Democratic Palestine : 5 (ص 22)
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- Democratic Palestine : 5 (ص 22)
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sions, based on the percentage of east-
ern Jews in the total population. In real-
ity, this is the political expression of a
class question; it is not related to the
number of eastern Jews, but to the
emergence and growth of a class force
in the society.
The Tami party, claiming to repre-
sent the eastern Jews, obtained only
2.3% of the 1981 vote. This is one indi-
cation that the immigrants’ origin does
not necessarily dictate their political
choice. Other, more decisive forces gov-
ern Israeli voting patterns. Moreover, the
Jewish population of ‘Israel’ is not only
composed of immigrants from east or
west. By 1981, 58% were born in ‘Israel’
as opposed to 26.3% in 1950. Of the
remainder in 1981, 19.1% had immig-
rated from Asia or Africa, and 23.9%
from Europe or America. This means
that the majority are more a product of
the new society than of the one from
which they came.
Without denying that there is an
ethnic problem in ‘Israel’, one must
determine its true extent and whether it
is growing or receding. Given that there
is material discrimination against east-
ern Jews, there can be two alternatives:
(1) joining a political institution with an
ethnic character, or (2) joining an institu-
tion that rejects the basis of this discrimi-
nation. The first alternative is rep-
resented by the Tami, whose limited size
we have noted. The second is rep-
resented by the Israeli Communist
Party, today Rakah. Without going into
the details of this party’s development, it
is known that its main base of support is
among Palestinian Arabs, and that it has
proved difficult to expand its base
among the Jewish population despite
various efforts.
In summary, the great majority of
eastern Jews opted for neither of these
alternatives. The size of the ethnic and
class problem was so small as to keep
the door open for a political alternative
based on the programs of the major par-
ties which deal with the major problems
of the society as a whole.
Political division. or active
political life?
‘Israel’ has an active political life,
facilitated by an electoral system of
proportional representation whereby a
party needs only one percent of the vote
to gain Knesset representation. This
gives the appearance of political divi-
sion: many election lists, splits and shift-
ing alliances. We must go behind these
surface phonemena to discover the logic
22
which guides Israeli political life. This
can be summarized as follows:
1. Divisions and shifts in Israeli par-
ties to the right... This is an experience
shared by the Marxist left as well as the
Zionist left and the right. For example,
Mapam, the Labor Party’s partner in the
Alignment coalition, presented itself as
Marxist for many years until eventually
denying this identity. When the Israeli
Communist Party split in 1965, the
Jewish majority separated in an attempt
to create a synthesis between Zionism
and Marxism,then departed from Marx-
ism altogether and eventually disap-
peared. Mapai, the Labor Party, experi-
enced a division led by Ben Gurion who
participated in the 1965 elections as
Rafi, along with Peres, Horowitz,Dayan,
etc. Later some of Rafi’s figures returned
to Labor, while others joined other par-
ties to the right. Mapai also experienced
the advance of its hawkish wing at the
expense of doves.
On the Zionist right, there was
growing inclination towards unity. This
resulted in the formation of the Gahal
coalition and later the Likud, which came
to power in 1977. Similar to the develop-
ment in Mapai, the hawkish wing gained
strength. Those to the right of Begin in
terms of rejecting Camp David, gained
the initiative: Shamir, Arens, Orgad.
New rightist formations gained Knesset
representation: Tehiya.
2. The gravitation of Israeli voters
towards the big coalitions...Despite the
many electoral lists and the emergence
of new ones, the proportion of votes to
these lists decreased in favor of the two
main coalitions. Lists based on individu-
als gained little weight even when
headed by prominent figures. Also, the
traditional religious parties gravitated
towards the Likud which attracted an
increasing number of their voters.
3. The basis for polarization is polit-
ical as opposed to ethnic or social fac-
tors.
The material base for the
right’s entrenchment
The general direction of political
development in ‘Israel’ is to the right. We
do not expect dramatic results in this
election that will reverse this trend, for it
has deep material causes. The shift to
the right can be traced to political and
social conditions in ‘Israel’; especially
since 1970, there has been a qualitative
shift that has moved increasing strata of
the population to new class positions.
The era is past when the state and His-
tadrut controlled everything through the
Labor Party and the economic, social
and political absorption of new immig-
rants. The Israeli economy has been
transformed in a way that the industrial
sector gained dominance; within it, mod-
ern technological industry became the
base.
The Israeli economy absorbs over
200,000 Arab workers in a total labor
force of 1.5 million. This allows a size-
able portion of the Jewish labor force to
leave its former position in production for
‘superior’ work. This is not primarily a
question of moving to the service sector,
but of rising to the position of profession-
als and experts. This has augmented the
labor aristocracy and given the right a
new reserve force.
As an example of this trend: In 1960
there were 98,800 Israeli Jews working
in agriculture, among them 36,100 wage
laborers. By 1981, despite the Jewish
population’s increase from 1.9 million to
3.2 million, the number of Jewish
agricultural workers was only 61,200,
among them 15,700 wage laborers.
The economic transformation of the
Jewish labor force has had its social
consequences. Statistics on private car
ownership and housing provide indica-
tions of this. Of wage laborers (heads of
families), 3.6% owned a car in 1962. By
1981, this figure was 38.5%. This is not
far fromthe 45.7% of self-employed who
owned a car in the same year. The
above figures also include Palestinian
Arabs, ot whom in 1981, 13.3% owneda
car. Taking their percentage into
account and also accounting for recent
developments, we can project that
approximately one-half of Jewish wage
laborers own a Car today.
Concerning housing: In 1967,
41.4% of families resided in houses with
an average of one per room. In 1981, the
figure was 54.6%. In the same period,
the number of families with two or more
per room fell from 31.3% to 11.9%;
those with three or more per room fell
from 10.2% to 1.4%.
In this context, it is important to
point out that: (1) Social comfort did not
begin with the Likud; and (2) There is a
deep link between the socio-economic
development and the 1967 war which
gave ‘Israel’ and its economy a vital
opportunity for expansion. The occupied
territories are not only a religious or polit-
ical affair but have become a direct
interest for an increasing number of
Jewish citizens. This is among the basic
material causes of the transition to the
right, which began almost two decades
ago. @ - هو جزء من
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