Democratic Palestine : 2 (ص 17)
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- Democratic Palestine : 2 (ص 17)
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met its Waterloo in Beirut and Central
Lebanon. Despite over a quarter billion
dollars in imperialist aid over the past
year, the Lebanese Army was simply
not up to its task. Of course, the Reagan
Administration took immediate mea-
sures to rectify this, deciding to up the
present 100 US advisors training the
army to several hundred. However, the
fact of the matter is that what is left for
the US in the way of coherent, local
fighting forces is the fascists (their mil-
itias and the hard-core of the army),
who have previously showed their inca-
pacity to impose themselves beyond
their own ghetto without outside help.
Even more direct military involvement
on the part of ‘Israel’ and/or the US’s
own torces is required, yet these options
involve internal repercussions in the re-
spective aggressor states. Moving the
Marines to the Sixth Fleet and assigning
greater firing prerogative to the war-
ships can impose more destruction on
Lebanon, as can the resumed Israeli air
raids. Yet neither has proved capable of
changing the minds of the Lebanese
masses and nationalist forces. At this
point, it is they who are deciding.
Echoes of victory
The repercussions of the nationalist
victory echoed beyond Lebanon’s
borders, compounding the dilemma of
Washington strategists. The enemy for-
ces had mapped out Lebanon as the
stage for breaking through the obstacle
which Syrian steadfastness poses for
Camp David. Quite the opposite oc-
curred. By asserting predominance in
the internal balance of forces, the Leba-
nese nationalists simultaneously high-
lighted the weight of Syria, which shares
the Lebanese National Salvation Front’s
founding premise: rejection of the May
17th accord, or any similar capitulation
to ‘Israel’. Thus, the US failure to im-
pose its wishes on Lebanon in turn ex-
poses the weak points in its regional
strategy, for one, its understimation of
the Syrian role.
The nationalist victory also opened
new vistas for the Palestinian revolution.
Revolutionary Palestinian organizations
placed their forces under Lebanese na-
tionalist command; Palestinian fighters
confronted the US and fascist aggres-
sion alongside the Lebanese masses ancl
militants. In late February, PFLP Polit-
bureau member, Bassam Abu Sharif.
issued a statement affirming that the
PFLP’s fighting forces are in Lebanon.
not in Beirut, but mainly in the Beqaa
Valley, side by side with the Lebanesv
nationalist and progressive forces: “We
have put all our capacities at the dispo-
sal of the Lebanese nationalist forces
and coordinate with them to resist the
Israeli occupation of the South.” Com-
rade Bassam explained that the Palesti-
nian revolution has no plans to return to
its old form of presence in Lebanon, but
he stressed that the Palestinians in the
camps have every right to freedom of
political and social action.
The importance of the Palestinian re-
volution as a whole doing its utmost to
consolidate its alliance with Syria and
the nationalist Lebanese, on a correct
basis, is underscored by the fact that the
battle is not ended. Rather, a new chap-
ces will try to reverse their set-back.
Any US or Israeli attempt will of ne-
cessity rely on the medium of the Leba-
nese fascists. In this context, it is interest-
ing to note the moves of the different
components of the fascist Lebanese
Front. On the one hand, we see Amin
Gemayel desperately maneuvering to
save his position, speaking of annulling
the treaty with ‘Israel’ and putting out
feelers for a reconciliation with Syria.
ter has been opened in the struggle to
roll back imperialist-Zionist-reactionary:
dominance in the area. There are, more-
over, concrete signs that the enemy for-
On the other, there are other, more basic
indications of the fascist position: The
Lebanese Front ‘godfathers’, Pierre
Gemayel and Camille Chamoun, and
their miltia commander, Fadi Frem,
have loudly declared that the treaty
must not be cancelled. Efforts are being
made for ‘President’ Gemayel to cement
more open and binding relations with
‘Israel’. The fascists know very well that
the Lebanon they want is totally antag-
onistic to that being created by the Leb-
anese nationalist and progressive forces;
they are preparing their alliances for a
comeback.
Indeed, the contradictions between
the fascists and the progressive national-
ists run too deep, and are currently too
intensified, to allow for easy comprom-
ise. It is indicative that in this round, the
traditional Saudi mediating role has
been rendered impotent. All indications
point to continued conflict, and in this,
we pledge our support to the heroic
Lebanese national and progressive for-
ces, for a free and democratic, Arab Le-
banon.
The nationalist forces’ advance from
West Beirut to Damour, only about ten
miles from the occupation lines, com-
pounded the Zionists’ dilemma in South
Lebanon. Their response was predicta-
ble: Top officials reaffirmed Zionist in-
tentions to remain indefinitely in the
South. The regular IDF patrols north of
the Awali line multiplied in an effort to
intimidate the national forces. All-out
aggression was stepped up. On February
10th, Israeli bombers struck the moun-
tains. On February 19th, Damour, as well
as sites in the mountains, were hit. On
February 2]st, there was a new air raid
on the Beirut-Damascus highway.
Actually, the Israeli cabinet had been
The Israeli Response - South Lebanon
a
order to escape the escalating attacks of
the Lebanese National Resistance Front.
In particular, they were considering a
pull-out from Saida, having already
transferred their headquarters to safer
ground inland ina Phalangist barracks at
Kfar Falous. This is a tribute to the heros
who have transformed Saida and the en-
tire southern coast into a hell for the oc-
cupiers. According to Israeli radio, the
Zionist troops were attacked 46 times in
January on the coastal road alone. In the
South as a whole, military operations
were averaging 4-5 daily in the middle of
the same month. To further enrage the
Zionists, three Katyusha rockets fell at
Metullah in northern Palestine on Febru-
ary 9th.
deliberating further partial pull-backs in
vil age a I ie vel
f fel ‘ita i River. Due to the vil-
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south |
‘sible for rec scent military opeuitia sin
area. = ar.
siege.
The general strike called i in oe ve C - هو جزء من
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