Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 9)
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- Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 9)
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IV. ENLARGING THE SCOPE OF THE
UPRISING
With the eruption of the intifada in the 1967 occupied ter-
ritories, there were significant supportive activities in the
Palestinian land occupied in 1948, culminating in some large
demonstrations and the eruption of the war of fires against
Zionist property. These activities aroused fear in Zionist
circles, where the propaganda machine had long been working
to spread the idea of «Arab-Jewish coexistence» under the
banner of the Jewish state. Some Israelis described these ac-
tivities as a catastrophe and a mortal danger. Of course, there
is nothing surprising about this reaction, for if the uprising
proves Israel’s failure to absorb the results of the 1967 war,
then the eruption of the uprising in Israel itself means the
failure to absorb the results of the Zionists’ usurpation of
Palestine in 1948. This gives rise to a major question concern-
ing the future of the Zionist project in Palestine and its poten-
tial for continuing.
Nonetheless, the activities in the 1948 occupied territories
have not yet developed from supporting the uprising to actual-
ly partaking in it, due to subjective and objective factors. The
most important of these is the objective difference between a
situation where our masses face the danger of transfer,
settlement-building, the iron fist, expulsion and collective
detention, and a situation where the Palestinians are con-
sidered second-class citizens. Moreover, there is a subjective
difference between a community where the Palestinian revolu-
tionary forces have the decisive role, and one where other
forces are relatively active and influential.
Although we do not belittle the importance of the militant
activities of our masses in the 1948 occupied territories, yet
they have not moved to the level of participation. So we should
put this issue on our working agenda by all possible means, and
in cooperation with the active Palestinian forces and the
(democratic) Jewish forces (in the 1948 occupied territories), in
order to enlarge the scope of the uprising, so that it covers all
of Palestine. Our success in achieving this goal is a qualitative
weapon which has a tremendous potential for affecting the
enemy. We should not belittle the importance of this weapon,
for it will have a decisive effect on the process of shortening the
distance between declaring and achieving independence.
V. THE ROLE OF PALESTINIANS IN EXILE
The fact that more than half the Palestinian people live in
exile obliges us to shoulder a special responsibility for ac-
tivating and organizing them, for the battle requires that all
participate. Since the outbreak of the uprising, the center of the
national struggle has moved to the occupied territories, but
that does not justify belittling the importance of the second
base of the revolution, which is outside Palestine. It is not
viable to concentrate periodically on one base and ignore the
other, as happened in the past when it seemed that we were
focusing on the exterior base rather than on the interior.
Priority must be given to the occupied territories, but that does
not at all mean belittling the importance of the role that our
masses in exile may play. Furthermore, the history of the con-
temporary Palestinian armed revolution is to a great extent the
history of the remarkable role of the Palestinians in exile, par-
ticularly in Jordan and Lebanon, at a time when our masses in
the occupied territories were experiencing very hard times.
It is true that the circumstances began changing in the last
decade, especially after the 1982 war, but that does not mean
Democratic Palestine, June 89
that the role of the masses in exile should not continue and
escalate, even though this occupies the second place in our
priorities at this stage. There are many duties to be performed
by the masses in exile in order to support the uprising - from
campaigns to collect donations, to political and informational
work in support of the PLO and the PNC’s resolutions, to
armed struggle across the borders to Palestine. However, all
this requires a programmatic policy from the PLO, in order to
benefit from these tremendous potentials and use them to
guarantee the continuation and escalation of the uprising.
Bearing in mind the difficulties the PLO faces vis-a-vis the
various Arab regimes and the latter’s failure to meet their
commitments towards the uprising, self-reliance is the only
way to insure that sufficient support is provided for the in-
tifada. When thinking about activating the role of the masses
in exile, we must take note of the hindrances that the Arab
regimes put before the PLO’s independent activity among the
masses. Nevertheless, these hindrances should not stop us from
advancing towards fulfilling this mission. It is our duty to exert
all efforts in our long and hard struggle to put our national in-
dependence into effect.
VI. DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN THE PLO
Mobilizing and organizing our people’s potentials and
fulfilling the tasks needed to reach freedom and indpendence
require a revolutionary instrument that can undertake these
tasks efficiently. It is no longer a secret that one of the dangers
facing the uprising is the level and type of unity that exists
within this revolutionary instrument, and the level and nature
of the PLO’s institutions. The policy of individualism and the
domination (of one group) still prevails in the Palestinian
work, while corruption and favoritism are still trademarks of
our national institutions. Work is hindered in almost all the
PLO’s mass organizations and unions. This abnormal situa-
tion should not continue, especially in the era of the intifada
which necessitates a «revolution within the revolution» and a
rearrangement of all our institutions, work programs and in-
ternal relations, in order to attain a really qualified and unified
revolutionary instrument which can rise to the level of heroism
which is being practiced daily in the occupied territories.
Democracy must be extended in all our institutions. We must
rely on the principle of proportional representation in forming
our organizational bodies, institutions and unions. All fields of
Palestinian national work should be unified so that we would
have a single united revolutionary instrument, rather than a
series of centers and offices. We should address the world with
a united line, policy and instrument, provided that the process
of reform takes place, and the PLO’s institutions are
reconstituted on the basis of proportional representation.
However, this does not rule out the organizational and
ideological independence of each component organization of
the PLO.
Achieving democratic reform is moreover necessary in order
to guarantee maximal support to the uprising, via a single
channel, i.e., the UNL. It is also important to conduct the
political battle with the same efficiency as the masses are
fighting the battle of stones and molotovs against the Zionist
enemy. To be loyal to the intifada and its central slogan
-freedom and independence, we need such a comprehensive
reform. This is an objective necessity and not a question of the
petty interests and calculations of some Palestinian officials
who turn their backs on democratic reform. @
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- Democratic Palestine : 33
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