Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 28)
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- Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 28)
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and the state of the struggle in each
country. The second must be the out-
come of serious political and ideologi-
cal debate aiming to define the princi-
ples of a new Arab _ revolutionary
movement: the revolutionary theory
on which it should be based, methods
of struggle, the forces making up the
movement and the _ organizational
frameworks for coordinating internal
relations. These are not the immediate
goals of the seminar on supporting the
intifada, but the discussions will high-
light them.
On the Lebanese level
The praise we hear about the role of
the Lebanese national and progressive
forces does not make us feel satisfied.
On the contrary, it reinforces our crit-
ical outlook, aiming to discover and
redress deficiencies. The Lebanese
arena played a role in inspiring the
intifada, and developing the Lebanese
national resistance is the greatest con-
tribution to supporting the intifada.
The struggle for a national democratic
solution in Lebanon entails the with-
drawal of the Israeli occupation troops,
confirming Lebanon’s Arab identity,
restoring national unity, foiling the
divisive Zionist project, and having
really democratic political reforms,
based on total negation of political sec-
tarianism, and establishing the state’s
executive, administrative, legislative
and military institutions on democratic
foundations.
The struggle for such a solution con-
tributes to the Palestinian intifada.
Nevertheless, all the above is not
enough to make us stop thinking of
how to restore the broader and unique
role played by the Lebanese arena in the
seventies. This role was restored after
the Israeli occupation, with the mise of
the Lebanese National Liberation
Front and the battles to liberate the
mountains and the southern districts of
Beirut and the other militants acts that
led to victories against Israel, the
Marines, the multinational forces and
the sectarian regime of Lebanon. It is
now very urgent to revive this role
whether the Arab solution agreed at
Taef succeeds or not. Restoring the
26
state of revival entails, first of all,
restructuring the relations among the
Lebanese nationalist forces on the
basis on commitment to the national
democratic, non-sectarian program.
The other requirement is establishing
the Palestinian-Lebanese nationalist
relationship on foundations of true sol-
idarity. Stress should be placed on the
role of the Lebanese nationalist forces
and masses in supporting the intifada,
protecting the camps and maintaining
the Palestinian revolution’s armed pre-
sence - to be used in fighting for liber-
ation.
In turn, the Palestinians must sup-
port the Lebanese nationalist forces’
national program and struggle against
Israel and the internal reactionary
forces. Yet the decisive factor in this
revival lies, as we noted before, in
restoring the Syrian - Palestinian -
Lebanese alliance.
3. On the international level
When seeking stronger international
support for the intifada, we must first
of all make use of the general senti-
ment of sympathizing with the intifada
and consequently with the Palestinians’
legitimate national rights. There is now
an unprecedented international con-
sensus on supporting the intifada,
which equals, or even surpasses the
consensus on supporting the Viet-
namese revolution in its final stages.
But this sympathy is being exploited by
some imperialist, Zionist and Arab
reactionary circles, who portray it as a
result of the PLO’s concessions, and
not the result of the steadfastness of
the Palestinian people and revolution.
This portrayal aims to elicit more con-
cessions, and we must be alert to these
dangers. International support is
necessary to reinforce the intifada, not
to replace it. If the revolution lays
down its arms and the intifada is sup-
pressed, world support would be
reduced to pity, and pity does not
retrieve rights or restore a usurped
homeland.
The second important matter is how
to turn this world sympathy and sol-
idarity into pressure on the Israeli
occupation and its US protector. It is
no secret that Israel is the only obsta-
cle to solving the Middle East crisis,
and the US is shielding its obstinate
position. Developing the international
support campaign would reinforce the
position of the Palestinian side in talks
with the US, and increase the latter’s
isolation, helping to show that the pos-
ition of the US administration is not
only contrary to the world consensus,
but also to US interests, especially
those of the American people.
Moreover, great efforts should be
exerted to influence American public
opinion in favour of the Palestinians.
The role of American public opinion
was very important in the Vietnamese
struggle, and the Palestinian cause is as
much an American domestic concern
in view of the strategic US-Israeli
alliance and the interlinked interests
between Zionism and US monopolies.
Here we must not forget the impor -
tance of acquiring more support from
Western Europe, because its position
influences American public opinion
and eventually the US position.
All this should not lead to any con-
fusion. In such a long, fierce war, the
revolution must have clear priorities.
In our view, top priority should be
assigned to consolidating the strategic
alliance with the non-aligned countnies,
other liberation movements and
revolutionary parties, and the socialist
countries, especially the Soviet Union.
Such strategic alliance is the main
guarantee of long-term active support
to the intifada. The leadership of the
intifada and the PLO should give this
matter the importance it deserves.
Current develpments in international
relations and the tasks imposed on the
great powers and their agenda of vital
issues, in addition to the difficulties
facing the socialist countries - all these
factors reinforce the importance of
consolidating alliance with the Soviet
Union and socialist countries. This
demands exceptional efforts, and a
firm position, as well as knowing how
to gain the suitable support, in order
to withstand pressure and confront
those who try to find easy solutions to
the regional conflicts, no matter what
the price. e@
Democratic Palestine, February 1990 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 37
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