Democratic Palestine : 11 (ص 6)
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- Democratic Palestine : 11 (ص 6)
- المحتوى
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us; that they do not see any Palestinian
armed role...
«During the war we tried to solve
the crisis in relations, in order to have
another opportunity to rebuild the tripar-
tite alliance on a new basis, whereby the
Palestinian partner can play an impor-
tant and effective role. This is exactly
what we are attempting to do now. The
following points constitute the basis for
rebuilding the alliance:
a) To preserve the Palestinian gun in
Lebanon...This means the preservation
of all the achievements of the Palesti-
nian revolution in Lebanon...This will
mean foiling the aims of the Zionist inva-
sion of 1982, to destroy the infrastruc-
ture of the Palestinian national strug-
gle... The PNSF realized early how vital
this matter is. The PNSF was quick to
present a working paper to regulate the
Palestinian presence and Palestinian-
Lebanese relations...
b) We understand that the non-Palesti-
nian partners to the tripartite alliance
have the right to present their point of
view of the commmon relationship. Of
course, the interests of all partners must
be taken into consideration - | mean their
interest in confronting the imperialist-
Zionist-reactionary enemy...
C) In any such alliance, there is always
room for minor contradictions and differ-
ing viewpoints. All partners must agree
on the methods for solving such con-
tradictions...»
Palestinian National Unity
«Concerning Palestinian national
unity, the Central Committee of Fatah
presented a memorandum expressing
their viewpoint on this unity. Unfortu-
nately, the memorandum confirmed our
viewpoint about the deceptive way in
which the Central Committee of Fatah
deals with the question of national
unity...
«Everyone knows that the major
obstacle to national unity is the Amman
accord...Fatah’s memorandum ignores
this subject...The public cancellation of
the Amman accord is a precondition for
national unity...
«There are some who believe that
the abrogation of the Amman accord is
possible while the official leadership of
the PLO remains in the leadership. The
PFLP holds no such conviction...How-
ever, we are ready to cooperate with all
other organizations, including those out-
side the PNSF. The common denom-
inator between us and them is the con-
demnation and abrogation of the Am-
man accord...»
6
The PNSF
«When the war of the camps broke
out in May of this year, some thought
that this would bring the PNSF to an
end...In reality, what has happened is
that the PNSF stood the test. This will
not lead us to draw overly optimistic con-
Clusions... The PNSF still faces a set of
contradictions. | will give some exam-
ples:
a) In the PFLP we still believe that the
base of Fatah is nationalist, despite the
fact that it is still dependent on the
leadership (the Central Committee),
financially and militarily. Accordingly, we
believe it is important to intensify
dialogue with Fatah’s base. The out-
come will be that this base will line up
with the PNSF...
b) There are still nationalist and democ-
ratic forces that remain outside the
PNSF...This fact should not lead us to
ignore them or escalate contradictions
with them. We have to convince them to
join the PNSF. If we fail, we have to try to
find the common denominator between
them and the PNSF...
c) The PFLP will comply with the politi-
cal platform of the PNSF which clearly
states that the aim of the PNSF is to
return the PLO to the nationalist, anti-
imperialist, anti-Zionist line. It is not to
split the PLO, or to have two organiza-
tions...»
The Amman accord
«All Palestinian nationalist organi-
zations, forces and personalities recog-
nized the threats posed by the Amman
accord...But there were some who
claimed that the accord was dead and
would remain dead...
«Now we can Say, with proof in our
hands, that the Palestinian right-wing,
deviationist leadership and the Jorda-
nian regime are still determined to pur-
sue their policy: the US, unilateral pol-
icy...For example, the right-wing leader-
ship and the Jordanian regime insisted
on convening the Arab summit with a
simple majority. Of course, their insis-
tence stems from the fact that they
needed an official Arab cover for the
Amman accord which was signed on
February 11, 1985...
«| differentiate between the serious
determination of both the (PLO) leader-
ship and the Jordanian regime to follow
the US solution, and the actual results of
their choice...After all, Israeli withdrawal
from the West Bank and Gaza Strip will
not be easy or even possible. However,
the dangers and splits caused by the
right-wing policy in the Palestinian
arena, should be evident. Herein lies the
necessity of confronting that pol-
icy...How can we confront and defeat
that policy?
«Our weapons are clear. First and
foremost is the weapon of comprehen-
sive, political, mass mobilization. This
mobilization will create a Palestinian will
able to besiege and destroy the right-
wing line. To succeed in this task, we
deemed it necessary for all organiza-
tions, forces and _ nationalist per-
sonalities to close ranks...1 am talking
about the PNSF and all other organiza-
tions opposed to the deviating line...
«A Palestinian peoples convention
should be the apex of this mobilization
process...We will call for such a conven-
tion in the name of the PNSF. Of course,
the PNSF will propagate its political plat-
form calling for the abrogation of the
Amman accord and the overthrow of its
proponents. After the convention, we
are ready to take a common stand with
the other organizations besides the
PNSF members...
«To succeed in this policy, we think
it is vital to elicit Arab support...We will
consolidate the tripartite alliance (Le-
banese nationalist-Palestinian-Syrian)..
We will consolidate our relations with the
Arab national movement...We cail for a
summit of the confrontation and stead-
fastness states...We will call for an Arab
peoples convention to back up the
Palestinian one...»
The Casablanca Summit
«The convening of the Arab summit
in Casablanca, was meant to provide a
cover for the Amman accord...The USA
wanted Arab support for that accord.
The cover was given in an implicit
form...lf you ask me why it was not given
explicitly, my answer will be that
America’s Arabs are not willing to enter
into an overt confrontation with Syria
and other Arab nationalist states...»
The Damascus agreement
«The implementation of the
Damascus agreement (to stop the war of
the camps) is going well... There are still
some obstacles to its full implementa-
tion...For example, there are still some
Palestinian prisoners who have not
been released. Not all forces of Amal
and the Lebanese Army Sixth Brigade
have withdrawn from all positions
around the camps...The reconciliation
process has not yet occurred...» - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 11
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