Democratic Palestine : 15 (ص 5)

غرض

عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 15 (ص 5)
المحتوى
PLO leadership encouraged the two enemies. What are their
plans?
King Hussein’s speech
The content of King Hussein’s speech clearly reflects his
intention to swallow the PLO...If there is one thing we have in
common with King Hussein, it is the necessity of studying this
speech very closely. Hussein gave a historical resume of how
his regime has viewed the Palestinian cause, emphasizing the
period after 1967. Time does not allow me to cover this speech
in detail, and | do not wish to keep you for three and a half hours
as he did. However, | do want to stress the main ideas.
Clearly, Hussein wishes to separate the subject of the
land from that of the Palestinian people’s national rights...He
emphasized UN resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of a just,
comprehensive and enduring solution for the Palestinian ques-
tion and the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, he com-
pletely neglected UN resolutions like 3336 which stress not
only the land, but the Palestinians’ right to return, self-determi-
nation and an independent national state! It is as if he is saying
it is important to save the land, but the martyrs of the Palesti-
nian revolution, the Palestinian people, the whole Palestinian
cause are something else.
Another idea along the same lines is his reference to this
period as one when the «consequences of aggression» must
be wiped out, i.e., to return the West Bank to the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, and then later deal with the other issues.
With respect to the decisions of the Rabat Summit of
1974, which acknowledge the PLO as the sole, legitimate rep-
resentative of the Palestinian people...Hussein intimated that
they have now become an obstacle to the process of recover-
ing the land. He goes further and tries to divide into two the
Palestinian people who are united under the banner of the
PLO. According to him, there are the West Bank and Gaza
Palestinians who are concerned with saving the land. Then
there are those Palestinians outside who don't really care
about saving the land, but are more concerned with slogans
and outbidding others.
some may say: «He has a point there; there is a foul set-
tlement plan, and frankly we want to save the land!» Well and
good, but how does Hussein propose to save the land?
There is a law derived from many revolutionary experi-
ences: What is taken by force can only be regained by force.
Our people’s experience with the Zionist enemy, the course of
the Zionist movement and the policies of the various Zionist
parties prove that it is impossible to expect ‘Israel’ to withdraw
from all the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Only if ‘Israel’ finds
itself under a barrage of fire mortally threatening it, might it
begin to consider withdrawal...Is that what the king has men-
tioned as a method for saving the land?...No! He advocates
diplomatic maneuvers...Maybe the US would finally condes-
cend to pacify Hussein with a piece of land?!
In short, Hussein's speech contains the following ideas:
(1)First we concern ourselves with the land and afterwards we
think about the people. (2)We restore the land through dip-
lomatic methods because of Arab weakness and hesitancy.
In the summer of 1971, we fought our last battle with the
regime on Jordanian soil. After that King Hussein proposed his
project for a ‘United Arab Kingdom’. The memoirs of prominent
US and Zionist politicians reveal that, during the decisive bat-
tles with the fedayeen, Hussein was promised the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.
Why wasn't he able to get the land back? Hasn't he read
the Likud’s program? He makes a big show of being scientific
and objective. We have the duty to expose his aims and deceit-
ful intentions to our masses. Let him read the Zionist programs
and then tell us if we can ever regain the land without force of
arms!
Hussein aims to swallow the PLO
In his speech, Hussein also stressed his adherence to the
Amman accord. He declared a halt to coordination with the
rightist leadership, but the accord still holds. King Hussein
realizes the extent to which the present PLO leadership is wil-
ling to stoop to enter the US gateway. He also wishes to pre-
serve the concessions already extracted. He wishes for this
leadership to go on making concessions until it liquidates itself
on its own.
Finally, | wish to point out that Hussein has now taken a
position different from the one he took after the Rabat deci-
sions. Houari Boumedien (the late Algerian president) person-
ally told me the story of how these decisions were made. They
were adopted unanimously. During the sessions, Hussein
opposed them. However, finding himself without sufficient
backing and due to the resounding voice of the PLO at that
time, Hussein grudgingly consented to their adoption. He said
to the PLO: «You try (and see if you can solve the Palestinian
Cause your way).»
In his speech, however, the king was definitely against the
Rabat decisions. This time he did not say: «The PLO and | did
not agree on resolutions 242 and 338, and | therefore leave the
matter up to the PLO.» This time, Hussein says: «I’m directly
concerned and my duties with regard to the East and West
Bank and Jerusalem oblige me to go ahead to save the land.»
This leads me to the political aim behind his speech.
Is the aim to pressure the PLO to make more concessions
and agree to resolutions 242 and 338?
Is it to protect his throne in the East Bank (Jordan), espe-
Cially in the light of the continuous Israeli threats?
Is it to decrease the difficulties in obtaining the arms pac-
kage from the US?
Is it to improve relations with Syria in the belief that the
Syrian stand towards the present PLO leadership would be
extended to all of the PLO?
The aim is all of the above in one form or another. We in
the PFLP believe, however, that the central aim is liquidating
the PLO, because it is considered the obstacle to the US solu-
tions. Other variations of this liquidation, which would allow for
the implementation of the US solutions, include finding a sub-
Stitute for the PLO, or a Hashemite PLO, or going ahead with-
out the PLO.
The wording of the speech is also indicative of Hussein’s
intentions. He notes that ever since 1967, he has taken the
initiative, or participated in all initiatives, except — he said —
the Sadat initiative, although he described it as a «historical
and daring» step. The ex-foreign minister of Egypt, Ibrahim
Kamel, notes in his memoirs that during the Camp David
negotiations, King Hussein was in continuous contact with
Sadat. Thus Hussein has not exempted himself from any initia-
tive. What he wishes to say is: «I will continue with these initia-
tives. | want the US to understand this well, so as to protect my
throne.»
For years we have led the battle to protect the PLO...Ever
since the foundation of the revolution, the enemy camp has
tried to liquidate it and the PLO. They imagined that they suc-
ceeded in defeating us in Jordan, but we sprang up again in
Lebanon. In Lebanon, the enemy tried many times to liquidate
3
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هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 15
تاريخ
أبريل ١٩٨٦
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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