Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 20)
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- Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 20)
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otherwise preferable Jordanian option would ultimately lead to
a Palestinian state on both banks of the Jordan River.
Two of the dangers Heller sees as remaining even after such
a settlement are: «secessionist sentiments among Israeli Arabs»
and Israeli access to water. Generally, Heller’s proposals are
technocratic: arrangements that assuage Israeli security fears
and meet Israeli conditions. He assumes, for example, that
Palestinians in their new «state» would still work in Israel
and/or that Israel can compensate for their cheap labor via a
needed technical overhaul. He totally overlooks the relations
and structures of colonialism that have evolved over the years,
and their political, social and economic impact on both the
Israeli and Palestinian societies. Despite all his talk of the ad-
vantages of peaceful settlement, his model ultimately rests on
continuing Israeli military control: continued reliance on pre-
emptive attacks, retention of Israeli-manned early warning
systems in the already demilitarized Palestinian state, and even
more US aid and strategic cooperation.
Now that the intifada has concretely proved that the
Palestinians are quite serious about building a truly indepen-
dent state, and are already laying its foundation, one wonders
how this reality fits with models such as Heller’s. In the in-
troduction to his book, he writes that the weakening of the
PLO by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 makes his
ideas even more feasible than when they were written. What
now, if the PLO is strong?
ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS
Israeli Security Planning in the 1980s: Its Politics and
Economics (Zvi Lanir, editor, 1984) is also from the Center for
Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University; the contributors are
from this center’s permanent staff headed by Aharon Yariv,
former head of military intelligence. By its own definition, the
center concerns itself with: «The concept of strategy... in its
broadest meaning, namely, the process involved in the iden-
tification, mobilization and application of resources in peace
and war to strengthen and solidify the national security of the
state of Israel.» This book includes a historical review of many
factors related to defense and security policy, but the focus of
many of the contributors in on the crisis of the Israeli
economy. Lanir introduces the study as follows: «Most experts
agree now that Israel has reached a critical stage where it must
reassess the challenge to its security and even its defense doc-
trines as the result of the weight of economic constraints.»
Writing about the regional arms race, Aryeh Shalev points
out that Israel’s ability to enlarge its armed forces in the future
will be limited because it has already reached its capacity to
allocate funds to defense; on the other hand, the technological
arms race can only push defense costs up. In the period since-
this study, Israel failed to fundamentally resolve its economic
problems, although a number of the symptoms have been in-
hibited. Thus, this issue is important in measuring the effects
of the intifada, if only in terms of the added defense outlays
required in the attempt to suppress it.
Reviewing this study in the Journal of Palestine Studies 56,
Summer 1985, Uri Davis writes how one is struck by the
authors’ awareness of the possibility of the state’s collapse,
noting: «The fact that the state of Israel controls the most
powerful military machine in the Middle East does not in itself
20
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redress its fragility.» Yariv himself writes: «Any Israeli defeat
in armed conflict spells out - and will continue to do so in the
foreseeable future - the end of its sovereignty.»
WITHDRAWAL FOR SURVIVAL
Harkabi adopts an even more comprehensive approach: «In
most countries the national debate centers on what policy will
yield the best results, whereas in Israel the debate is existential:
what policy is less perilous to the country’s existence? Mr.
Begin repeatedly said that if Israel withdraws it will find itself
in ‘mortal danger’» (Israel’s Fateful Decisions, p. 50). Harkabi
contends the opposite: «Withdrawal will leave a state that will
have to defend itself and live in difficult conditions. Annexa-
tion will lead to safer borders, but it is doubtful whether the
state will survive to defend them.» He bases his contention on
three main criteria:
1. Demographic: «Israel must withdraw from the West Bank
not because of any obligation to Jordan or the Palestinians but
in order to prevent a demographic disaster that would put an
end to Israel as a Jewish state. Furthermore, it is the only way
to put an end to the conflict» (op. cit., p. 119). Based on
estimates that if prevailing trends persist, Palestinian Arabs
will constitute 45-50% of the population of ‘Greater Israel’ by
2000 or soon afterwards, Harkabi warns that this is com-
parable to the PLO dream of a democratic Palestinian state,
and a strategic problem much greater than the geographical
problem that would accompany Israeli withdrawal from the
West Bank. Concerning the other side of the demographic
balance - Jewish immigration - Harkabi sees no reason for op-
timism. He terms the settlement movement a success only in
physical terms, but a failure in human terms, since immigra-
tion is dwindling. He refutes the belief that annexation will
awaken a fresh wave of immigrants, saying: «Jews may be at-
tracted to a Jewish state, but not to a country with a mixed and
unsettled population» (op. cit., p. 48).
2. Time is not on Israel’s side: Harkabi views the younger
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