Democratic Palestine : 29 (ص 34)
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- Democratic Palestine : 29 (ص 34)
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constitutionally committed to serving
and promoting the interests of Jews and
Jews only...» (p. 60).
In the chapter covering political
repression, Davis examines the 1945
Emergency Laws, noting that their
passage, four days after the Israeli
state’s establishment, means that
politically and legally the Zionist state
has always been in a state of emergen-
cy. Davis also notes that the 1967 war
«marked both the zenith and the
beginning of the decline of Zionist and
Israeli achievements» (p.65). He re-
counts the subsequent problems faced
by the Zionist state in the 1973 war and
the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and
concludes: «... there is little doubt that
the Zionist impetus and the capacity of
the state of Israel to implement its
Zionist objectives of establishing
Jewish sovereignty and a Jewish
numerical majority in all parts of
British Mandate Palestine are very
much impaired. Since the war option as
a Zionist panacea is currently
unavailable, the only alternative for the
Israeli leadership, committed officially
and unequivocally to the Judaization of
the entire territory of Palestine, is the
intensification of internal repression»
(p. 60).
All in all, Israel: An Apartheid State
will be extremely useful to those wan-
ting to know more about the causes of
the Palestinian-Zionist conflict; it will
be equally useful to those already in the
know as a concise and well-documented
reference.
DIALOGUE TOWARDS
A DEMOCRATIC
PALESTINE
The book distinguishes itself on
another count as well, due to the
author’s consistent anti-Zionist stand
and history of struggle alongside the
Palestinian people. The second half of
the book is devoted to presenting the
alternative to Zionist apartheid - the
PLO, and the possibilities for a
democratic state in Palestine. Davis is
not content with simply exposing
Zionism, but is explicitly committed to
an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue to pro-
mote an alternative solution which
would benefit both Palestinian Arabs
and Israeli Jews. In his view, such
dialogue should be based on. three
truths:
1. «...as long as the 1948 refugees are
excluded from any part of their
homeland, including Acre, Haifa, Jaf-
34
fa, Beer Sheba, and reduced to the
misery of refugee camps and exile, they
are right to reassert their presence in the
homeland from which they are exclud-
ed, if necessary by military means and
armed struggle... we must support them
morally and materially in_ this
struggle.»
2. «...an Israeli Jewish people has been
created in the process of the Zionist
colonization of Palestine. This people
must be guaranteed full rights to
cultural autonomy: Hebrew schools,
newspapers, clubs, etc. It cannot and
must not be allowed a state of its own
for the single reason that the continued
existence of the state of Israel as a
Jewish state must necessarily entail the
continued exclusion of the 1948
Palestinian Arab refugees from all and
any parts of their homeland. If all 1948
refugees are allowed to return and al]
UN Assembly resolutions are im-
plemented, including the 1947 Partition
Plan and Resolution 194 (III) of 11
December 1948, stipulating the return
of all Palestinian Arab refugees or the
payment of compensation, there can be
no Jewish state.»
3. critical awareness.
With these truths in mind, Davis
reviews the political development of the
PLO in terms of how it has formulated
its strategic and interim goals in con-
formity with international law. In
general, his presentation is to be much
appreciated in that it clearly shows that
the PLO is the party most qualified to
forward a just, peaceful solution to the
conflict. On the other hand, Davis very
precisely analyzes the limitations of the
Israeli ‘peace camp’:«the Israeli Jewish
peace camp strives to secure recognition
by the PLO of the legitimacy of the
continued existence of the state of
Israel inside its 4 June 1967
boundaries... without insisting that
such recognition must be subject to the
condition that Israeli citizenship be
granted to all - approximately 2 million
- 1948 Palestinian Arab refugees...» (p.
102).
Davis also puts forth a number of
propositions such as that the PLO
should not recognize ‘Israel’ in its pre-5
June 1967 boundaries, but could
recognize the ‘Israel’ specified under
the conditions of the 1947 UN Partition
Plan; he envisions a process whereby
the two states, an Israeli and Palesti-
nian one, would grant citizenship to all
their inhabitants (present and former)
and hold universal elections for their
respective legislatures, culminating in a
united secular democratic Palestine,
through peaceful means, in a few years.
Davis’ proposals also include enabling
Palestinian Jews to become members of
the Palestinian National Council and
amending the Palestinian National
Covenant (Charter) to allow Israeli
Jews to remain in liberated Palestine
and acquire Palestinian citizenship.
Although some of Davis’ ideas go
beyond the policy adopted by the PLO
to date, we think that the last two men-
tioned propositions in particular are
worthy of discussion as part of the
PLO’s work to build relations with
democratic, anti-Zionist forces. Other
of Davis’ propositions, such as the first
two referred here, could be understood
as part of a PLO peace initiative aimed
at adapting to new conditions that may
be created in the course of the ongoing
liberation struggle, including exploiting
the contradictions that will arise in the
Israeli society in this process. However,
such questions must be discussed in the
context of an overall analysis of all
facters of the conflict. We see it as a
limitation that the book does not deal
with the role of imperialism, the US in
particular, in the conflict, even though
this issue impinges directly or indirectly
on many of the strategic questions
raised. At the same time, Davis men-
tions only in passing the international
conference under UN auspices, which is
in fact the peace initiative unanimously
adopted by the PLO, as opposed to the
false ‘peace’ plans promoted by the US
and some Zionist forces.
The neglect of US imperialism’s role
in the Palestinian-Zionist conflict is
reflected in a number of Davis’
assessments to which we would put
serious questions, for example his
evaluation of the PLO’s relations with
Jordan. These relations can never be
evaluated as a local question isolated
from imperialist plans in the region, for
the Jordanian monarchy has historical-
ly functioned to promote these plans,
meanwhile shielding the Zionist state.
Davis notes that at the PNC’s 16th
session a major shift occurred in PLO
policy with the adoption of a resolution
advocating a «confederation between
two independent states» (Palestinian
and Jordanian), followed by the 1985
Amman accord with the Jordanian
regime. Davis views this accord as «a
tactical manoeuvre pursued under the
pressure of extremely adverse condi-
tions for the PLO regionally and inter- - هو جزء من
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