Democratic Palestine : 10 (ص 18)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 10 (ص 18)
- المحتوى
-
The Islamic Meeting
and the National Program
On July 9th, 13 Lebanese Muslim
leaders meeting in Damascus with
Syrian Vice-President Khaddam agreed
on a plan entitled «The National Prog-
ram for Solving the Lebanese Crisis».
This program proposes to end the secta-
rian structure of the Lebanese state and
institutions, enabling equal opportunity,
rights and duties for all. It calls for reor-
ganizing the army and formulating anew
constitution, stressing Lebanon's unity
as well as its Arab patriotic identity and
role. Also agreed on was a security plan
for West Beirut: withdrawing all armed
men from the streets, closing militia
offices and assigning security duties
soldy to the Internal Security Forces and
the Lebanese Army, with Syrian obser-
vers monitoring implementation.
Participants in the Damascus meet-
ing also agreed to form the Front for
National Alliance, grouping the parties of
the Lebanese National Democratic
Front (LNDF), the Amal movement, the
National Political Council for Saida, and
a number of other patriotic forces and
figures. This front sets a precedent, for
Amal has previously refused to enter a
formal alliance with the national and
progressive forces. The impetus for the
new program and front was common
desire to end the disorder and internal
strife plaguing West Beirut in the recent
period. This had assumed sectarian
dimensions with one group striving to
dominate the nationalist areas, and sec-
ondary conflicts taking precedence over
the struggle against the main enemies.
Muslim leaders met in Damascus to end
this situation, for it threatened the unity
of the nationalist forces at a time when
Lebanon still faces lingering Israeli
occupation and the fascist forces’ divi-
sive plans. The agreement reached is a
minimum for tackling the Lebanese
crisis which has become steadily more
complicated and deep-rooted. Ending
the sectarian system requires radical
change, not simply a reshuffling to
create a new kind of «balance». The
forces advocating democratic reform
must themselves leave behind every
vestige of sectarian thinking and prac-
tice.
18
Participants in the Damascus
meeting
Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rashid
Karami
Education Minister Salim Hoss
Transport Minister Walid Jumblatt,
leader of the Progressive Socialist Party
and the LNDF
| Justice Minister Nabih Berri, leader of
the Amal movement
Defense Minister Adel Osseiran
Mufti of the Republic, Sheikh Hassan
Khaled
Jaatarite Mufti Sheikh Abdelamir Kaba- |
lan
Vice-President of the Higher Shiite
Council, Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi
Shamseddin
Druze Sheikh Akl
Shakra
House Speaker Hussein Husseini
Sidon Deputy Nazih Bizri
Mustafa Saad, General Secretary of the
Saida Nasserite Organization
Director Genera! of Dar al Fatwa, Hus-
sein Kuwatly.
Mohammad Abu
If the stated goals are ever
implemented in practice, the consensus
reached in Damascus would be «a turn-
ing point in the history of relations bet-
ween Syria and Lebanon's national
forces», as it was characterized by the
Lebanese Communist Party. In any
case, by uniting their ranks and reassert-
ing demands for democratic reform, the
nationalists put the ball in President
Amin Gemayel’s court, again testing if
he will act as Lebanon's President or the
President of a particular sect. The
Damascus meeting is intended as a pre-
lude to new attempts at inter-Lebanese
reconciliation, leading to dialogue with
Lebanon's President and Christians.
«The «National Program» faces a
range of obstacles to implementation.
One obstacle is seen in the concept of
«Muslim-Christian» dialogue, for the
fascist forces lay claim to representing
the Christians. Amin Gemayel tried to
belittle the Damascus accord without
directly contradicting it: He equated it
with the principles adopted by Karami’s
national unity cabinet in 1984, which
have remained ink on paper in great part
due to Gemayel’s own handling of the
presidency in the interests of his party,
the Phalangists. The main components
of the fascist Lebanese Front, the
Phalangists and Chamoun’s National
Liberal Party, openly criticized the
accord. Chamoun interpreted it as
«auto-security» for the Muslims, justify-
ing the fascists’ «auto-security» in pre-
dominantly Christian areas. The fascists
are betting on the nationalist forces’ fai-
lure to reorganize and unify their ranks.
Thus the fascists could again avoid the
renewed demand for reforms.
Fascists close ranks
At the same time, the fascists scut-
tled to reunify their ranks in the face of
this new attempt to abolish the sectarian
system on which their privileges rest.
The procedure charted by the Phalan-
gist Party for resolving its tactical differ-
ences with the Lebanese Forces militias
was not due for completion until a con-
gress this autumn. However, on July
15th, the Lebanese Forces announced
that their military forces had united with
the Phalangist militia loyal to Amin
Gemayel. One can question whether
this has truly ended the internal con-
tradictions that led to Geagea’s revolt in
the spring and recurring, though usually
unreported clashes in East Beirut. Yet
the closing of the ranks was intended to
put the fascists in a better position to
sabotage «The National Program»
whether by Amin Gemayel’s political
maneuvering or by unleashing a new
round of violence.
Patriotic readiness
The obstacle posed by the fascist
forces was directly addressed by LNDF
leader Walid Jumblatt: As the security
plan was about to be implemented in
West Beirut in mid-July, he declared:
«What is happening may be useful and
may lead to a truce, but it will not lead to
a solution... There can be no sofution as
long as the Phalangist Party exists.»
The nationalist forces cooperated with
implementation of the new security plan - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 10
- تاريخ
- أغسطس ١٩٨٥
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
Contribute
Not viewed