Democratic Palestine : 2 (ص 16)
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- Democratic Palestine : 2 (ص 16)
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No to the Phalangist regime
On the political level, the head-on
confrontation led the opposition to
sharpen its platform. In the face of ef-
forts to enact a security plan prior to any
political solution (actually a cover for
the army’s planned offensive), PSP
leader Walid Jumblatt, on January 31st,
accused the regime of amassing its
troops. Terming the security plan a
“waste of time”, he predicted, “The dec-
isive battle is forthcoming and inevita-
ble. A solution.with the Phalangists is
impossible.” By ‘February 4th, the Na-
tional Salvation Front had specified its
conditions for a ceasefire: withdrawal of
the US and other MNF troops; neutrali-
zation of the Lebanese Army; uncondi-
tional Israeli withdrawal and abrogation
of the Lebanese-Israeli accord; com-
mitment to national dialogue; and aboli-
tion of Phalangist hegemony. Amal
leader Nabih Berri’s call for patriotic
ministers to resign precipitated the end
of the Wazzan government. By Febru-
ary 6th, both Jumblatt and Berri were
calling for Amin Gemayel’s resignation,
strengthening the political platform uni-
ting their respective military forces’
joint struggle. Also, in this round, the na-
tionalist leadership directly called on
soldiers to desert from the fascist-
controlled army.
This signified a definitive crystalliza-
tion of the national forces’ standpoint:
That the only way to abrogate the May
17th agreement and prevent fascist he-
gemony in Lebanon is to remove Amin
Gemayel from the presidency. It is he
who represents the Phalangists’ hold on
state power, and this is irreconcilable
with Lebanon’s unity, Arab identity and
democratic development. (See _inter-
view with Comrade George Hawi for
further discussion of this aspect.)
Mass desertion
The enemy forces’ most fatal miscal-
culation was totally overlooking the so-
cial factor, and its link-up with the pollit-
ical and military aspects. On February
2nd, as the army was besieging the
southern districts of Beirut, a high Shiite
religious leader, Qabalan, warned that
the use of the army in these areas would
“create a revolt in the soul of the soldier,
who could not side with the authorities
against his people.” However, what the
sheikh could easily foresee seemed an
unknown factor to the Reagan Adminis-
tration militarists, who think that all
conflicts can be resolved by brute force.
Under the impact of the all-out con-
frontation, the Lebanese Army expe-
rienced disarray in its ranks no less ex-
tensive than its break-up during the
1975-76 civil war. In the battle for West
Beirut, 90% of the soldiers surrendered
their arms to the nationalist forces. Over
6,000 went over to the nationalist side.
Ibrahim Shaheen, a deserting officer,
called for changes in the military’s struc-
ture, so that it will do its national duty in
the South, and not against the people.
It was estimated that one-third of the
Lebanese Army was incapacitated, yet
Reagan persisted in blaming Syria for
the nationalist advance, ignoring all in-
ternal Lebanese factors. The US aid to
the army — heavy shelling from the
Sixth Fleet — was destructive enough
for the Lebanese land and civilians: On
February 8th alone, the New Jersey in-
discriminately fired almost 300 one-ton
shells into the mountains. However, this
made no dent in the internal balance.of |
forces favorable to the nationalists. In
retrospect, it appears as a show of sound
and fury, to cover the Marine’s subse-
quent retreat to the warfleet.
By the time the nationalist forces took
Khaldeh, several hundred soldiers of the
Lebanese Army 4th division were flee-
ing across the Awali River to the protec-
tion of the Israeli occupiers; others had
deserted in favor of the nationalist for-
ces. The brigade itself was surrounded
in Damour and eventually retreated
without much of a fight, in order to be
evacuated by ship to the fascist harbor
of Junieh. The 4th and 8th brigades had
been the only evidence a White House
spokesman could find on February 9th,
to back up the US claim that the Leba-
nese Army had not collapsed.
The Reagan Administration’s policy
of supporting local dictators, without
regard for their lack of popular support,
In an interview with Fran-
coise Chipaux and_ Lucien
George, printed in “The
Guardian’, February 21st, Amal
leader Nabih Berri very suc-
cinctly pinpoints the crisis be-
tween the fascist controlled re-
gime and the population, which
led the nationalist forces to de-
cide to liberate West Beirut.
Asked why the battle of West Beirut
began in the southern suburbs, Berri
replied: “Twenty-five per cent of the
Lebanese population (roughly 700,000
people) live in this suburb at the en-
trance to Beirut. The great majority of
the people living there are Shiites, but
there are also a fair number of Christi-
ans...in addition to Sunnis and Druze.
All these people have one thing in com-
mon - they are poor and underprivile-
ged...The army, ‘Phalangized’ by the
government, treated the people the way
the South African regime treats the
blacks. The Lebanese Forces entered
the suburb and even opened offices...
operating under the cover of the army.
Using peaceful means, I tried to warn
the government against establishing
such a presence. It was necessary to
prevent a repetition of the tragedy that
took place in Nabaa, another poor Shiite
neighbourhood where the inhabitants
were chased out by the Phalangists in
1976. I organized meetings, gave news
aa
In a Nutshell - Causes of the Crisis
conferences and brought the matter to
the public’s attention. But still with no
result.
“When on February 2nd, the Mar
Mikhael church, held by the Lebanese
army, was taken by our militiamen, I
expected the army to counterattack...
Instead of fighting, the army shelled the
poorer neighborhoods of the southern
suburb for 18 hours, using 60 tanks, and
170,000 people had to leave their home.
It was a monumental crime...”
When asked why the battle was so vi-
olent, and if there was a plan to invade
the southern suburb, Berri answered:
“You can’t invade the southern suburb.
The idea was to terrorize its inhabitants
and force them to flee, and thereby
whittle down the population’s socio-
political clout which the government
finds irksome.
“These people are against religious
sectarianism, against the proprietary in-
terests representing them in the parlia-
ment and against the Lebanese-Israeli
agreement of May 17, 1983. They are
determined to liberate Lebanon, start-
ing from the south.”
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