Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 29)
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- Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 29)
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WH
themselves.
The calls also differentiate between
the various components of the interna-
tional community. Calls no. 14 and 15
recognize the Soviet Union’s leading
role in the efforts to convene a fully
empowered international conference,
while call no. 17 terms the Soviet-
Palestinian agreement, regarding
legitimate Palestinian national rights, a
just basis for which there is no alter-
native in a comprehensive solution of
the Middle East problem. In call no. 29
the work of solidarity committees is
recognized, and they are asked to
pressure their governments to recognize
the Palestinian state and_ exert
economic and political pressure on
‘Israel’. Call no. 28 notes the non-
aligned countries’ support for the
Palestinian cause.
On another level, the UNL is ob-
viously monitoring positions that are
subject to change under the impact of
the uprising, such as that of the EEC
which is commended for originally not
renewing certain economic treaties with
‘Israel’, then criticized in call no. 29 for
signing three agreements despite con-
tinued Israeli repression.
The calls also express solidarity with
other liberation movements. Call no. 20
designates June 25th as a day of strug-
gle against racial discrimination, and
solidarity with the people of South
Africa and all people subject to this.
Call no. 23 expresses solidarity with all
the people struggling for freedom and
independence, naming Namibia and
Chile as well, while joining the interna-
tional cry for the release of Nelson
Mandela.
The uprising’s democratic outlook is
also reflected in relation to the Israeli
society. Call no. 21 salutes the Jewish
progressive, democratic and _ peace
forces that support the Palestinians’
national rights. In call no. 23, Jewish
doctors who have treated the wounded
of the uprising, and journalists who
have exposed the occupation’s brutali-
ty, are singled out for commendation,
and urged to work to increase con-
sciousness among Israelis since «a
human being who accepts the repres-
sion of others can never be free.»
THE ARAB ENVIRONMENT
The uprising has posited the struggle
of the masses under occupation as the
central dynamic in the process of
liberating Palestine. This, however,
implies no indifference on the part of
the UNL to the Arab political scene. By
combining the concrete political posi-
tions expressed in successive calls, a
clear picture emerges of the constella-
tion of forces in the Arab world, and
their respective roles.
The first concrete reference to Arab
politics occurs in call no. 5 (January 5,
1988), terming the Jordanian regime
«traitorous» and accusing it of trying to
exploit the uprising. Coupled with this
is a call for boycotting Al Nahar, the
pro-Jordanian newspaper in the West
Bank - the first of many measures that
expressed and enforced the
marginalization of pro-Jordanian
figures by the uprising. Succeeding calls
reject the various initiatives of Jordan
and Egypt, naming the Arab reac-
tionary forces which are most promi-
nent in the attempts to abort the upris-
ing, and pinpointing their alliance with
US imperialism. This critique is
generalized in call no. 10 to include all
Arab states who welcome Shultz’s
shuttles, while call no. 13 denounces the
reactionary attempts to delay the
Summit of the Uprising.
The calls also recognize the role of
the opposing camp in the Arab world
by praising the mass demonstrations in
support of the uprising, while saluting
the Lebanese nationalist masses and the
people on the Golan on a par with the
Palestinians in the 1948 occupied ter-
ritories - indicating where the uprising
sees its main sources of support. The
Arab nationalist states are dealt with in
relation to concrete events: Algeria is
praised for its initiative to convene the
Summit of the Uprising; Libya and
Algeria are commended for their ef-
forts to reinforce the PLO’s unity and
align all Arab nationalist forces against
the Shultz plan; meanwhile, there are
repeated calls to Syria to normalize
relations with the PLO.
The calls also define the supportive
environment which the Arab world
could constitute for the uprising. This is
most obvious in the UNL’s demands to
the Arab summit. Call no. 12 makes
clear «to the Arab kings and presidents
that the Palestinian people do not seek
money; they are ready to suffer hunger
and poverty, but never to surrender.»
The uprising’s demands to the summit
are chiefly for a united Arab stand,
publicly declared, refusing Shultz’s
plan,while adhering to the PLO’s
status, Palestinian rights and the con-
cept of an international conference.
These basic positions of support for the
uprising are linked with a call for
releasing political detainees from Arab
jails and instating democratic
freedoms, so that the Arab masses can
«join with the masses of the victorious
uprising» (call no.17).
Notably, the calls do not spell out
specific demands to the Arab masses
Other than designating occasional days
for solidarity demonstrations.
However, what the UNL would like to
see in the Arab world can be inferred
from references to Lebanon. Besides
calling for the Palestinian-Syrian-
Lebanese nationalist triangle of stead-
fastness, the UNL says: «The struggle
of South Lebanon and the struggle of
the uprising should unite in order to
speed up the process of ending the era
of Camp David in the Arab area, in
order to begin a new era for a new
struggle» (call no. 29). The fact that the
UNL does not elaborate on what is ex-
pected of the Arab masses is surely
connected to the generally low level of
the response of the Arab national
liberation movement to the new situa-
tion created by the uprising. As one
sees from the UNL’s directives in
Palestine, it always gears its guidelines
to the concrete realities and
possibilities. An upsurge in the struggle:
of the Arab masses and progressive
forces would surely spur a new dialogue
on how to enact change in the whole
area, which would then be reflected in
the UNL’s calls.
ARMED STRUGGLE
There has been a tendency in the
media to contrast «the revolution of the
stones» with the Palestinian armed
resistance which began in organized
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