Democratic Palestine : 9 (ص 11)
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- Democratic Palestine : 9 (ص 11)
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What the US really wants is assur-
ances that it will not be a PLO delega-
tion: «We are counting on Arafat not
endorsing 242», said a State Depart-
ment official (Middle East Policy Survey,
April 5). To sound out the precedent of a
non-PLO delegation, Murphy met a
group of about 40 West Bank Palesti-
nians. More than 100 nationalist per-
sonalities of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip condemned this meeting, calling
for a boycott and emphasizing that any-
one attending violates the will of the
Palestinian people, for the US only aims
to eliminate the Palestinian cause.
Unfortunately, some of those who did
attend have been considered part of the
nationalist, pro-PLO ranks. Their atten-
dance shows the confusing and divisive
effect of Arafat’s right-wing line on our
people under occupation.
Murphy's visit precipitated new
problems for the deviating Palestinian
leadership. The Jordanian Prime Minis-
ter demanded a clear-cut written answer
to the US conditions, to be delivered by
Abu lyad and Farouq Qaddoumi, or
there will be problems in the PLO-Jorda-
nian relations. Since these two are
known for their criticism of the Amman
accord, this is the regime’s way of cor-
nering Arafat. The Executive Committee
meeting in Baghdad in mid-April was
reported to be explosive, pitting Arafat
and Hani Hassan against those who
want to retain a role for the PLO. The offi-
cial decision was to participate in a joint
delegation only as the PLO and without
recognizing ‘Israel’. Yet a few days later
inaradio interview, Hani Hassan termed
the Murphy plan a positive advance; he
said that the Palestinian delegation can
be independents and that all Fatah
accepts the Amman accord. Thus, from
now until Schultz's visit is the final
chance for those in Fatah’s Central
Committee, who profess adherence to
the PLO’s national role, to break with the
deviating line.
Because of the anticipated mass
reaction, the Palestinian right is careful
not to reveal the depth of its deviation in
public statements. However, there are
indications that in their defeatism, they
have opted for some kind of ‘autonomy’
plan, long ago rejected by our masses,
as the only feasible solution. In the last
issue of Palestinian Affairs, the PLO
Research Center’s journal, Sabri Jiryis
provided the «theoretical» background
for why such thoughts are now enter-
tained. He basically concluded that the
results of the 1982 Zionist invasion of
Lebanon were a favor for the PLO: They
freed it of the armed struggle, «Syrian
pressure» and_ internal opposition.
Accordingly, the 17th PNC in Amman
was the best of all sessions. With such
arguments in print, we hardly need
polemics as to how the right-wing
bourgeoisie is incapable of continuing
the Palestinian revolution.
«Land for Peace» means
«autonomy»
The Jordanian and, before it, the
Egyptian regime launched the «land for
peace» formula because of their class
need for reactionary stability in the area.
The Palestinian right has now followed
suit, because its own class nature
renders it incapable of continuing the
national struggle. Due to the right-wing’s
attempt to cover its real intention, it is
necessary to examine this formula to
see how it links up with the ‘autonomy’
plan.
Of course, the basic fallacy of this
formula is that it reduces the Palestinian
cause and Middle East conflict to border
questions, when in reality it is a struggle
for the Palestinian people's very exis-
tence and nationhood. More broadly, itis
a struggle over whether imperialism will
succeed in dominating the area totally
and perpetuating its forward base, 'ls-
rael’.
Having said this, let us deal with the
details of the «land for peace» formula.
The Palestinian and Arab right are
wagering on Labor's premiership in the
Israeli government, so let us look at
Labor Zionism’s version of «land for
peace» as it was outlined in the plan of
Allon, foreign minister in the 1970s.
While this plan was never officially
adopted by the Israeli government, it did
serve as Labor's guide in establishing 76
settlements in the 1967 occupied ter-
ritories, and the encirclement of
Jerusalem with Jews-only suburbs, up
till 1977. Among these settlements are
Maale Adumin and Kiryat Arba. Today
these two compromise over one-half the
total number of settlers in the West
Bank. They combine the two demo-
graphic ingredients needed for perma-
nent Zionist control: Maale Adumin is an
urban center, attracting ‘non-ideologi-
cal’ Jews who need cheaper housing
and thus gain material interests in retain-
ing the West Bank. Kiryat Arba is infam-
ous as the home of the ultra-aggressive
and expansionist-minded _ settlers
whose terror attacks aim to empty the
West Bank of the Palestinians, paving
the way for annexation. In this light, it is
ironic that Labor is viewed as willing to
exchange land for peace. Allon, like so
many Israeli politicians,started his ca-
reer in the military.His plan was
designed to meet «defense» needs, i.e.
plans for strategic control of land and
water resources, outlining ‘concessions’
that would not impede these priorities.
While the Jordanian regime pre-
tends that 242 means exchanging total
peace for total land, the Zionists have a
different interpretation. Zalman Shoval,
former MK and aide to Moshe Dayan,
has pointed put the wording of 242:
«Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent con-
flict» and not, as he notes, «the forces»
or «the territories»: «In other words,
while the resolution does indeed call for
withdrawal of Israeli forces from ‘ter-
ritories’ it does not indicate which or how
many forces or which territories...there
will be a withdrawal of forces-but only
insofar as this does not make the bound-
aries insecure...lsrael-also in accor-
dance with 242-could ‘withdraw armed
forces’ from areas not vital to its security
and redeploy them in military camps»
(Jerusalem Post, March 24th).
Thus, 242 does not contradict the
‘autonomy’ plan. Cabinet minister Ezer
Weizman has stated that 242 is not a for-
mula for trading land against peace, but
for sharing the administration, as per-
Ceived in the ‘autonomy’ plan. To News-
week (November 26, 1984), Weizman, a
veteran of Israeli- Egyptian relations and
billed as «understanding» towards the
Arabs, stated: «I will stick to the
autonomy formula we accepted at Camp
David. | don’t want the West Bank and
Gaza annexed to Israel, and | don't
believe in. territorial compromise with
Jordan.» Prime Minister Peres has said
that ‘autonomy’ is the first topic on the
agenda in future negotiations with Jor-
dan. On March 21st, Defense Minister
Rabin told the other side of this story: He
assured Settlers in the Gaza Strip that
the territory «must remain an inseparar
ble part of the State of Israel». Inthe light
of all this, itis difficult to see the great dif-
ference between Labor policy and
Begin’s «autonomy for the people not
the land».
Regardless of these realities, the
Palestinian right endorsed the «land for
peace» formula and all its anticipated
consequences, trying to drag the PLO
into Arab reaction’s wagering on the
Labor Zionist policy and US imperialism.
There is an objective reason why the
Palestinian and Arab right fall prey to
such illusions: Their class nature pre-
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