Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 22)
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- Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 22)
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workers was only 17.5% in 1984, in contrast with African Jews
for whom the comparable ratio was 84.4%. These figures are
typical indications of the degree of injustice, oppression and
discrimination against our people under occupation, as com-
pared even to the lowest strata of the Jewish social scale. They
expose the hideous racist character of Israeli policies within the
so-called green line.
In brief, we can say that the enemy has enjoyed additional
sources of income which increased its wealth and enabled it to
reconcile its security and developmental needs, without
disturbing the living standards of the settler population. This
saved the Jewish population from exposure to social pressure.
Quite the contrary, social conditions became steadily better
relatively quickly. This was possible thanks to abundant
resources from abroad, as well as labor productivity at home.
These resources were distributed according to a rigorously ap-
plied taxation policy, aiming at bridging social gaps, while
preserving the position of the private sector. State regulations
guaranteed the productive character of wealth and of the pro-
fits of the private sector which was made to function in the in-
terests of the state, not the other way around.
These are the most outstanding features of the social policies
of the Zionist entity, as well as the principal changes in this
sphere. Once more, the supreme strategic objectives of
Zionism appear to be the regulator and motivator of the social
policies, which should be carefully studied.
3. DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC THEORY
AND MILITARY CAPACITY
Along with the socioeconomic sphere, the field of strategic
theory and Israeli military capacity has undergone noticeable
development over the last forty years; hence the necessity of
considering all these innovations in a comprehensive perspec-
tive. Rather than ruminating on our old information and
analysis, we must delve into the core of the changes and
evaluate them, in order to formulate a counterstrategy of con-
frontation, based on science and facts, not on dreams and illu-
sions.
The results of the 1973 war may have been the fundamental
turning point for the Israeli strategic theory. ‘Israel’ seemed to
realize that the realities of the June 1967 war, and its army’s
The Israeli Python 3 air-to-air missile exhibited at Paris air show in 1983
easy victory over the Arab armies, were no longer valid after
1973. The gap between the Arabs and ‘Israel’ could be.
decreased in a few years; the Arabs could exploit the change to
the degree that the balance of forces could shift in their favor,
unless substantial alterations were made in Israeli strategy. The
objective of the Israeli strategy after the 1973 war was not,
therefore, simply preserving the balance of forces in their
favor. Rather, it was increasing their clear superiority, and
creating a technological time gap that could not easily be
bridged by the Arabs within a limited number of years.
Together with this change in the strategic theory of the
enemy, there were other changes in the Israeli concepts of the
balance of forces, «the enemy» and the elements of power. The
changes were by no means unrelated to the essence of the
supreme strategy on which the Zionist project in Palestine was
based and which it has always been trying to apply in practice.
For ‘Israel’, national security is a concept equal to existence
itself. Therefore, it needed to adopt a new way of viewing its
enemy, not only the actual one, but also the potential enemies
it may designate for nationalist, religious, ideological and
technological reasons. When calculating the balance of forces,
‘Israel’ should take such considerations into account, through
full estimation of all the human, technological elements, etc.
Thus, it is impossible to look at the elements of power only
from the military aspect. All the economic, human, i.e.,
demographic, and security aspects must be taken into con-
sideration.
Accordingly, in recent years, ‘Israel’ acted in a way that
projected its influence far beyond the frontlines with the
Arabs. Nowadays we hear about projects and plans going as
far as hitting the nuclear reactor in Pakistan, to prevent it from
the production of atom bombs which might threaten Israeli
security in different circumstances. Moreover, important
changes have been made in the structure of the Israeli military
institution, followed by changes in the economic structure and
in the military industry in particular. We are going to point out
some of the aspects of the enemy’s strategic thinking which
have affected its military capacity:
First: One of the most important lessons ‘Israel’ drew from
the 1973 war concerned the human aspect, i.e., the necessity of
increasing the human capacity of the military institution. The
number of both reserve and active-duty soldiers has been in-
creased, to enable ‘Israel’ to mobilize a number of soldiers not
much less than the Arab armies in time of war. The profes-
sional and permanent personnel of the Israeli army now
number a quarter of a- million, besides the reserves. More
serious is that this increase was not at the expense of manpower
employed in the civilian sector. It was balanced by raising the
rate of employment, in spite of lagging immigration, and by
using Palestinian Arab labor. In addition, there was a
qualitative change in the level of the personnel engaged in the
security and military field, with the introduction of
technologically advanced equipment and the wide use of elec-
tronics.
Second: Besides depending on imported arms, the Israeli
army began to use advanced weapons manufactured in ‘Israel’.
The Israeli military industry has already made great progress in
providing the army with its munition needs as well as different
kinds of arms, together with modifying old imported weapons
to meet the requirements of accelerated technological
development and of the circumstances in which they would be
used. The important factor which continues to limit the Israeli
army, as clearly stated by Israeli leaders, is armaments, not the - هو جزء من
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