Democratic Palestine : 2 (ص 20)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 2 (ص 20)
- المحتوى
-
People of the southern suburbs - living under Phalangist 7
threat, Dec. 1983
fend Lebanon as an independent Arab state in the face of
Israel and its imperialist backers, or there will be no army in
Lebanon. Without this task for the army, there is no need to
have an army; the internal security forces are better than the
army in preserving internal security. We want an army that
agrees with Syria and the Palestinian revolution on confront-
ing the Israeli occupation and the danger of US aggression,
not an army that fights Syria and the Palestinian revolution
with US and Israeli support.
There is also the economic crisis. An added reason for
this crisis is that billions of dollars are paid in cash to the US
and France. The state pays 30% more than market price in
order to have immediate delivery. The state also pays the -
price of shells shot by the US fleets against our people and
the Lebanese treasury. All this is accompanied by deals and
brokerage within the government. The economic situation is
a total disaster. It threatens the working masses with unem-
ployment, the agricultural workers with losing their bread;
also small producers are threatened, as is the national indus-
try and agriculture and a major part of services.
The destructive social consequences of the economic cri-
sis portend the emergence of crises of a new type. The bread
revolt, as happened in Tunisia and Morocco, is possible in
Lebanon, but here it will be among an armed people, an
armed working class, armed revolutionary forces. We shall
not fail to use any method in our struggle to keep the working
class and other working people from paying the price of the
crisis. How can the working class go hungry while possessing
arms and when there is food in stock, and money accumulat-
ing in the monopolies’ treasuries? We propose a socio-
economic reform in the country, even more strongly than in
the previous period, because the crisis is more violent and
destructive than previously.
Where, then, is it possible to make compromises? Why
compromise with the state? Our principled position specifies
a set of factors: (1) the balance of forces, (2) the position of
our allies, in as much as we may propose an advanced task,
(3) our permanent distinction between the central link in the
struggle and other links, (4) our view that if the major link is
broken, this opens opportunities for developing the struggle
in other areas. The battle is going to be difficult and long.
Our major task is to build an internal balance of forces that
demonstrates the internal character of the battle. This will
lessen external influence without cancelling it. This would
also have the Arab position become a supportive one and not
an alternative that runs against the Lebanese progressive and
nationalist forces. We will work to have complete coordina-
20
tion with Syria and the Palestinian revolution, and we will
rely on international support to our national cause.
On the perspectives for the Lebanese National
Resistance Front if the Israelis were to withdraw
from the South...
If Israeli withdrawal takes place, it means that we have
made a great historical accomplishment, not only in our
struggle in Lebanon, but this would have repercussions on the
Arab national liberation movement in general and the Pales-
tinian revolution in particular. In this case, we face a major
question: What can a liberated Lebanon offer the Palestinian
revolution in support of the Palestinian people’s cause? It is
inevitable to play a very important role, not less than the role
played by Lebanon previously; the practice will be the same,
but in different forms. It is not in the interest of the Palestini-
an revolution, the Lebanese progressive forces, Lebanon, or
the Palestinian cause, to return to the same anarchy and old
practices. This did not push the Palestinian revolution to
practice its vanguard role in a better way. Lebanon will not
go back to the same exposed form of conflict, as a place for
public Palestinian revolution presence, exhibitionism and in-
termittent infighting. Lebanon, with its nationalist ties, be-
longs to the Lebanese nationalist forces, and to the Palestinian
revolution as well. We must know how to use this arena bet-
ter for the Palestinian revolution, while at the same time not
damaging the Lebanese nationalist forces. We must use it as a
means to mobilize potentials in order to continue the struggle
in all forms, inside and outside the occupied territories, for
liberating Palestine and achieving the legitimate national
tasks of our people. We are not ready to return to an ap-
proach that bypasses the Lebanese national factor and then
drags the Palestinian revolution into problems that detract
from its tasks of liberation, as happened before. The Palesti-
nian revolution will not find it easy to establish a kingdom on
others’ territory, instead of struggling based on the facilities
available in this land for the political, military and popular
work in the occupied territories. This requires a radical
change in the size and quality of Palestinian armed presence
and the form of practice. In this perspective, the PLO no
longer needs the thousands of fighters, but it needs quality
fighters.
On the Palestinian role in the Lebanese National
Resistance Front...
It is our duty to say that Palestinian revolutionary forces,
among them PFLP and DFLP, participate in an important
part of the Lebanese National Resistance. However, Palesti-
nian participation is not limited to the South. Palestinians are
present in other areas - the mountains, the southern suburbs
of Beirut, etc. More than others, they are exposed to terror,
harassment and maltreatment by the puppets of Israel, the
fascist forces and the authority. Self-defense is a basic right.
On one hand, they participate according to their conviction
in their self-defense. On the other, they participate with the
Lebanese National Resistance Front, their allies in the strug-
gle.
On the future...
A realistic analysis of the conflict today, on different
levels, makes us optimistic. Our victory in Lebanon, if totally
achieved, will not only automatically reflect on the overall
situation of the Arab national liberation movement. In addi-
tion, the dilemma for US imperialism and Israel in Lebanon
will develop into a big dilemma for Arab reaction... We have
confidence in the abilities of our people, in the support of our
allies and friends, and in the ability of our own party as well. - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 2
- تاريخ
- مارس ١٩٨٤
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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