of the Jordan River
also fuels the intifada. According to Lua’y Dabbagh, «If there
is a revolution in Jordan, a new kind of democracy, this will
support the intifade more than anything, providing it with
endurance that will rule out any unjust solution. When the
Jordanian: people have the right to participate in
decision — making, the Palestinians are protected, because the
people support the Palestinian cause; even if the government
changes, this popular support will remain. The popular
movement here is deeply affected by the performance of the
intifada in facing up to Israel. The movement in Jordan has
always had the Palestinian cause as a top priority. In the last
three years, the intifada has taken top priority on the agenda of
the partics and mass organizations. Mobilizing material
support to the intifada and spreading its, message all over
Jordan has been a main duty of the Unity Party on a daily basis
— our main task after defending democracy.»
Something like the majority of families in the West Bank
depend on their families in Jordan for economic support, and
this has surely increased with the exodus of Palestinians from
the Gulf oil states. Sectors of the West Bank economy depend
on the Jordanian market and vice versa. This interdependence
was devastatingly apparent in 1988, when the Jordanian dinar
collapsed, inflicting added economic hardship on_ the
population of the occupied territories. However, Tayseer Al
Zabri, who is a member of the Committee to Support the
Intifada, noted that even with the economic crisis, people in
Jordan are giving more now to the intifada than before under
martial law and its restrictions. He also noted the intertwining
of the political processes affecting Jordan and Palestine: «We
put the intifada as an essential matter for our movement in the
wake of the Gulf crisis, along with the defense of democracy in
Jordan, because both are effective tools against the US and
Israeli plans to dominate the region.»
One comes away with the impression that the intifada is not
at all an external matter for people in Jordan, but rather a part
of their lives. Abdel Rahman Al Majali spoke for many when
he said: «The intifada is the frontline for defending Jordan,
while Jordan and its people, Jordanian and Palestinian, are the
intifada’s strategic depth.»
27
هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 45
تاريخ
أغسطس ١٩٩١
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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