Democratic Palestine : 9 (ص 25)
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- Democratic Palestine : 9 (ص 25)
- المحتوى
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basis of redistributing power among the representatives of the
sects. Therefore, the matter hinges on the balance of power
between the nationalist alliance as a whole and the enemy,
and between the different social groups within the national
alliance. The matter is one of conflict within unity: How to man-
age such a conflict between the nationalist forces within the
framework of the primary contradiction between these forces
as a whole and the main enemy. This must be done so that the
working class party neither be isolated from other forces that
have an interest in fighting Israeli occupation, nor submit to the
lowest denominator of the program of its allies, for in the final
analysis this does not lead to ending foreign domination.
There have been attempts to belittle the role of the
communists in the Lebanese national resistance.
How do you explain this in terms of your party's
desire not to put itself in the forefront, and in terms
of others’ role in belittling your contribution?
Frankly, we are striving to establish better structures for
waging the struggle, since it is not an easy one, and not one we
would be comforted by the thought of waging alone. We have
looked for formats which would facilitate the participation of
others, and how their role would be made known. In our view,
the degree of participation of other forces is the main chal-
lenge, on which the success or failure of this work hinges. If the
struggle had been waged exclusively by the communists, it
would have remained limited, qualitatively and quantitatively;
the mobilization of the broadest energies for this national strug-
gle task would have been obstructed; the communists would
have continued to be honored for their role, but this could not
have been transformed into a decisive historical movement in
the Lebanese struggle, nor in terms of its regional impact.
Therefore, the Party labored for a long time on the premise that
the main task was for the struggle to grow, rather than the
Party’s declaring its own identity.
The Party’s identity is self-evident. Thus, the most we
want to accomplish is that our slogans of struggle are spread
and that the influence of the direction we call for broadens; we
are aware that this direction will subsequently yield gains,
including organizational gains. The fact that there is no direct
reflection of our work in the propaganda field does not bother
us,for we consider the struggle to eliminate the Israeli occupa-
tion of the South to be a long and complicated process, not a
matter of propaganda stunts, or dependent on what events
surface.
We realize that some other forces, whose participation is
essential on the mass level and important militarily, are more
able than us to be on the surface at this specific stage, due to
their nature. We have no mosques or husainiyat (religious
community centers); nor do we have the protection of being
associated with a particular sect, or any religious cover. It is
completely natural for other forces to enjoy greater freedom of
movement in work among the broad masses. Such is the case,
for example, with the local bourgeoisie in Saida, that broad
gathering whose nationalist positions are expressed by MP
Nazeeh al Bizra. There is also Adel Oseiran (MP from the
South, now Defense Minister), who surprised many by his
nationalist positions at the Geneve and Lausanne conferences
(held after the nationalist victories in Lebanon 1983-84). There
is also the Amal movement with its broad potential for move-
ment in the South, and the gatherings of Shiite theologians,
among whom there are a number of militant patriots who
encourage and participate in military operations.
We never viewed these forces to be in competition with us
or in contradiction with our work, which is characterized by its
internal, infrastructural and organizational nature in the milit-
ary, organizational and mass fields. It is heartening for us that
these allies started to realize with us that facing an enemy of
such a nature requires an organizational structure for waging
the struggle at the highest level.
Due to its radical and and long-term nature, the struggle
requires revolutionary organization and correct alliances bet-
ween the forces that have an interest in continuing it. It does
not bother us that the media does not mention the role of the
communists, but we are outraged if the struggle is not pre-
sented in its true dimension, as a national liberation struggle
against Israeli occupation and foreign domination. We are con-
vinced that our role is obvious firstly to the masses in the South
and secondly to the Lebanese masses as a whole. If we were
forced to choose between a more distiguished role for our-
selves as opposed to more bredth, we would prefer bredth.
This does not stem from an idealistic position of self-negation,
which some of our allies think is characteristic of us. No, it
stems from concern for the interests, role and growth of the
Party in the long-term battle, the results of which will not be
measured like the daily tabulations of a shopkeeper, but by the
final results of the struggle.
Some view the role of the Party in terms of the number of
pictures allocated to it in the newspapers, but | would like to
remind you of one fact: During the liberation war in Vietnam,
pictures of Buddhist clergy burning themselves in protest
against the actions of the occupation authorities dominated the
news media, as a form of struggle for liberation. This did not
bother the Vietnamese communists. On the contrary, it heart-
ened them, for it expressed the fact that the liberation struggle
encompassed very broad social sectors, including those cler-
gymen, who were contributing heroically to the process of
overall popular uprising against the occupation. The same is
true in our case
This is one side of the story. The other side is that there are
many forces inside and outside of Lebanon that concentrate a
great deal of energy on preventing the Lebanese communists
from playing an essential role in the national liberation strug-
gle. Due to their class positions, these forces realize that their
room for maneuver vis-a-vis the national cause increases in
proportion to the weakness of the positions of the party of the
working class; that their ability to influence the struggle
diminishes as the party of the working class assumes a greater
role; that the horizons of the struggle will remain within the
bounds of imperialism’s supervision in one way or another, as
long as the Communist Party does not assume a leading role;
and that the horizons will go beyond the bounds of imperialist
solutions if the Party assumes its vanguard role.
The role of the Party is not confined to the South, however
central and essential this region may be, but encompasses the
overall Lebanese struggle. As part of the designs of the enemy,
there are attempts at stamping it out, so as to enhance the sec-
tarian aspect at the expense of the class, social and national
liberation nature of the battle. Accordingly, the sectarian fightis
«legitimate, for it leads in the final analysis to sectarian solu-
tions, but the fight for national liberation is «forbidden» so that
a democratic solution will not impose itself. In this regard, one
could see the direct influence of the US and the West in gen-
eral, and of Arab and international reaction. We could also see
some shortcomings on the part of the progressive national
resistance, and some weaknesses in the Arab nationalist pos-
ition. @
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- Democratic Palestine : 9
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