Democratic Palestine : 19 (ص 23)
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- Democratic Palestine : 19 (ص 23)
- المحتوى
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cerned about the cause - far from it. It would have been much
better had they turned to the national democratic forces in
Egypt directly.
It is the duty of every progressive nationalist Arab to extin-
guish the fires of secondary conflict in the Arab nationalist
ranks. Dictated by a sense of responsibility towards the Arab
nation, all should support the unity of the PLO on the basis of
the Aden-Algiers agreement. No doubt, implementing the
Prague Declaration requires much struggle, before the unity of
the PLO is realized on the basis of opposition to imperialism -
far from any illusions - and allied with Syria and the Lebanese
national movement. This alliance would then be a genuine
support to the Egyptian national movement.
What are the implications of the relations between
Mubarak’s regime and the rightist PLO leadership,
for the Egyptian and the Palestinian national
struggles?
When Sadat returned from his visit to Jerusalem in 1977, he
was welcomed. It was only the Egyptian Communist Party and
the Progressive Unionist Party that opposed the visit.
However, before the year was out, all forces in the Egyptian
arena were opposed to this visit. The Egyptian people know
that Egypt was boycotted because of this visit, because of this
clear treason to the Palestinian and Egyptian cause.
If the regimes do not reconsider their relations with the
Egyptian regime, this will contribute to strengthening the illu-
sions of the Egyptian people that Mubarak’s regime is better
than Sadat’s. And if the PLO, the party directly concerned
with the cause, does not reconsider its relations with the Egyp-
tian regime, this reinforces these illusions.
This poses the question: What’s the use of a broad mass resur-
gence against the regime?
This all contributes to misinforming the masses and streng-
thens the illusions as to the nature of the regime and the extent
of its deterioration.
During the recent period, especially after the revolt of the
security forces, there was talk about national reconciliation
among national forces which possess a high level of awareness.
What, then, do we expect of the ordinary citizen when he wit-
nesses rapprochement between those directly involved in the
cause and the Egyptian regime. We remain opposed to any
attempts to build bridges with the Egyptian regime.
Some news agencies carried information about a
struggle among different factions in the Egyption
regime, especially between the former prime
minister and the defence minister and the president.
According to the news agencies, these struggles
were connected to Washington’s desire to change
the regime, replacing Mubarak with Abu Ghazala,
the defence minister, because he is more responsive
to Washington’s plans. In your opinion, how cor-
rect is this information? Does this have a rela-
tionship with developments in the region as a
whole?
First, it is necessary to clarify a subject that some ignore:
Mubarak and Abu Ghazala and Kamal Hassan Ali (the former
prime minister) are all sons of Egypt’s military institution.
Secondly, the question of struggles between various capita-
list forces is an established fact. In the USA, where pure capI-
talist development has reached its highest stages, there are
contradictions and struggles, for example, between the military
sector and the civilian industrial sector, between the oil mono-
polies and agricultural monopolies....etc. Such contradictions
are inevitable because any capitalist regime is based on compe-
tition. They are however secondary contradictions and will not
reach the point of rupturing the regime.
In Egypt also, there are contradictions between various fac-
tions of the ruling authority.
Some speak of comprador capitalism. Some prefer to des-
cribe it as parasitic, others as bureaucratic, and there are those
who speak about a big bourgeoise connected with foreign
capital.
Those some describe as «parasites» are, in fact, capitalists.
Some of them accumulated their wealth - at first through
illegitimate (i.e. parasitic) activities, stealing, bribery, illegal
transactions between the private and public sectors, hashish
trade...etc. Let us take Sadat as an example. At first, he
accumulated his wealth through illegitimate means. After
accumulating this wealth, preserving it necessitated its
investment into bigger projects. For example, Sadat owned a
tile factory, a petroleum shipping company, poultry farms and
farm lands, a company for importing wood...etc. All these are
activities which are at the heart of normal capitalist activity.
Capitalism which accumulated its wealth through parasitic
activities, is big capitalism. Those who accumulated their
capital by taking advantage of their positions in the public
sector, i.e. bureaucratic bourgeoisie, also began expansion by
investing this wealth in their own private projects.
Conflicts emerge among the various bourgeois sectors, on
who will be the decision-maker. They are, however, all joined
through links to foreign capital, the multinational corpora-
tions, and their complete subjugation to the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund schemes. In addition, they
are organically united among themselves in their exploitation
of the toiling masses of worker and peasants.
Thus such contradictions are secondary and cannot be relied
upon to reach a stage whereby radical changes can occur,
resulting in a nationalist regime. The wagering on such false
hopes by differentiating between such things as «evil parasitic
capitalists» and «positive capitalist production» must be eli-
minated. The latter is an expression of the intermarriage bet-
ween local and foreign capital.
Discussion of the possibility that Abu Ghazala may orches-
trate a coup against Mubarak in order to force the latter into
granting more concessions, has no support in reality. Let us
take the example of the General Motors Corporation deal
which Abu Ghazala was involved in and signed for the pro-
duction of cars in Egypt. This ‘gain’ for the big bourgeoise in
Egypt was reciprocated with a concession to the U.S. : allowing
the passage of U.S. nuclear warships through the Suez Canal.
This concession was made by Mubarak not Abu Ghazala. We
are confident that Abu Ghazala does not have more to offer
than Mubarak.
With respect to a possible military coup, it is known that any
coup in order to succeed must offer something to win credibi-
lity. What will Abu Ghazala offer? Will he say he is against
corruption and Mubarak is a symbol of that corruption? Can
he promise to extricate Egypt from its chronic economic crisis?
The option of a military coup is improbable; however what
may prolong the life of the regime is the liberal facade that
allows the opposition «to let off steam» in the newspapers. The
lesson of Marcos and Duvalier confirm that Washington easily
abandons its agents and dictatorship regimes in order to pre-
serve this facade of liberalism.
In addition to this, the new tune in Egypt today is that of the
«danger of Islamic groups». This is the new scarecrow being
brandished in the face of the masses in order that they be satis-
fied with the standing situation of corruption.
Nevertheless, the more important question remains: Is there
a force which can generate enough pressure to threaten the
regime with being overthrown thus justifying a search for a
more vicious alternative? I think the matter in Egypt has not
reached this point, despite the fact that the awareness of the
masses supercedes that of the existing frameworks. Therefore,
a military coup or the «danger of Moslem groups» are merely
scarecrows used to terrorize nationalist forces, of petit bour-
geoisie Origin, into submissive acceptance of coexistence with
the existing regime. @
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- Democratic Palestine : 19
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