Democratic Palestine : 27 (ص 8)
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- Democratic Palestine : 27 (ص 8)
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tant; nor was it an issue that could be discussed with the same
ease that we now discuss things. Despite our not participating
in this session, I remember that we organized forty seminars in
Jordan to explain our position, saying that we are replacing
our non-participation in the PNC session with forty «PNCs».
Concerning the 17th session, everybody knows that other
organizations, including the Democratic Front, joined us in
boycotting this session, for reasons which are well known,
particularly in view of the dominance of a particular political
line at this session which was held in Amman (1984), which led
to the rightist trend’s continuing its political option which
ultimately led to the signing of the Amman accord with the
Jordanian regime.
Concerning the Executive Committee, we boycotted it dur-
ing the period between the PNC’s 12th and 14th sessions. Dur-
ing this period, we all remember the slogan raised by Fatah,
which controlled the PLO leadership, for keeping things as
they were, i.e., keeping us outside the Executive Committee.
The question might be raised as to the reasons for the
PFLP’s non-participation... What were our aims with non-
participation on certain occasions, and what were the real
reasons for this behaviour? A review of the PFLP’s literature
shows that our non-participation was due to our convictions
concerning essential political and organizational issues. We felt
we had to use all methods available in order to have certain
issues adopted in the PLO in a manner that would consolidate
national unity and promote the PLO’s goals. Despite our con-
stant adherence to the process of political and organizational
reform, we were not the decision-makers in the PLO.
Everybody talks about hegemony in the PLO leadership and
the absence of democratic practices in its institutions. What
then could we do when we face a Serious political or organiza-
tional issue not approved by the hegemonic leadership. The
fact was that after expending all efforts, and failing to have
these positions adopted, we used this tactic of non-
participation in order to bring the discussions being held
behind closed doors out in public. This was a way of saying to
our masses that there is an important question which keeps us
from participating in the PNC, or the Executive Committee,
and this question concerns not only us, but concerns first and
foremost the Palestinian masses. We were seeking to draw the
masses’ attention to the problem presented by the hegemony in
the PLO leadership, and the political and organizational
results of this hegemony.
Forming the PLO’s institutions and leading bodies on
democratic front-like principles, that guarantee collective
decision-making, is the only way to prevent the occurrence of
this phenomenon. The continuation of the hegemony does not
preclude the PFLP from using this tactic again.
If the PFLP’s non-participation is disturbing, the hegemony
and non-democratic methods used in the PLO are more
disturbing. Consolidating Palestinian national unity requires a
radical treatment of the political and organizational miscon-
duct.
Concerning the PFLP’s mistakes in dealing with the PLO,
everybody knows from experience that we are not among those
Organizations that claim to always be correct. Our literature
includes a review of the mistakes we have committed.
Could we say that after 20 years in the PLO, the
PFLP’s use of the weapon of non participation
produced the desired results?
8 ,
Theoritically yes. During the period that preceeded the con-
vening of the April 1987 session of the PNC, the front succeed-
ed, by its decisive adherence to some political and organisa-
tional issues, in having the PNC cancel the Amman accord. In
addition to some other resolutions that opposed the imperialist
solutions and rehabilitated the PLO’s alliances and national
program.
We have also won the political battle when the Rejectionist
Front was formed. We won by interconnecting the transitional!
solution with the strategic solution of the revolution.
But winning a battle comes only as a result of the political
developments which force the influential rightist trend in the
PLO to correct its political stands. For example, when the issue
of classifying the Arab reaction in the camp of the enemies was
subject to discussions at the Sth session of the PNC, we suc-
ceeded later in having the PNC adopt this classification only
because the Jordanian regime had started its war of attrition
against the Palestinian resistance movement. But naturally
winning theoritically is different from winning practically. The
rightist trend in the PLO never adhered to the resolutions.
The issue of the Palestinian national action leader-
ship’s crisis has been raised for years. Aren’t you a
part of this leadership? Does this crisis apply to the
Palestinian left’s leadership as well?
There is a difference between the bourgeoisie’s dilemma in
leading the national work and the difficulties that face the
working class when leading this work. The dilemma of the
Palestinian national movement is a part of the Arab Libera-
tion movement’s crisis. The crisis lies in both movements in
the class nature of this leadership, and in the particular
dilemma of the revolutionary alternative to this leadership.
The continuing difficulties the Left faces contribute to exten-
ding the Palestinian national action leadership’s dilemma. The
historical role of the bourgeoisie has declined. It is no longer
capable of continuing and concluding the national and
democratic liberation tasks. At some times this class can’t even
maintain what was achieved. Concerning the Palestinian
struggle, the great difficulties we face in this stage, could lead
the Palestinian bourgeoisie to favor a political settlement with
the enemy before concluding the political liberation stage. This
could be seen in the political position taken by the rightist trend
following the Palestinian forces’ withdrawal from Beirut in
1982.
The concept of the crisis as talked about does not apply to
the Left. Despite the difficulties the Left faces, the future for
the Left is wide open. The Palestinian Left, due to its
ideological and class nature, will continue the battle against the
enemy until total victory.
It is worth pointing out that the Palestinian Left was not
born as materialized Left. The process of transormation
governs the Left’s development. This means that the Left could
have many mistakes and shortcomings which could delay
reaching its historical status as the leader of the Palestinian
national action.
The scopes for the Palestinian Left to take control of the
revolution’s leadership are subjected to several factors. First,
this process is a historical one. And during this long process
the achievements of the Left are accumulated until reaching
these goals. Second, taking control of the revolution requires
the consolidation of the Palestinian revolutionary democratic
forces’ efforts on all levels, ideological, political and - هو جزء من
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