Democratic Palestine : 10 (ص 7)
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- Democratic Palestine : 10 (ص 7)
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arms to the Lebanese army, and the Syrian units of the Arab
Deterrent Force will return to Syria.
9. «The basic concept of this plan is consistent with the
objective of the Government of Lebanon that all foreign milit-
ary forces withdraw from Lebanon.»
These are the terms that were imposed as a result of the
siege of Beirut and the balance of forces at the time. It is clear
that this agreement cancels the Cairo agreement and all the
rights of our people in Lebanon. Our arms were to be handed
over and our fighters dispersed. The agreement included our
formally taking as given final arrangements that would leave no
foreign presence in Lebanon, including that of the Palestinian
revolution.
The rightist leadership did not have the courage to cancel
the Habib agreement. Possibly this was because of the critical
situation, the sensitivity of the balance of forces, and the
atmosphere of national unity at that time. But is it then logical
to attack the Damascus agreement which cancelled the Habib
agreement, and implemented the right of our people to political
and military action? Why do they attack the Damascus agree-
ment which deepened the nationalist relations between Pales-
tinians and Lebanese, and which preserves the right of the
Palestinian revolution to continue its struggle from Lebanon,
side by side with the Lebanese masses and national forces? Is
it not unfair to criticize the Damascus agreement which
restored respect for the meaning of joint nationalist relations
between Lebanese and Palestinians, which stopped
bloodshed in the camps and in fact saved them?
Why the right attacks the Damascus agreement
The third fact concerns the credibility of the attackers.
Those who now cry out against the Damascus agreement are
well-known for their weak political stands throughout the his-
tory of the contemporary Palestinian revolution. Most, if not all,
of the agreements they have made with the Arab authorities
and others reflect a weak political stand. There are many
examples, from the agreements made in Amman (after Black
September 1970), to the Habib agreement in Beirut. In 1977,
the Shtoura agreement was signed under conditions much
less difficult than those which existed in the camps during the
recent fighting. To those who pretend to forget, we mention
some of the points of the Shtoura agreement: (1) removing all
armed appearances; (2) hindering those who carry arms out-
side the camps; (3) withdrawing from the camps the arms
which exceed the amount stipulated in the Cairo agreement;
(4) stations will be assigned for the Arab Deterrent Force
around the camps. Also included was that joint committees
would be formed to supervise implementation of the agree-
ment according to a schedule, and that the Arab Deterrent
Force would attack any illegal arms stores in any part of Leba-
non.
These are the points of an agreement that was signed at
a time when the Palestinian revolution enjoyed considerable
power from North to South Lebanon. It was at the time of the
ascent of the Lebanese national forces, fighting side by side
with us, politically and militarily. Yet the Lebanese national
forces were disregarded in the Shtoura agreement.
In view of these facts, do those who raise their voices to
outbid the Salvation Front in signing the Damascus agree-
ment, have a right to be critical? Can we view the present con-
ditions, the balance of forces and the Damascus agreement as
a defeat, yet hold in regard the other agreements which
included real concessions concerning the rights and gains of
our people in Lebanon and elsewhere? Can we view the
agreements signed by the rightist leadership, under conditions
better than the present, as victories or proof of their credibility
and cleverness? What does this say about the credibility of the
Palestinian right’s attack on the Damascus agreement?
The roots of the problem
The fourth fact concerns the roots of the problem which we
must view in a long-range perspective in order to see the
essence of the right-wing’s attack on the Damascus agree-
ment. There are two main reasons for this campaign:
First: The right-wing deviators share a common
denominator with those who initiated the camp war: an ultimate
wish to devastate the camps. The deviators want this in order
to take advantage of the catastrophe to go further in their
involvement with the US solution for the area, in accordance
with the Arafat-Hussein agreement. The second party, the
initiators of the war, work to enact this catastrophe in order to
strengthen their geopolitical position in Lebanon, and increase
their share of the sectarian cake. This party hopes to benefit
from an illusory political settlement for Lebanon. They proved
their intent to get a bigger share of the cake by initiating the
camp war.
Even if they appear to be at odds, these two parties start
from a common point, and both will be harmed by the
implementation of the Damascus agreement. They will try to
keep it from working by all means.
Second: the struggle in the Palestinian arena between
two political lines affects all aspects of Palestinian action. The
Salvation Front is the pole opposing the deviationist line. The
Salvation Front is striving to gain legitimacy in leading the
Palestinian people on the basis of a clear program, adhering to
the PLO and its patriotic program, and confronting the
Capitulationist forces. Accordingly, the capitulationist forces
put all their energy into defending their positions and policies,
by rejecting the leadership and role of the Salvation Front,
because it is the antithesis of their capitulation.
The Salvation Front put all its political, military and popular
capacities of steadfastness to defend the camps of Beirut, then
concluded the Damascus agreement which recognizes it as
the leadership of the Palestinian people in Lebanon. In view of
this, it is not logical to accuse the Salvation Front and question
the credibility of its leadership. This campaign against the Sal-
vation Front is actually an extension of the struggle between
the two main political lines in the Palestinian arena; there is no
other explanation for it, if we view the terms of the Damascus
agreement honestly and concretely.
The deviating rightist leadership has accustomed us to the
continuing concessions it has freely made. This same leader-
ship views the Damascus agreement with bitterness, jealous
of the military and political leadership of the Salvation Front
which was tested for the first time on this level, and proved its
credibility. The heroic struggle of our people in the camp war
proved their potential for even greater struggle if there is a
steadfast leadership with a clear political line, defending Pales-
tinian rights in life and revolution, and defending the PLO
national program. In contrast, the capitulating leadership is
fearful; it has landed in defeatism and is running after its own
interests. It is this leadership that has squandered our people’s
steadfastness and the gains of their struggle. @
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- Democratic Palestine : 10
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