Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 23)
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- Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 23)
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munal strife whose dynamics will continue the confrontation but
in no way further the...peace process» (American-Arab Affairs,
Winter 1988-89).
Yitzhak Klein and Joel Peters of the Hebrew Univeristy out-
lined a «Strategy for Peace» in the Jerusalem Post International
Edition, January 21, 1989, noting :«The reluctance of
mainstream Israeli opinion to recognize the Palestinians them-
selves as Israel’s main adversary, and hence its main potential
interlocutor, has a logic of sorts. To recognize that the Palesti-
nians are Israel’s legitimate opposite number in the dispute
means acknowledging that they are entitled to something by vir-
tuc of their existence.»
Repercussions beyond the military
From failure to end the uprising militarily, and the resulting
demoralization and loss of stature of the army, stem all the other
questions about Israeli security, pertaining to settlements,
international relations, demography, relations to the Palesti-
nians in the Zionist state itself, economic considerations, etc..,
which we will address be!ow.
Settlements - A provocation
Our examination of settlements in the first part of this study
showed that their role in security is ambiguous; they are more
related to the drive for control of the land than to defense needs.
The uprising, and the international push for a political solution
that accompanied it, led part of the Zionist leadership to clarify
their position, as when Rabin said on Israeli radio, May 2nd,
that settlements don’t necessarily contribute to security with the
exception of those in the North, Golan Heights, Jordan Valley
and Arava, but that they do symbolize the «return to Zion.»
However, the overriding phenomenon is polarization on the
role of settlements, which parallels the controversy concerning
territorial compromise.
Those who continue to oppose any withdrawal also maintain
that settlements have a security role. Shamir and Sharon are the
most outspoken proponents of this line. In an interview printed
in the Washington Report, September 1989, Sharon said that the
following in answer to a question about self-rule for the Palesti-
nians:«...people must understand, the settlements are not an
obstacle to peace. On the contrary, the settlements are a very
important factor in our security. Once we manage to accomplish
our plan, the possibility of granting that autonomy becomes
wider». Here it is obvious that security is doublespeak for
demographic and military control that would preempt any con-
cessions to the Palestinians. On May 7th, Arens stated that the
settlers are the main obstacle to a Palestinian state.
If such statements are often rhetorical, let us look at what the
Israeli government has actually done concerning settlements, as
an indication of the importance attached to them. In the first
year of the uprising, two new settlements were established in the
West Bank, and the year ended with the Labor-Likud coalition
agreement - a compromise - to create -cight more settlements
within a year. In 1989, at least two new settlements have been
Democratic Palestine, December 1989
established, while the settler compound in AL Khalil (Hebron)
was expanded. Throughout the period, the Housing Ministry
has pushed for building new houses in existing settlements.
While this is clearly a drop compared to previous years, we can-
not attribute it solely to the impact of the uprising, for settle-
ment-building had already slowed in the mid-eighties due to
economic constraints. This summer there was extensive land
confiscation in areas of the West Bank for expanding scttle-
ments, and roads to settlements and military outposts, while the
government was reported to have a new plan for expanding set-
tlementsin Jerusalem.
Ironically, the intifada has actually spurred an attempt to
revive the settlement boom begun by Begin’s government in
1977. An article in Haaretz, September 1, 1989, was entitled: «
Despite the intifada. Also because of it.» It reported that the
number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip grew
by 10.3% in 1988; aslightly higher increase is expected this year;
and more families have applied for places in settlements than
could be accomodated. This increase is much less than in earlier
years; still it is noteworthy because of its political connotations.
As explained by one of the newsettlers:«I’m very fearful, but we
came to settle here despite the intifada. The intifada has
strengthened our feelings that we have to show the Arabs we
aren’t afraid of them.» Another family quoted in the article had
moved from Hadrea (Israel), because Palestinian Arabs had
begun moving into their neighborhood. In the West Bank, they
said, «We don’t see Arabs and don’t have social contact with
them.»
Although the uprising was from the start directed against the
occupation army, the settlers obviously sensed it as a threat
because it reasserted the Palestinian ownership of the land they
had colonized. This was seen in a dual respor :e: Settler attacks
on Palestinians began four days after the uprisiu, * meanwhile.
there was a settler exodus from the Gaza Strip, where many of
the settlements serve as weekend farms, and the residents have
houses in Israel as well. The second phenomenon contrasts shar-
ply with data from the height of the settlement drive when 90%
of applications were for places in the Strip. it being considered
relatively safe (Al Fajr, June 17, 1983).
In purely physical terms, the settlers have not been particu-
larly threatened; in the first year of the uprising, they killed at
least 16 Palestinians and wounded 107 more, whereas three
settlers were killed, one of them shot by a fellow settler sup-
posedly guarding her, in the march on Beita village in April
1988. Despite these objective realities, the impact was
immediate:«Suddenly it is dangerous to drive on the roads andit
is impossible to.sell a flat. With more time passing. the situation
becomes worse. The settlers suddenly found themselves on the
margin of the Israeli society. They are aware that the society is
no longer willing to pay for them.» wrote Dan Margalit in
Haaretz, May 12, 1988. @
To be continued in the coming issue.
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