Democratic Palestine : 29 (ص 37)
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- Democratic Palestine : 29 (ص 37)
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Actual defense needs played little part in the deliberations
of the Israeli leadership. When the decision to bomb the reac-
tor was taken by the Israeli cabinet in October 1980, «those
who supported the raid replied that the amount of weapon-grade
uranium in Iraqi hands was not enough to produce even one
bomb.» In addition, ‘Israel’ three times proposed to India to
make a joint attack on Pakistan’s nuclear reactor, but was
turned down (International Herald Tribune, February 23,
1987). This is despite the fact that there has never been any in-
dication that Pakistan would use its nuclear power against the
Zionist state. The real intent was demonstrating Israeli capaci-
ty to threaten and blackmail the Arab regimes and nationalist
forces, while advertizing Israeli military capacity before the
world. The authors of Two Minutes Over Baghdad estimate
the Israeli Air Force to be the third largest in the world, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, and the most experienced in
modern air tactics and warfare. They moreover note: «... the
brilliant execution of the Israeli Air Force in the Iraqi nuclear
raid is probably the best possible advertisement for US aircraft
manufacturers (General Dynamics and McDonald Douglas)...
The Mirage III had practically no customers until Israel
achieved such dramatic success with its Mirage IIIs during the
1967 Six Day War.» They describe quite openly the results
cultivated by ‘Israel’ with this incidence of state terror: «...the
annihilation of the Iraqi reactor has torn apart the rules of in-
ternational behaviour previously known in the Middle East...
Israel and Prime Minister Begin have created for themselves a
nuclear monopoly in the Middle East.» Concurrently, the Arab
world received a shock of 1967 proportions.
Perlmutter, Handel and Bar-Joseph’s telling of the US reac-
tion is also noteworthy: «You can’t help but admire their
technical proficiency, although we strongly condemn the ac-
tion,» said one US Defense spokesman. Reagan reportedly
assured the Israeli ambassador that the raid would not hurt
US-Israeli relations, while National Security officials privately
applauded the boldness and efficiency of the raid on a «Soviet
ally». Bob Woodward’s 1987 book VEIL revealed more about
the US role: «...under the intelligence arrangement set up with
Casey’s approval, Israel had almost unlimited access to U.S.
satellite photography and had used it in planning their raid.»
The raid occurred on June 7, 1981. One month later, the head
of Israeli military intelligence Maj. Gen Yehoshua Saguy
visited Casey in the US where «they agreed that if there ever
was a need for something special they would deal directly with
each other.»
‘Israel’ is still banking on the fear instilled in the Arab
regimes by the 1981 attack. Its blackmail is not restricted to
nationalist forces, but is also aimed against reactionary
regimes which are vying for US favor. In March this year,
‘Israel’ made a big fuss when it was learned that Saudi Arabia
had obtained surface-to-surface DP-3 missiles. As noted in
Newsweek, April 4th edition: «The missiles are not yet opera-
tional, and last week Israel hinted it might make sure they
never were. ‘We have a reputation that we do not wait until a
potential danger becomes an actual danger.’ said Yossi Ben-
Aharon, a top aide to Prime Minister Shamir. It was taken as a
clear reference to Israel’s 1981 raid on an Iraqi nuclear reactor
- and U.S. electronic intelligence confirmed that Israeli Air
Force jets have been conducting intensive, low-level attack
practice runs.» As of this writing, it appears the Israelis have
refrained from any such attack in view of US advice. This is
merely one more sign of the Zionist state’s increasing integra-
tion into imperialism’s global strategy.
PARTNERSHIP
From the time of the 1967 war, the Zionist state placed itself
more overtly in the context of US global strategy. This
tendency became even more blatant after the 1973 war when
«Israel» was only bailed out by the massive US airlift of
military supplies. US-Israeli military relations assumed a more
institutionalized character, with the ever increasing militariza-
tion of the Israeli economy occurring under direct US auspices.
Israel Shahak gives one interesting example of this: «The main
source of the increase (in Israeli military production) following
the Arab-Israeli war of Cctober 1973, was the ‘acquisition of
whole factories in the U.S. by Sultam, Taas and Tadiran,’ and
their transfer to Israel, and the employment of the most
developed American technology (Israel’s Global Role:
Weapons for Repression, AAUG, 1982; the internal quote is
from Haaretz, March 7,1977). With US-made F-15s forming
the backbone of the Israeli air force, «Israel» 1s dependent on
the delivery of spare parts and ammunition from the US in the
case of a prolonged conflict.
Israeli emphasis on developing its own arms industry and the
US cooperation in this venture shows that the nature of their
relationship is that of partnership, not simply that between a
big power and its client. As noted in MERIP Middle East
Report No. 144, January-February 1987, «Israel controls the
largest inventory of US and US-compatible arms outside the
United States. More important than compatibility of weapons
is the compatibility of ideology and political analysis. Here we
see the offspring of the Nixon-Kissinger strategic calculations
in the years following the 1967 war... The US has allowed
Israel to co-produce US military equipment under license at a
‘higher level of technology’ than any other FMS credit reci-
pient, according to one State Department official.»
ANTI—SOVIET STANCE
Concurrent with its integration into US global strategy, the
Zionist state assumied a more blatantly anti-Soviet stance, see-
ing the attainment of specific Zionist goals as inextricably
bound to advances for imperialism. After the 1973 war, Rabin
argued against moves towards a political settlement as follows:
«Israel should try to ‘gain time’, he urged, in hope that ‘we will
later find ourselves in a better situation; the U.S. may adopt a
more aggressive position vis-a-vis the USSR...» (Noam
Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, 1983, p. 13, quoted according
to Amnon Kapeliouk, Israel: la fin des mythes, 1975). The
Zionist leadership had thus primed itself to be a main partner
in the Reagan Administration’s anti-Soviet crusade, as was
formalized in the November 30, 1981 memorandum of
understanding article 1, clause 1: «The United States-Israeli
strategic cooperation, as set forth in this memorandum, is
designed against the threat to peace and security of the region
caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled forces from
outside the region introduced into the region.»
The 1982 invasion of Lebanon embodied the Zionists’ ef-
forts to intertwine their objectives of eradicating the Palesti-
nian cause with other US imperatives in the region. In the spring
of 1982, US Secretary of State Haig had linked three main
issues the US had to deal with in the region: ‘autonomy’ for the
Palestinians, i.e., expanding Camp David; the situation in
Lebanon and the Gulf war. The Zionist state undertook to
resolve two of these issues, implementing the ready-made plans
for invading Lebanon in hopes of destroying the PLO, after
the spring uprising in the occupied territories had made it clear >
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