Democratic Palestine : 27 (ص 11)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 27 (ص 11)
- المحتوى
-
ficulties. This concept might be viewed as a failure, because
our experience in Jordan failed to establish a sound and solid
base. At present, the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon faces
so many difficulties created by several sides. However, there
are insisting questions; namely: What tasks should be
shouldered by over 1.5 million Palestinians in Jordan and
about 500,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon? Would the
Palestinian Revolution inside Palestine be able to go on with
such a great effectiveness and vigour without the support and
the backing of the second base abroad?
The long experience of the contemporary Palestinian strug-
gle made it clear that to keep the dialectical link between the
Revolution’s forces inside and outside occupied Palestine, it is
essential to establish operational bases for the Revolution in
the front Arab countries, particularly in Jordan, due to its
specific significance and peculiarity. Ocassional failures and
difficulties should by no mean make us give up these facts,
which were developed into rules through the experience of the
Palestinian struggle.
This is our outlook of the issue. Furthermore, our political
and organizational strategy laid down by the second Congress
in 1969 called for the creation of an Arab Hanoi. With this
frankness, we addressed our masses and our revolution forces.
Bx no way should we adopt empiricism as a law. It is essential
to have a workplan and to lay down a Strategy. Such a strategy
might be modified, re-considered or developed, but there must
be one.
The difficulties that confronted the Revolution’s second
base in Jordan and Lebanon did not urge us to re-consider the
concept itself, because it is completely right, rather urged us to
find out why did we fail to establish invulnerable operational
bases outside Palestine. Our thorough review of this experience
allows us to attribute this failure mainly to the failure of the
Palestinian Revolution to establish the proper relation with the
Jordanian masses and their revolutionary forces before 1970
and to the non-establishment of sound relations with the
Lebanese masses and their revolutionary forces between 197]
and 1982.
In Jordan, the Palestinian Revolution disregarded and
replaced the Jordanian people and the Jordanian national
movement. Misled by the illusion that it can neutralize the
regime by raising the slogan of «non interferrence in its inter-
nal affairs», the Revolution did not participate in the Jorda-
nian masses’ social-national battles.
In Lebanon, the relationship was confined to containing the
National Lebanese Movement. It confiscated their role, reviv-
ed opponent traditional reactionary forces, and moved behind
the scenes to contact their facist enemies, including the
government.
Had the Palestinian Revolution enjoyed clarity of vision and
had it known how to establish good relations with the Jorda-
nian and the Lebanese people, had it supported them against
their national and class enemies, the situation would have
greatly altered.
Prospects of struggle inside the occupied homeland
What are the limits of the Palestinian struggle in-
side Palestine? What is the exact task of this strug-
gle and what is the actual capability to upgrade this
struggle? To what extent have the slogans on this
level been translated into concrete ac-
complishments?
The struggle of our people inside the occupied homeland is
strongly linked to the struggle mounted by their fellow people
in exile. These ties were marvellously manifested through the
uprisings staged by the Palestinian people inside the occupied
territories to back and support their revolution abroad in time
of need.
Undoubtedly, there are wide prospects for this courageous
Struggle, as resistance ways are being continuously developed.
The recent uprising staged by the Palestinian people in the oc-
cupied homeland in protest to the visit of George Shultz, the
US secretary of State, provided undeniable evidence to their
absolute and non-controversial rejection of the Camp David
Accords, and of the Jordanian regime’s option. Their uprising,
which lasted for months, provided evidence to the fact that
collective unified action could crystalise and safeguard against
the capitulationist plans masterminded by the US—dZionist
alliance, and accepted by the Amman and the Cairo circles.
The collective Palestinian will, demonstrated during Schultz’
visit, is a good example to follow in the future. It might work
as a first link in the chain of the Palestinian counter-attack
against the deterioration and retreat scheme targeting the entire
Arab World. |
It is high time to accord sufficient attention to the Palesti-
nian Revolution’s first base, inside the occupied territories.
This is a lesson we learnt from the past experience. In the past,
the Revolution leadership did not work effectively to develop
national struggle, it has rather involved itself in several pro-
blems and concerns facing the Palestinian action abroad.
In occupied Palestine, there are about two million people
living under the yoke of occupation and suffering of awful and
unbearable conditions. Therefore, it is necessary to exercise all
forms of struggle. Once again, the significance of the first base
is demonstrated.
At present, we must first work to unite the instrument of the
revolution inside Palestine, through the possible coordination
forms. Therefore, we should speed up work to translate the
resolutions of the unification session of the PNC held in
Algiers last April. We express satisfaction over the results at-
tained on this level and call for attaining more similar ac-
complishments.
It is time to give priority to stepping up our military activities
inside occupied Palestine, to escalate all other forms of strug-
gle and to take the months-long uprising as our example for
future action.
It is time to accord more attention to the. anti-Zionist
democratic Israeli forces and to extend support for their
struggle against the common enemy.
Struggle inside the occupied territories has more than one
strategic and direct task. It should keep the Palestinian question
aflare on both the Arab and the international levels, in order to
enable friendly forces to step up their solidarity campaigns in
support of our cause and intensify their pressure on the enemy
to force it to recognize our legitimate national rights, foremost of
which the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
and to the establishment of their independent state.
It should also push the Israelis to be convinced that there
are a Palestinian people having just national rights. As
«Israel» managed to introduce psychological changes in our
ranks by persuading all that «Israel» is undefeatable, we should
at least tell the enemy that the Palestinian people exist, and can
not be ignored. Their rights have has to be recognized.
We must exert every possible effort to make the burdens of
the occupation far heavier than its revenues. Then and only >
11 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 27
- تاريخ
- ديسمبر ١٩٨٧
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
Contribute
Not viewed