Democratic Palestine : 5 (ص 20)
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- Democratic Palestine : 5 (ص 20)
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Elections
New proof of Zionism’s ability to contain social discontent, and possibly the prelude to new
The outcome of the July 23rd elec-
tions ruffled the consolidation of the right
which has been the dominant trend in
Israeli society in recent years. Yet it did
not reverse or seriously disrupt this
trend. Despite Likud’s disasterous
economic policy and the unprecedented
dissent raised by the war in Lebanon,
the Labor Alignment did not obtain a
clear electoral mandate for an alterna-
tive course.
Given the underlying sameness of
Likud and Labor concerning expansion
and colonialization - the hallmarks of
Zionism, there was no rational reason to
expect meaningful change in Israeli pol-
icy towards the Palestinian question,
withdrawal from Lebanon, etc. There
were, however, widespread predictions
that Labor would get sufficient votes to
form a government in view of the
economic situation. On the contrary, the
elections affirmed that social discontent
in ‘Israel’ is still easily absorbed. Despite ;
Likud’s having presided over the steady
worsening of the crisis, social discontent
did not merge into a massive shift away
from the extreme right.
Discontent was instead reflected in
a relative fragmentation of votes as com-
pared with the 1981 elections, when
Likud and Labor together accounted for
80% of the votes. This time the figure
was 70%, giving Labor 44 Knesset
seats and Likud 42. Fifteen lists gained
representation as opposed to ten in
1981. With few exceptions, this spread-
ing of voting was between lists whose
political differences are so small as to be
almost irrelevant if one is not a Zionist.
Yet the added leverage of the smalt par-
ties make the formation of anew govern-
ment even more difficult than in 1981
when this process took over a month.
This is especially true because the gains
of the smaller parties were roughly
divided between the far left and right.
(Except for the Democratic Front for
Peace and Equality, whose main com-
ponent Rakah is a genuine left force, our
use of the terms /eft and right are relative
to the spectrum of Zionist politics.)
To the left of Labor, the new Arab-
Jewish Progressive List for Peace
20
aggression
i
i
;
t
a
acquired two Knesset.seats without this
reducing the representation of the
Democratic Front for Peace and Equal-
ity which retained its four seats. The Citi-
zens’ Rights Movement, which advo-
cates immediate withdrawal from Leba-
non and some vague form of Palestinian
self-determination (without the PLO of
course), rose from one seat to three,
having formed a common list with Baron
of Peace Now and Ran Cohen of Sheli.
Shinui, also considered dovish, gained
three seats as opposed to two last time.
To the right of Likud, Tehiya, which
opposed returning the Sinai, got five
seats as compared to three in 1981, hav-
ing consolidated itself by joining forces
with Tzomet of General Eitan, the
butcher of Lebanon. The blatantly fas-
cist tendency within Zionism gained an
Official place and thus added immunity in
the Israeli system, as Rabbi Kahane’s
KACH list gained a seat for the first time.
Kahane celebrated by leading his gang
on a rampage through Arab East
Jerusalem. KACH now plans to escalate
its presence in the Galilee and Triangle
and has vowed to stage a similar
«march» through Um al Fahm, known as
a center for Palestinian social and cul-
tural activities.
In view of the lack of clear-cut plur-
ality for either Labor or Likud, the religi-
ous parties, whose composite weight
remained the same, and the three seats
gained by former Defense Minister
Weizman are pivotal in forming a new
government.
This is the background for the cur-
rent negotiations where Likud and Labor
are both scrambling to form their own
government or at least preempt the
other from doing so. The complexity of
this process and its possible failure have
raised the prospect of national unity gov-
ernment. There are also speculations
about holding new elections after three
months. Whatever the final results in
terms of a government, the election
results made a mockery of the illusions
of Arab and Palestinian right-wingers
who banked on Labor's return to edge
their way into the imperialist settlement.
In addition to the ultimate fallacy of
expecting real concessions from Labor,
the election results rule out the possibil-
ity of a strong Labor government which
could implement its own policy unilater-
ally. Yet one should not be deceived by
the seeming fragmentation on the Israeli
political scene. In reality it masks a
deeper unity between Zionism’s main
currents and the consistent rightwards
march of Israeli politics, accentuated in
times of crisis.
The campaign
The campaign itself reflected the
higher unity in Zionism and the con-
tinued strength of the right. There was a
kind of non-aggression pact between
the Likud and the Labor to avoid the vio-
lence that plagued the 1981 campaign.
Both were aware of the disasterous con-
sequences of real division in the colo-
nial-settler state. Labor in particular is
afraid of the extreme right which has
demonstrated its capacity for using vio-
lence even against fellow Jews. Labor’s
campaign was not a frontal attack on the
Likud; the latter's policies were not
emphasized as being wrong but as not
having worked. Labor’s most publicized - هو جزء من
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