Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 14)

غرض

عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 14)
المحتوى
important that the PLO define its priorities. Our first priority is
Palestinian unity - the unity of the masses and their adherence to
the PLO and its program. When this is the case, the other links -
Arab and international - will not be able to ignore the Palesti-
nian cause. The Palestinian link will give the PLO momentum
for entering the international scene. In fact, the achievements
realized in the first.year of the uprising were made before the
PLO Icadership began to give gratuitous concessions. Duc to
the Palestinian cohesiveness, for example, King Hussein was
forced to sever legal and administrative ties with the West Bank.
Many other gains were made such as Security Council resolu-
tions 605, 607 and 608.
So, why don’t we stop running after the mirage of the US solu-
tions? Why don't we firmly declare: No to the Shamir plan, No
to the Mubarak plan, No to Baker’s plan and No to any other
plan that doesn’t recognize our inalienable national rights? We
have the ability to resist all pressures if we preserve national
unity and are committed to the national consensus and the resol-
utions of the PLO’s leading bodies.
How has the intifada impacted on the PLO itself? The
democratic reform needed to make a qualitative
change in the PLO’s performance hasn’t occurred.
What is needed to implement these reforms?
The issue of democratic reform in the PLO has always been a
priority for the PFLP and other national and democratic forces.
Today, this takes on greater importance in view of the uprising.
Our commitment to the uprising requires the process of democ-
ratic reform. The formula should be as follows: the uprising in
Palestine and democratic reforms in the PLO’s institutions in
exile. The uprising demands that the PLO institutions be trans-
formed from their present shabby, bureaucratic state into new,
militant and mass institutions. What is keeping the Palestinian
masses in exile from being mobilized in support of the uprising -
politically, materially and militarily? It isthe present situation in
the PLO. Out of loyalty to the uprising, we are obliged to imple-
ment democratic reforms.
Theoretically, democratic reform means developing the rela-
tions among all parties in the national front, in form and con-
tent. Whenever major political developments occur, there
Should be a review aimed at resolving any contradiction or
descrepancy that may have arisen between the objective factor
of the revolution and its subjective factor, i.e., its leadership.
Our ultimate goal is to mobilize all the Palestinian masses in and
outside of Palestine; at the same time, the various Palestinian
organizations represent all classes of the people. Therefore, the
reform process should aim at rearranging the ranks and adjust-
ing the internal bylaws in a way that reflects all the changes tak-
ing place in the revolutionary process. In this way, democracy
and collective work will be consolidated and all forces will be
mobilized. Dealing with the uprising with old means and institu-
tions will not contribute to its development. The uprising has
spread to all towns, villages and camps in the occupied ter-
ritories before some of the PLO offices had woken upto the fact.
Individualism, the hegemony of the single organization,
bureaucracy and corruption are still not being seriously dealt
14
with. The PFLP, together with other organizations, has been
struggling for remedying these negative phenomena. We have
presented many proposals - most recently the paper submitted
to the Central Council mecting in Baghdad. We have not
achieved tangible results, but we will continue our struggle.
More and more forces are gradually seeing the importance of
reforms and their direct influence on our national cause. The
uprising is developing and is, at the same time, surrounded by
conspiracies. The performance of our institutions should not
remain incapable of mecting this challenge. The negative
phenomena affect the level of support given by the masses in
exile to the intifada. and the masses in exile should shoulder
their responsibility to bring about reform. Reform should
become a mass demand. The PFLP will make democratic
reform a priority in the next PNC, with anew membership. The
first priority for us will be a critical review of the PLO’s policies
since the 19th PNC was held in November 1988.
The PLO has restricted its attention almost exclu-
sively to the 1967 occupied territories. How can all of
the Palestinian people take part in the battle for free-
dom and independence?
Achieving the goals of freedom and independence requires
mobilization of all our people, everywhere, especially those in
the 1948 occupied territories, because they live closest to the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and most importantly, they live in
the Zionist entity. The Zionist enemy is most fearful of our
people in the 1948 occupied territories moving from supporting
the intifada, to participating in it. Itismecessary for our people in
the 1948 occupied territories to be directly involved in the upris-
ing, yet I do not feel it is possible for them to be fully involved at
present. I dare say the PFLP made a mistake when during the
first year of the uprising, we raised the slogan of the participa-
tion of the masses in the 1948 occupied territories in the upris-
ing. We changed this slogan into advocating more support tothe
uprising from these masses, as a step towards actual participa-
tion. When we say full participation is not possible now, we
mean that the objective and subjective conditions for this are
not yet ripe, in contrast to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Palestinians in the 1948 occupied territories are exposed
to many forms of discrimination and repression, but not to the
same degree as the masses in the 1967 occupied territories. I
want to point out some of the differences between the objective
and subjective conditions in the two areas. On the objective
level, the enemy has confiscated 50% ofthe West Bank and over
34% of the Gaza Strip, but about 30% of the land belonging to
the Palestinians residing in the 1948 occupied territorics.
Moreover, the enemy has confiscated over 80% of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip water resources. There is also avast differ-
ence in wages, educational systems and political and civil free-
doms.
The level of political organization is much higher in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. The organizations there are underground
and have adopted different means of struggle than those
adopted by legal organizations that exist under certain restric-
tions in the Zionist state.
Democratic Palestine, December 1989
هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 36
تاريخ
ديسمبر ١٩٨٩
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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