Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 27)
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- Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 27)
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HII
intifada’s continuation. We also stress
the dialectical relationship between the
unity of these forces and the PLO’s
unity. Consequently, we call for a real
discussion of the different aspects of
unity and struggle inside the PLO.
Although this unity sometimes seems
superficial and lacking a firm base, to
neglect it means pushing for division
with catastrophic effects on _ the
intifada. Nevertheless, clinging to unity
at all costs, even if some parties violate
the collective resolutions of the PNC,
becomes a hindrance for the true
nationalists, preventing them from
playing their role, alongside the mas-
ses, defending the slogans of freedom
and independence.
These are issues to be seriously
addressed. In this context, we give
great importance to the PFLP’s politi-
cal position and militant practice. We
consider this position one of the main
factors in determining our own posi-
tion.
2. On the Arab level
The intifada’s entering its third year
raises many serious questions on the
Arab level, although they are not new
to us. They are the result of a bad situ-
ation to which we Lebanese com-
munists pointed frankly and clearly.
The tragic shortcomings are not limited
to the disgraceful state of the Arab
world watching the intifada for two
years, while the Palestinians were
fighting alone - with the exception of
the Lebanese National Resistance
against the Israeli occupation, and
Syria’s role as the sole. Arab state con-
fronting Israel and Zionism. Even
worse than just watching were mali-
cious endeavors by some Arab regimes
to pressure the PLO leadership to give
more concessions, in order to contain
and abort the intifada, and con-
sequently destroy the PLO’s credibil-
ity. These endeavors aimed to cancel
the PLO’s role and turn the Palestinian
representation over to Jordan once
again, or to Jordan and Egypt jointly,
with a weak collaborationist interior
leadership, mandated by the PLO in
the initial stage, only to be put aside
later. To make a long story short, we
Democratic Palestine, February 1990
can conclude four main lines regarding
the tasks of supporting the intifada on
the Arab level:
1. Confronting the Arab reactionary
maneuvers, especially the Egyptian
regime’s 10-point plan which is but a
mechanism for implementing Shamir’s
plan. Foiling this and other similar
projects - which will increase whenever
the intifada develops and the situation
becomes more awkward for Zionism,
imperialism and Arab reaction. This
should be the major task of all the
forces of the Arab national liberation
movement, and not of the Palestinian
people and uprising alone.
2. Pressuring the Arab regimes to
adhere to the Arab summit resolutions
concerning the PLO’s representation
of the Palestinian people - without this
diminishing Arab obligations towards
the Palestinian cause, and the political,
moral and financial support that should
be given to the intifada.
3. Working to create an Arab popu-
lar and official progressive center,
grouping the regimes, forces and par-
ties which adhere to the slogans of the
intifada and have interests in its suc-
cess. We call for reviving the Stead-
fastness and Confrontation Front on a
new basis, including the Arab popular
movements and main progressive par-
ties in addition to the regimes. We also
give utmost importance in this domain
to the Palestinian - Syrian - Lebanese
nationalist alliance, which requires first
of all, improving relations between the
PLO and Syria, the latter being the
major base of the Palestinian struggle
and the major force confronting Israel
and Zionism. Thus we join our voice
to the conscious voices in the PLO,
who call for an end to viewing rela-
tions with Syria from a perspective of
tactical maneuvering, because these
relations are a vital strategic issue and
could have a tremendous effect on the
intifada. This is the only condition for
restoring the militant Palestinian-
Syrian-Lebanese nationalist alliance. It
might constitute the impetus capable of
surmounting the obstacle of the US-
backed, Israeli rejection of the
intifada’s demands and the Palestinian
people’s rights. Moreover, the Palesti-
nian - Syrian - Lebanese nationalist
relationship constitutes the cornerstone
for the unity of all sincere Arab
nationalist forces, and for more effec-
tive Arab support, wherein the stand
of Libya, Algeria, Democratic Yemen
and North Yemen play a pioneering
role, in addition to the popular move-
ments and parties.
4. The intifada has revealed the
depths of the crisis of the Arab
national liberation movement on two
levels. First is the responsibility for the
crisis of the movement’s current class
leadership. The second is the crisis of
the supposed revolutionary alternative
to the presiding leadership. We must
review the position towards. the
intifada in terms of the size of support,
and the influence it has internally in
each country as an element for crystal-
lizing the conditions for revolutionary
change. Then we must plan how to
develop this position on the intifada.
The position towards the intifada not
only reveals the state of mass apathy,
but specifically the state of disarray in
the leadership of the Arab national lib-
eration movement and the popular
movement. The situation on the mass
level appears as bad as the official situ-
ation, and the situation of the
revolutionary leadership is not better.
To avoid a theoretical argument about
whether or not s:-:. a leadership
exists, we hasten to clarify tuat we sim-
ply mean the various national and pan-
Arab leaderships of the forces com-
mitted to the tasks of national and
pan-Arab liberation, and the general
upshot of relations between these
leaderships. Our deep awareness of the
crisis does not encourage us to call for
solidarity with the intifada organized
by these forces, for although such sol-
idarity is needed, it will not achieve
the required minimum in the current
conditions.
Our thinking is directed mainly
towards the role of the intifada in sol-
ving the Arab national liberation
movement’s crisis. The intifada’s role
in deepening this crisis could be the
first step towards solving it. Yet great
efforts are needed on the two levels.
First is the reality of the intifada itself >
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