Democratic Palestine : 9 (ص 29)
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- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 9 (ص 29)
- المحتوى
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«For a united, federal, democratic Sudan»
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Interview ‘with Col/Dr. John Garang, leader of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army and Movement
(SPLA/SPLM)
How do you. characterize the
new regime in Sudan?
The new. military.regime in Khar-
toum has no real relation with the forces
that brought down Numeiri: the SPLA.
the workers, professionals, students
and the traditional political parties. None
of these are represented in the ruling
Military Council which is the real’ power.
Neither are most of these. forces rep-
resented in the civilian cabinet. of Al
Jazoli Dafalla which is composed
wholely from the professional unions
and traditional political parties. These
are uncontestable facts. The new
regime does not belong to those who.
suffered the most during Numeiri’s 16
years of misrule, or who actually strug-
gled to overthrow him. The new regime
is therefore bound to be insensitive and
intransigent.
In effect, it is the regime of the same
generals who, until April 5th or even 6th,
were still defending Numeirt and shoot-
ing down demonstrators who stormed
Kober prison to release the prisoners.
This is why we denounced the regime as
neo-Numeirism, Numeiri’s regime in a
different form. Whatever clothes ‘the
hyena puts on, it remains a hyena.
What is Swareddahab’s position
on the problem in southern
Sudan, and what are the aims of
your struggle?
The regime never stopped fighting
the SPLA even during the seven days of
ceasefire which we declared. They
attacked our forces in Farhala and
Jehon. Then,
announced their own unilateral cease-
fire, they attacked our forces in Fangak.
The regime is actually preparing for war
not peace. All this talk about peace is
only to deceive the Sudanese public and’
hoodwink international opinion. Until
now, the regime has never sent a mes-
senger or message to the SPLA. The
generals base their policies on lies and
wishful thinking, not on objective
realities. in complete disregard of the
Sudanese people.
As to Swareddahab’s stand on the
so-called Southern Question. you will
have to ask him. Our view of the problem
is clear in our manifesto: The SPLA/
especially after they:
SPLM has long ago. in July 1983.
rejected the thesis of the Question or
Problem. of Southern Sudan. It is the
nationalities question that must be
addressed in general. It is simply
because the South took up arms, in
1955-77, that the nationalities problem
has traditionally been identified with the
South. but other nationalities or regions
are also capable of taking up arms if no
general solution is found.
In fact, the war in the-South.has
effected other regions and nationalities
in a major irreversible way. So there is a
general demand for .some form of
regionalism for the West, East and
North. This is a fact. So, if you solve the
problem of southern Sudan even in what
appears to be a satisfactory way, then
you will soon after be faced with the
problem of the Nuba Mountains, the Fur
or the Beja, and the country will again be
bogged down in civil war.. .
Hence, the SPLA/SPLM addresses
the nationalities question in Sudan as a
whole. and proposes a comprehensive
solution: a united, federal, democratic
Sudan in which the federal states have
real power, in the hands of the masses
not the elitist intellectual bourgeoisie.
The structure of the federal government
would be shared-in.such a way that all
the states effectively participate. .
Why aren't you participating in
the new cabinet?
It is not true that we tefused to par-
ticipate in the Military Council or in the
civilian cabinet -of Al Jazoli Dafalla.
Nobody consulted. the SPLA/SPLM. As
usual things were determined in Khar-
toum, by Khartoum. The regime created
a story that | was on my way to Khar-
toum, knowing that this could not and.
would not materialize. This was simply
to deceive the public that the SPLA/
SPLM had refused to participate. The
Strategy of the generals was to isolate
the real forces that overthrew Numeiri.
Jazoli's government is not really a gov-
ernment. It was a concoction of the gen-
erals to defuse tension in the streets and
make people return to work. It has no
powers whatsoever. Take foreign affairs
as an example: Itis the generals who are
globetrotting, not the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Jazoli's government should res-
ign and leave the generals to run their
show until the people run them out.
How can the generals’ attempt
to cool down the popular upris-
ing be prevented?
The real issues that led to the popu-
tar uprising will continue to baffle-the
generals as .they did .Numeiri.. The
economy is in complete shambles and
will continue to deteriorate. under the
plunder of the generals’ neo-Numeirism.
The national and religious questions will
continue to haunt them. Given their nar-
row, sectarian outlook, they: cannot
come near to a correct analysis, let
alone a solution. To be more concrete,
the real guarantee that the generals will
not succeed in hijacking the people's
revolution is the SPLA. The SPLA is the
dynamo of the popular uprising and will
keép it aflame to burn down the new
generals.
What really happened concern-
ing Numeiri’s allowing Sudan to
be used for the transfer of Ethio-
pian Jews to Israel?
The Sudan Airways workers are
best situated. to expose this plot. They
are doing, this well and we appreciate
their revolutionary stand. Numeiri's
motive in this undertaking was most cer-
tainly financial. It is reported that more
than 56 million dollars in bribes were
paid to Numeiri and his immediate circle
of officials. Such .a.giant project cannot
be executed without the knowledge and
explicit involvement of the ministry of
defense. Civil aviation was under the
ministry of defense at this time. And who
was the minister of defense when the
project was executed? Of course, the
same generals who are now the govern-
ment. The question is not whether, but
how much some of them took of the 56
million dollars, and to what extent they
Participated in the plot. Numeiri and the
present regime are inseparable. The
generals cannot bring Numeiri to trial for
this affair or for any of his hideous crimes
because that would also incriminate
them. Some window dressing can be
nade to hoodwink the public, but'no real
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- Democratic Palestine : 9
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