Democratic Palestine : 26 (ص 19)
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- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 26 (ص 19)
- المحتوى
-
Joint Administration Plan
and Prime Minister Peres
Security and Police
territories, while Jordan is responsible
for policing.
+ Jordanian police work in the Arab
cities and villages: Israeli police work in
the Israeli settlements.
- Water sourees are subject to joint
administration; each country has a veto
right.
- Supervision and guarding of both
‘taken by the Jordanian and Israeli
by the Jordanian authorities on the
Jordanian side.
Elections and
Settlements
- Arab citizens in the West Bank have
the right to vote for the Jordanian
parliament; Israeli residents in the West
Bank vote for the Israeli Knesset.
-No new settlements would be
established in the occupied territories,
and present settlements would not be
expanded.
- Agreeing on the convening of an in-
ternational conference with the USSR’s
participation. Israel demands the
restoration of relations with the USSR
as a precondition for its approval.
Freezing
- Agreed upon by King Hussein
- Israel is responsible for security in the
bridges on the Jordan River is under- -
authorities on the West Bank side, and |
ed. The detailed plan confirms that this
negotiations.
Syria and the PLO in an international
conference. Israel agrees to Syria’s
participation and objects to the PLO’s., -
Jerusalem: Open Issue
- The issue of Jerusalem would be left
open. Israel agrees to Jordanian
presence in Jabal Al Beit and even
allows the raising of a Jordanian flag
there.
- West Bank lands are subject to joint
administration with each party having |
veto right.
- The transition period is five years as.
demanded by Israel; Jordan demands a
period of only three years.
The plan calls for cancellation of
military rule in the territories. Civil af-
fairs are to be governed by a joint Jor-
danian - Israeli council. The council’s:
bilateral negotiations. Israel will reduce
its military presence in the West Bank. |
Jordanian and Israeli police forces are
to be formed. Appointed Palestinian.
mayors would replace Israeli officers. |
Jordan will not be allowed to bring
military forces to the West Bank, The
borders will be open. Joint economic
ventures would gradually be establish-
partial solution is a stage on the way to
a comprehensive solution. The time
schedule and the powers of the joint
council would be decided on during the
Republica in late May: «We refuse the
principle of land for peace, and accept
only the principle of peace for peace.»
Shamir’s message to Hussein is that
Peres’ pledge of Israeli withdrawal
from 85% of the 1967 occupied ter-
ritories represents only Peres’ view-
point, not that of the Israeli govern-
ment. Thus, while the Jordanian regime
has yielded to all the US-Israeli
demands in return for an international
conference, Shamir rejects such a con-
ference and any discussion of Israeli
withdrawal.
For its part, the US administration
still seems hesitant about the idea of an
international conference. This
hesitance is actually a maneuver for
gaining more Arab concessions, while
reassuring the Zionist state that only a
conference that suits its demands would
be held. In the first week of August,
Richard Murphy, the State Depart-
ment’s top official on the Middle East,
stated that solutions to the Middle East
conflict «cannot be worked out by fiat.
They cannot be dictated by the Security
Council or by any power outside the
region... If the conference is set up, it
will not have any authority either to
veto agreements reached between the
parties, or to impose its will on those
parties.»
THE DANGER OF THE US
SETTLEMENT
In this situation, Washington has
only to keep up a certain level of
diplomatic activities, such as the
August visit of Secretary of State
Schultz’s aide, Charles Hill, to Tel
Aviv. Such activities aim mostly at
spreading illusions about a settlement
being close at hand. They lend momen-
tum to the moves of the reactionary
Arab regimes, particularly Egypt and
Jordan, and assure them that the US
solution is continuing, despite having
so far-been impeded.
The meetings between Hussein and
Peres are only part of these activities.
Whether or not the US solution is
faltering, these meetings remain a
danger for a number of reasons. Simply
talking about Israeli willingness to
withdraw from 85% of the occupied
Palestinian territories bolsters the Jor-.
danian regime’s demagogic claims
about the possibility of regaining land
in return for peace. This spreads illu-
sions about a solution that is not at all
in the offing. At the same time, the
process of Jordanian meetings and
agreements with Israelis is a means of
making the Arab and Palestinian public
become accustomed to the idea of direct
negotiations with and recognition of
the Zionist state. This psychological
warfare would eventually lead to ac-
ceptance of surrender to the Zionist-
imperialist conditions.
In the absence of signing a Sadat-
type agreement, the Jordanian regime is
step-by-step normalizing relations with
the Zionist state. The continuation of
this process of meetings and agreements
paves the way for a surrender no less
dangerous than Sadat’s. Although it
has yet to reap the results, the Jorda-
nian regime has been pursuing this
capitulationist course for twenty years.
Despite rhetoric about a just settlement
and adhering to the 1974 Arab recogni-
tion of the PLO as the sole, legitimate
representative of the Palestinian peo-
ple, the regime is now exhibiting its
readiness to enter into bilateral solu-
tions that would totally bypass the PLO
and Palestinian rights. So far, cir-
cumstances have not offered suitable
conditions for the Jordanian regime to
openly enter into a bilateral deal with
‘Israel’. This, however, does not lessen
the need for confronting the regime’s
reactionary policy as part of the strug-
gle to foil the US-Zionist-reactionary
plan for subjugating the people and
resources of the area.
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